Boston University School of Law

Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law
Faculty Scholarship
2002

Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About Religion,
Civic Education, and the Constitution
Jay D. Wexler
Boston University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Education Law Commons, and the Religion Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jay D. Wexler, Preparing for the Clothed Public Square: Teaching About Religion, Civic Education, and the
Constitution , in 43 William and Mary Law Review 1159 (2002).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.bu.edu/faculty_scholarship/1628

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
Scholarly Commons at Boston University School of Law.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship
by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at
Boston University School of Law. For more information,
please contact lawlessa@bu.edu.

PREPARING FOR THE CLOTHED PUBLIC SQUARE:
TEACHING ABOUT RELIGION, CIVIC EDUCATION, AND
THE CONSTITUTION
JAY D. WEXLER*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. TEACHING ABOUT RELIGION: A BRIEF HISTORY ..........

A. The Post-Schempp Years .........................
B. Efforts in the Eighties ...........................
C. CurrentDevelopments .........................

1172

1172Z
1181
1186

II. TEACHING ABOUT RELIGION AS Civic EDUCATION .......

1191

A. The Theory of Civic Education ....................
B. TeachingAbout Religion as Civic Education .........
1. IntellectualReasoning Skills ....................
2. Knowledge of ReligiousHistory ..................
3. Informed Evaluationof Government Laws and
Other Action Affecting Religion ..................
4. Understandingthe Role of Religion in
PublicDebate and Decision Making ..............
5. Tolerance ....................................
6. Two Counterarguments ........................
a. The Argument From PoliticalLiberalism ........
b. The Argument From Civic Republicanism .......
ABOUT RELIGION AND CiviC EDUCATION:
TEACHING
III.
WHAT TO TEACH AND How ........................
A. Introductory Thoughts ...........................
B. Which Religions? .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1191.
12001200
1202
1203.
1214
1219
1220
1220
1229
1231
1231
1237

* Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. The author thanks Tricia Bellia,
Neal Devins, John Dufiy, Tom Grey, Sean Hecker, Gia Lee, Trevor Morrison, Steven Shiffrin,
and participants in workshops at Boston University, Cornell, and William and Mary Law
Schools for their extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article. The author
also thanks Erin O'Callaghan and the editors of the William and Mary Law Review for their
excellent work editing and preparing this Article for publication.

1159

1160

WILLIAM AND MARYLAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1159

IV. TEACHING ABOUT RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION ....

1243

A. IntentionalInculcation ..........................
B. UnintentionalInculcation ........................
C. Coercion ......................................
D. Endorsement Through Selection of

1244
1248
1250

What Traditionsto Teach .........................

1252

E. Endorsement Through Selective Presentationof a
Shared Text or Tradition with Multiple Schools ......
F. Disapproval....................................
G. IncidentalBurden on Religious Believers ...........
CONCLUSION ........................................

1255
1256
1258
1262

2002]

PREPARING FOR THE CLOTHED PUBLIC SQUARE

1161

Although law and religion scholars have long argued about
whether American culture marginalizes religious belief,' many
important indicators suggest that religion indeed plays a prominent
role in contemporary American life.2 America is an extremely
religious nation. Polls consistently show that about ninety percent
of Americans continue to believe in God,3 and both church
attendance and membership remain at high levels. This religiosity,
moreover, spills out into the public square. A great many Americans
rely on religious reasons when thinking and talking about public
issues.5 Ninety percent of the members of Congress, by one report,
1. Compare,e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 6 (1993) (arguing that

the "common rhetoric" of our society"refuses to accept the notion that rational, public-spirited
people can take religion seriously"), and Randy Lee, When a King Speaks of God; When God
Speaks to a King: Faith, Politics, Tax Exempt Status, and the Constitution in the Clinton
Administration, 63 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROBs. 392, 392-93 (2000) (arguing that religion is
marginalized), and Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L.
REV. 115, 127 (1992) (noting that religion in America has been "shoved to the margins of
public life"), with William P. Marshall, The Culture of Belief and the Politics of Religion, 63
LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 453, 454 (2000) (arguing that the "purported marginalization is
more a matter of perception than reality"), and Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal
Democracy, 59 U. Cml. L. REV. 195,195-96 (1992) (noting that there are "numerous indicators
of religion's lively role in contemporary American social and political life"). See alsoFrederick
Mark Gedicks, Public Life and Hostility To Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 671-73 & nn.1-9
(1992) (describing the debate and citing sources).
2. Because it is not directly relevant to the arguments I advance here, I do not undertake
any analysis of the meaning of"religion." I do find Kent Greenawalt's working definition to
be useful and relevant for my purposes: "[Rleligious bases for decision are connected to
theistic belief or other belief about a realm of ultimate value beyond, or deeper than, ordinary
human experience, or to forms of life or institutions understood to be religious .... " KENT
GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 39 (1995).
3. BARRY A. KOsbIN & SEYMOUR P. LAcHMAN, ONE NATION UNDER GOD: RELIGION IN
CONTEMPORARY AIERICAN SOCIETY 9 (1993) (noting that fifty-eight percent of Americans

believe that religion is "very important" and that ninety-four percent believe in God or a
universal spirit); WARREN A. NORD, RELIGION & AMERICAN EDUCATION: RETHINKING A

NATIONAL DILEMMA 2 (1995) ("Polls consistently show that nine out of ten Americans believe
in the existence of God."); WARREN A. NORD & CHARLES C. HAYNES, TAKING RELIGION
SERIOUSLYACROSS THE CURRICULUM 1 (1998) ("The United States is a religious nation. About
90 percent of Americans claim to believe in God, and almost 80 percent say that religion is an
important part of their lives. Seventy percent of Americans pray and 40 percent attend
religious services and read the Bible each week.").
4. See Marshall, supranote 1, at 459 (noting that in 1995, church membership stood at
sixty-nine percent, and that church attendance stood at forty-three percent).
5. See, e.g., KENTGREENAWALT, RELIGIOUSCONVICTIONSANDPOLITICALCHOICE30 (1988)
(noting that it is "self-evident to most seriously religious persons" that "[r]eligious convictions
of the sort familiar in this society bear pervasively on people's ethical choices, includihg
choices about laws and government policies"); see also STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME IN
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consult their religious beliefs when voting on legislation.6 Amajority
of Americans believe that religious organizations should publicly
express their views on political issues,7 and an even stronger
majority believe it is important for a President to have strong
religious beliefs. 8 It came as little surprise, then, when all of the
major presidential candidates invoked their religious faith in public
speeches during the 2000 campaign.9
Americans also strongly believe that religion should play an
important role in solving society's problems. Over seventy percent
of Americans believe that religious organizations--"clearly the
major forces mobilizing volunteers in America,"' ° according to one
prominent scholar-help solve these problems." Believing this
himself, President George W. Bush, within days of taking office,
issued an executive order establishing the White House Office of
Faith-Based and Community Initiatives to expand opportunities for
faith-based organizations.' 2 Much public debate in the months
VAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION IN POLITICS 4-7 (2000).
6. CARTER, supra note 1, at 111; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 153-55 (citing

statistics).
7. See The PEW Research Center for the People and the Press, Religionand Politics:The
Ambivalent Majority,at http'l/www.people-press.org/dataarchive (last visited Feb. 12, 2002)
[hereinafter PEW Research Center] (noting that fifty-one percent of Americans believe that
churches should express their views on social and political matters). Moreover, as Diana Eck
has recently pointed out, the American public square is now populated with a greater variety
of religious traditions than ever before, each with its own unique way of participating in that
public square. DIANA L. Ecm, A NEW RELIGIOUS AMERICA: HOW A"CHRISTIAN COuNTRY" HAS
Now BECOME THE WORLD's MOST RELIGIOUSLY DrvERsE NATION 67-75 (2001).

8. See PEW Research Center, supra note 7 (reporting that seventy percent of Americans
believe that it is important for a President to be a person of faith).
9. E.g., E.J. Dionne, Jr., Religion and Politics,WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1999, atA23 (noting
that Gary Bauer and Orrin Hatch named Jesus as the political philosopher with whom they
most identified); Hanna Rosin, BalancingJewish Law, PublicLife, WASH. POST, Aug. 8,2000,
at A12 (noting that Joseph Lieberman "drop[s] Talmudic references in speeches" and speaks
"freely about his religion on prime-time television"); Faith-BasedCampaigning,WASH. POST,
Aug. 10, 2000, at A28 (editorial) (describing George W. Bush's statement that "Jesus was his
favorite philosopher," and Al Gore's practice of "asking himself what Jesus would do" before
making every decision).
10. E.J. Dionne, Jr. & John J. DiIulio, Jr., What's God Got To Do With the American
Experiment?,BROOIUNGS REV. 4, 6 (1999) (reporting comments of Father Andrew Greeley).
11. PEW Research Center, supranote 7 (observing that seventy-two percent of Americans
believe churches, synagogues, and other religious organizations "help solve important social
problems").
12. Exec. Order No. 13199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (Jan. 29, 2001) ("Establishment of White
House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives"); see also Exec. Order No. 13198, 66
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following this order focused on the desirability of extending
charitable-choice legislation to allow more religious service
providers to share in public funds."3 Religion may or may not have
played an equally important role in American public life seventeen
years ago when Richard Neuhaus first decried the "Naked Public
Square,"14 but today at least the public square is substantially
clothed with religion.'
At the same time, in a series of recent decisions, the United
States Supreme Court has significantly limited the judicial role in
reviewing government action affecting religion. In Employment
Division,Departmentof Human Resources v. Smith,"5 for example,
the Court reversed decades of precedent by holding that laws and
regulations incidentally burdening religious belief and practice
generally would be reviewed under an extremely lenient standard
when challenged on Free Exercise Clause grounds. 7 Moreover, in a
Fed. Reg. 8497 (Jan. 29,2001) (setting out agency responsibilities with respect to faith-based
initiatives).
13. See, eg., Nathan J. Diament, A Faith-BasedRorschach Test, WASH. POST, Mar. 20,
2001, at A29 (noting variety of fears about the plan); E.J. Dionne, Jr., Dilulio'sFaith-Based
Challenge,WASH. POST, Marf 30,2001, at A29 (noting that Bush's plan to offer government
aid to social programs run by religious groups "has unleashed intense argument and soulsearching"); Laurie Goodstein, A Clerical,and Racial, Gap Over FederalHelp, N.Y. TIMEs,
Mar. 24, 2001, at Al (discussing disagreement over Bush's plan); Steven Waldman, Doubts
Among the Faithful,N.Y. TnmS, Mar. 7, 2001, at A19 (discussing conservative opposition to
the plan). Another recent example demonstrating the important role played by religion in
public life is President Bush's consultation of religious authorities when determiningwhether
federal funds may be spent on stem cell research. See Bill Broadway, Faith is a Force on Both
Sides of Stem Cell Debate, WASH. POST, Aug. 4,2001 at B09.
14. RicHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIc SQuARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRAcY IN
AMiERICA vii (1984) ("The naked public square is the result of politically grounded values from
the conduct of public business. The doctrine is that America is a secular society. It finds
dogmatic expression in the ideology of secularism. I will argue that the doctrine is
demonstrably false and the dog~ha exceedingly dangerous.").
15. See Marci A. Hamilton, Power,the Establishment Clause,and Vouchers, 31 CONN. L.
REV. 807, 814 (1999) ("The problem with the marginalization thesis is that it conflicts with
sociological data and political facts."). I first came across the phrase "clothed public square"
in CARTER, supra note 1, at 211.
16. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
17. Id. at 883-91. It should be noted, however, that at least as a practical matter, if not
a theoretical one, the Supreme Court did not, even prior to Smith, generally interpret the Free
Exercise Clause as imposing a substantial limitation on the State. See, e.g., O'Lone v.
Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (rejecting challenge to prison regulations allegedly infringing
upon inmates' religious rights); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (rejecting
challenge to Air Force regulation that prohibited a serviceman, who was an orthodox Jew,
from wearing a yarmulke).
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series of recent Establishment Clause cases, the Court has
overruled prior decisions by holding that public institutions can lend
computers and other instructional equipment to religious schools'
and that public school teachers may provide remedial instruction
to students on the premises of religious schools. 9 The Court also
has upheld a variety of other laws providing aid to religious
organizations, ° as well as laws specifically accommodating religious
belief and practice.2 ' By limiting the judicial role in these ways, the
Court has provided the State with broad latitude to enact legislation
affecting religion and therefore has left the primary responsibility
for evaluating the desirability of such laws to elected officials and
the citizens who elect them.
Both of these states of affairs-the prominence of religion in
American public life and the responsibility placed on citizens to
evaluate government action affecting religion-strongly suggest
that to participate most effectively in public life, citizens must
know something about religion. Despite this need, the public
institutions that are primarily responsible for preparing citizens for
public life in America-the public schools-have not taught students
very much about religion. The typical high school curriculum, as
interest groups from both sides of the political spectrum agree, has
"all but ignore[d] religion." 2 Most public schools do not offer classes
about religion.23 Teachers have not been trained to teach about
18. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (overruling Meek v. Pittenger,421 U.S. 349
(1975), and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977)).
19. Agostiniv. Felton, 521 U.S. 203,209 (1997) (overrulingAguilarv.Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985)).
20. E.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(upholding the payment of public funds to outside contractor for printing costs of publication
of religious student group); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
(upholding payment of public money to deaf student to pay for interpreter to help him in
Catholic high school).
21. See infra text accompanying notes 213-16.
22. NORD & HAYNES, supra note 3, at 2; See also George W. Dent, Jr., Religious Children,
SecularSchools, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 863,868-71 (1988) (noting that fundamentalist Christians
as well as the People for the American Way believe that "public education has slighted
religion").
23. See NORD, supra note 3, at 212 (citing Department of Education study from 1980s
indicating that only 640 of 15,000 public high schools offered courses in religion, and that only
two-tenths of one percent of all students were enrolled); see also Marjorie Coeyman, Talking
Religion in the Classroom:SupportersArgue It's Key to UnderstandingEverything,CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONrIOR, Dec. 14, 1999, at 15 ("[Mlost educators in public schools tread gingerly around
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religion.24 And although there is some indication things are
beginning to change slightly,2 5 textbooks in all core subjects,
including history, for the most part have treated religious topics in
a perfunctory or superficial manner or have ignored them
altogether.26 As a result, students have often graduated from high
the topic of religion-or avoid it altogether."); Gilbert T. Sewall, Religion Comes to School, PHI
DELTA KAPPAN, Sept. 1, 1999, at 10 ("In social studies and civics, the overwhelming thematic
foundation in the curriculum is caution about a 'wall ofseparation' between church and state.
... [T]he secular establishment that administers the nation's 16,000 school districts finds it
difficult to conduct any school-based discussion of religion's place ... in human life .... ");
Christine Wicker, Teaching, Not Proselytizing: Oxford Series Aims to Give Students a
Scholarly Look at Religion, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 16, 1999, at IG ("[I]n the past 20
years, teachers and textbook writers have become timid about discussing faith in public
schools.").
24. NORD &HAYNES, supranote 3, at 91 ("For the teacher, the challenge of achieving even
minimal fairness in the treatment of religion when teaching world and U.S. history is
daunting to say the least. Few teachers have much background in religious studies."); George
R. La Noue, The ConditionsofPublicSchool Neutrality,in RELIGION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION
22, 30 (Theodore R. Sizer ed., 1967) ("Assuming it were possible to design a satisfactory
comparative religion course, the enormous shortage of qualified teachers in this field remains
a serious problem."); Jim Castelli, Schools Take up Religion as an Academic Study, USA
TODAY, Nov. 6, 1990, at 4D ("[Tihe lack of training for teachers to teach about religion is a
major problem....").
25. NORD, supranote 3, at 159 ("There have been incremental improvements in the latest
editions of at least a few social studies and history textbooks .... "); NORD & HAYNES, supra
note 3, at 78 ("The news is not all bad. According to the American Textbook Council, there has
been some improvement in the treatment of religion in the new generation of history texts.")
(citation omitted); Gilbert T. Sewall, Religion and the Textbooks, in CURRICULUM, RELIGION,
AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: CONVERSATIONS FOR AN ENLARGING PUBLIC SQUARE 73, 80 (James

T. Sears & James C. Carper eds., 1995) ("Mhe most widely used U.S. and world history
textbooks cover major religious events and movements-including non-Western
religions-more thoroughly than they did as little as 10 years ago.").
26. ASSOCIATION FOR SUPERVISION AND CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT, RELIGION IN THE

CURRICULUM 7 (1987) ("Nor is it only texts in American history that are affected. The critical
influence of religion on world history and culture is similarly slighted in texts on political
science, sociology, literature, and world history."); NORD & HAYNES, supra note 3, at 78-79
("Despite this progress, textbooks are still woefully inadequate in their treatment of religion.
World history texts do provide brief accounts of the basic teachings and practices of the major
religions as they appear in history, but, in our view, the texts do not give enough space to the
topics to enable students to make sense of these traditions."); PAUL VrTz, CENSORSHIP:
EVIDENCE OF BIAS IN OUR CHILDREN'S TEXTBOOKS 56-57 (1986) (pointing out that textbooks

make little mention of religion in American history in the last seventy-five to one hundred
years); Dent, supra note 22, at 870 ("Textbooks ignore the role of religion in history .... ");
Warren A. Nord, Religion, The FirstAmendment,and PublicEducation,8 BYUJ. PUB. L. 439,
440-41 (1994) (concluding that textbooks "essentially ignore religion"); Sewall, supranote 25,
at 81 ("Textbooks seldom explain religion's role in shaping human thought and action or as
a motivating agent of culture, politics, and ethics.").
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school without learning anything more about the breadth of the
American religious experience than what they have learned about
their own religion in their own home or place of worship.
In recent years, however, this situation has begun to change.
Committed and sophisticated reformers," seizing on strong dicta
from the Supreme Court supporting the need to teach students
about religion, have spearheaded a movement to convince schools to
teach about religion. These advocates have made remarkable
progress in persuading school administrators, school boards, and
communities that public schools can teach objectively 9 about
religion without running afoul of the First Amendment and without
causing paralyzing controversy among concerned parents and
lawmakers."0 They have developed educational materials, trained
27. Cf ECK, supranote 7, at 70 ("Americans, on the whole, have a high degree of religious
identification... and yet a very low level of religious literacy.").
28. These reformers include Warren A. Nord of the University of North Carolina, Charles
C. Haynes of the Freedom Forum's First Amendment Center, and Oliver Thomas, previously
general counsel to the Baptist Joint Committee for Public Affairs.
29. Of course, the meaning of objectivity, and particularly the idea that actual objectivity
is achievable, is highly controversial. For discussions of the concept of objectivity in the legal
literature, see KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJEcTrVTY (1992); Jules L. Coleman & Brian
Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 549 (1993); Heidi Li
Feldman, Objectivity in Legal Judgment,92 MICH. L. REV. 1187 (1994); Jeanne L. Schroeder,
Subject: Object, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1 (1992). Despite the problematic nature of the concept,
I do not doubt that, as the Court has suggested, there is a useful and workable distinction
between the objective presentation of religious phenomena and a presentation of the same
phenomena in a nonobjective manner (such as one attempting to convince the listener of the
correctness of a certain religious viewpoint). This is the distinction that has animated the
academic study of religion, and the impossibility of achieving complete objectivity has never
made the enterprise impossible or pointless. As historian of religion Wendy Doniger
OFlaherty explains:
[S]cholars of religion have made the most self-conscious effort to be more
objective than the chemists .... This is all well and good; if one is going to teach
a highly charged subject like religion, one must be more aware, not less aware,
of the impossible goal of pure objectivity. It behooves us, even more, perhaps,
than it behooves anthropologists or classicists, to play by the rules of the game
of scholarship .... Clifford Geertz has stated the problem well: "I have never
been impressed by the argument that, as complete objectivity is impossible in
these matters (as, of course, it is), one might as well let one's sentiments run
loose. As Robert Solow has remarked, that is like saying that as a perfectly
aseptic environment is impossible, one might as well conduct surgery in a
sewer."
WENDY DONIGER O'FLAHERTY, OTHER PEOPLES' MyI-s: THE CAvE OF ECHOES 21-22 (1988)
(quoting CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTUREs 30 (1973)).
30. See infra text accompanying notes 114-25; see also Castelli, supranote 24, at 4D ("But
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teachers, and articulated guidelines to help teachers and administrators implement such programs." They have written books and
articles to persuade policymakers that teaching about religion is a
necessary part of a strong education.32 Finally, they have convinced
diverse interest groups and associations that schools should teach
about religion. For example, a 1995 statement of principles stating
that "[s]chools demonstrate fairness when they ensure that the
curriculum includes study aboutreligion, where appropriate, as an
important part of a complete education," was endorsed by such
diverse groups as the Christian Coalition, the National Association
of Elementary School Principals, the National Association of
Evangelicals, the Anti-Defamation League, and the People for the
American Way.3"
all of that is changing. Educators say there's still a long way to go, but schools all across the
country are putting information about religion-not religious devotion-back into the public
schools.").
31. See infra text accompanying notes 109-36.
32. See, e.g., FINDING COMMON GROUND: A FIRST AMENDMENT GUIDE TO RELIGION AND
PUBLIC EDUCATION (Charles C. Haynes & Oliver Thomas eds., 1998); NORD &HAYNES, supra
note 3, at 43 (noting that without learning about religion, "[situdents will not be liberally
educated, they will not be able to make reflective and critical judgments about anything that
is religiously contested"); id. at 57 ("If students are to be liberally educated, they must learn
a good deal about religion .... "); NORD, supra note 3, at 8 ("I will argue that all students
should receive a liberal education that takes seriously a variety of ways of making sense of
the world, religious ways included, if they are to be informed, reasonable, and responsible
individuals."); Charles C. Haynes, Averting Culture Wars Over Religion, EDUC. LEADERSHIP
(Dec. 1998/Jan. 1999) ("The key, of course, is to neither inculcate nor inhibit religion, but
rather to teach about religion objectively."), availableat http//www.ascd.orgreadingrooml
edlead/9812I hayes.html; see also Philip C. Kissam, Let's Bring Religion into the Public
Schools andRespect the ReligionClauses, 49 U. KAN. L. REV. 593 (2001) (urging Kansas public
schools to introduce the study of religious subjects).
33. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, PUBLIC EDUCATION, AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY:
A STATIEMENT OF PRINCIPLES, reprintedin FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 32, at 2*2;
see also PRESIDENT'S GUIDELINES ON RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS, reprintedin

FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 32, at 13*7 (noting that public schools "may teach
about religion, including the Bible or other scripture; the history of religion, comparative
religion, the Bible (or other scripture)-as-literature, and the role of religion in the history of
the United States and other countries"). For more on the federal government's approach to
religion in the public schools, see its website at http:I/www.ed.govfnits/religionandschools
(last modified Jan. 30, 2001). The movement's leaders have announced that there is now a
"New Consensus" in favor of teaching about religion in public schools. E.g., NORD & HAYNES,
supra note 3, at 9. The authors explain:
Given the heated nature of our culture wars, it may come as something of a
surprise to many that over the last decade a fairly broad consensus about the
role of religion in public schools has developed at the national level among the
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Despite this recent success, several important questions
remain regarding teaching about religion in public schools. For one
thing, the movement could benefit from greater theoretical focus.
As the reformers themselves recognize, the "basic principles" of
the movement (that teaching about religion objectively is
constitutional and "tremendously important if students are to be
educated about our history and culture"34 ) are "open to varying
interpretations."3 5 One critical task for the future is prioritization.
Reformers have called for a plethora of curricular changes to inject
more religion into the classroom. These include teaching students,
among other things, religion's role in U.S. history;" religious
interpretations of history;" theological history;3 8 competing views
of the First Amendment;39 religion's role as a buffer to state
authority; ° religious views on contested policy issues;4 1 how
religion affects political choices;42 religious views on economic
leadership of many religious and educational organizations. This New
Consensus has been articulated in a number of documents ....
Id.
34. NORD & HAYNES, supra note 3, at 9.
35. Id.
36. See FINDING COmmON GROUND, supra note 32, at 8*1-8*11 (listing twenty-nine
religious influences on U.S. history and sources that discuss each); see also CHARLES C.
HAYNES, RELIGION IN AMERICAN HISTORY: WHAT TO TEACH AND How (1990) (providing
instructional strategies to incorporate religion and U.S. history).
37. See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 3, at 80 ("Without exposure to religious conceptions
of history, students will understand little about how history has been interpreted for much
of the development of Western civilization; they will learn that all of history should be
interpreted only in secular ways.").
38. See id. The authors assert:
Students can make better sense of the last two centuries of world history if they
have some understanding of such theological developments as the rise of literary
and historical biblical criticism, debates within Roman Catholicism since the
Second Vatican Council, the fundamentalist response in various traditions to
religious liberalism and modernity, and the impact of science and psychology on
religious thinking.
Id. at 90.
39. Id. at 101 ("Students need to be familiar with this ongoing controversy [between
separationist and accommodationist interpretations] over the 'separation of church and state'
and the meaning of the Establishment Clause.").
40. Id. at 103 ("[Ilt is also tremendously important that students appreciate the
widespread religious concern about nurturing an uncritical allegiance to the state.").
41. Id. at 104 ("Students must learn to look at the actions of government through the eyes
of people in various religious communities if they are to understand our politics and make
educated judgments about justice and government.").
42. Id. at 102 ("To make sense of our politics, students need to understand the religious
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questions;' religious meanings in art and literature;44 the
secularization of literature and art in modern times;4 5 religious
views on the debate over origins, the Big Bang, nature and ecology,
technology, genetic engineering, health and healing, and other
scientific issues;' the Bible as literature, in literature, as history,
in history, and as scripture;4 7 and world religions, including a
comparative study of sacred scriptures."3 But with limited resources49
and a host of other subjects vying for space in the classroom,
developers of educational materials, school boards, school
administrators, teachers, and parents must find some way to decide
which elements of religion stake the strongest claim to inclusion in
the public school curriculum.
To know what and how to teach about religion, educational
policymakers need a coherent general theory of public education to
guide their decision making. As Amy Gutmann explains:
All significant policy prescriptions presuppose a theory, a
political theory, of the proper role of government in education.
When the theory remains implicit, we cannot adequately judge
its principles or the policy prescriptions that flow from them.
worldviews that shape our culture wars and the ongoing debate over the proper role of
religion in politics.").
43. NORD, supra note 3, at 302:
What should students learn of religious ways of thinking about the economic
world? They should be taught something of the scriptural and historical roots of
contemporary religious understandings of justice and morality, rationality and
human nature, tradition and community, in the major religious traditions. They
should know something of mainline Catholic theory since Leo XIII, the Social
Gospel movement and its legacy in contemporary liberal Protestantism,
liberation theology, and conservative Christian defenses of free enterprise.
44. NORD & HAYNES, supra note 3, at 121 ("[I]f students are to be liberally educated they
must have some sense of the religious as well as the more narrowly secular ... meaning and
significance of art and literature.").
45. Id. at 131 ("Students should understand that the historical secularization of literature
and art is one of the major themes of Western cultural history.").
46. Id. at 134-61.
47. Id. at 164-71.
48. Id. at 172-77; see also FINDING COMMON GROUND, supranote 32, at 9*1-9*12 (listing
resources for teaching about world religions).
49. See, e.g., Edd Doerr, Teaching About Religion, HUMANIST, Nov. 1, 1998, at 33
("Meanwhile, there are school challenges that demand more immediate attention [than
teaching about religion]: more adequate and more equitably distributed funding, smaller
classes; more availability of preschool and early childhood education; and beefing up curricula
in history, English, foreign languages, science, world literature, and other areas.").
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The attractions of avoiding theory are... superficial. We do not
collectively know good educational policy when we see it. 0
Although there are many educational theories from which to
choose, 5 this Article argues that, in light of the need to prepare
students for legal and political life in a nation suffused with
religion, public schools should teach students about religion as part
of "civic education," which has as its purpose "the formation of
individuals who can effectively conduct their lives within, and
support, their political community."5 2 The Article contends that
schools should teach about religion so that students can make fully
informed decisions about laws and other government actions
affecting religious belief and practice and so they can understand
the myriad ways that religious beliefs affect the way that many
Americans think and talk about issues of public importance,
including law, in the clothed public square. It explains why recent
decisions of the Supreme Court regarding the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses have made this need for knowledge about
religion more acute. It further considers the argument, based on
notions of Rawlsian public reason, that knowledge of religion is
unnecessary for participation in political life because public
50. AMY GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 6 (rev. ed. 1999); see also id. at 5:

1Without a theory], we neglect educational alternatives that maybe better than
those to which we have become accustomed or that may aid us in understanding
how to improve our schools before we reach the point of crisis, when our
reactions are likely to be less reflective because we have so little time to
deliberate.
51. For example, so-called "liberal" theories of education, according to Gutmann, "aim at
developing individual autonomy." Id. at 8. "Philosophic" education, according to William
Galston, aims to "seek truth" and develop students' 'capacity to conduct rational inquiry."
William Galston, Civic Educationin the LiberalState, in LIBERALISMAND THE MORALLIFE 89
(Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989). Utilitarian theories of education seek, as Mill says, to
'render the individual, as much as possible, an instrument of happiness, first to himself, and
next to other beings." JAMES MILL ON EDUCATION 41 (W.H. Burston ed., 1969). For further
discussion of utilitarian theories of education, see Amy Gutmann, What's the Use of Going to
School? The Problem of Educationin Utilitarianismand Rights Theories, in UTILITARIANISM
AND BEYOND 261,264 (Amartya Sen &BemardWilliams eds., 1982) (summarizingBentham's
theory of education). For a relatively modem example of a utilitarian theory of education, see
R. M. Hare, Opportunityfor What? Some Remarks on Current Disputes About Equality in
Education,3 OXFORD REV. OF EDUC. 207, 211 (1977) ("[L]et us ask what I say is the main
question: What principles ofjustice as regards the provision of education will have the highest
acceptance-utility?").
52. Galston, supra note 51, at 90.
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discourse and decision making should rest on arguments accessible
to all citizens, and it explains why recent scholarship in law and
religion undermines this contention.
A second important issue raised by this teaching about religion
movement concerns the limitations placed on schools and teachers
by the Constitution. Several Supreme Court Justices have said in
dicta that schools generally may constitutionally teach about
religion, 3 but the issue is more complicated than these general
pronouncements suggest. The Constitution is by no means
irrelevant to the actual implementation of a religious studies
program.5 Indeed, the concept of teaching about religion raises a
series of important issues at the boundary between inculcation or
promotion of religious viewpoints on the one hand and objective
presentation of religious phenomena on the other hand. Because
this boundary is so thin, the case for teaching about religion in the
public schools is subject to the criticism that its benefits are not
worth the costs of constitutional litigation and violations. This
Article, therefore, considers the various constitutional limits to
which schools must adhere when implementing a program to teach
about religion, and it argues that, although these limits are
important, they by no means preclude schools from implementing
a successful teaching about religion program, as evidenced by the
many schools that have succeeded in implementing such programs.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the Supreme
Court's dicta concerning teaching about religion and outlines the
history of the teaching about religion movement incited by that
dicta. Part II introduces the theory of civic education and argues
that public schools should teach students about religion to prepare
them for citizenship because, among other things, such teaching will
equip students to evaluate laws affecting religion and to understand
discourse in a public square clothed with religion. Part III provides
some thoughts about how and what schools should teach about
53. See infra text accompanying notes 55-66.

54. In this Article I use the phrase "religious studies" to denote a class or set of classes
that teach about religion objectively. See Leslie Griffin, "We Do Not Preach, We Teach":
Religion Professorsand the FirstAmendment, 19 QUINNIPIAc L. REv. 1, 9 (2000) ("What is
religious studies? It is the name often used in the United States for the academic study of
religion, a term used to distinguish such study from the more traditional theology."). For an

argument questioning the validity of the religious studies field, see TIMOTHYF2GERALD, THE
IDEOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS STUDIEs 3 (2000).
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religion in order to achieve the civic goals outlined in the previous
Part, and it argues specifically that schools should teach students
about a broad range of religions to prepare them for legal and
political life in a pluralistic national (and global) community.
Finally, Part IV considers the constitutional issues involved in
implementing a religious studies program and argues both that the
Constitution does not preclude teaching about religion, and that the
benefits of teaching about religion outweigh any possible
constitutional costs.
I. TEACHING ABOUT RELIGION: A BRIEF HISTORY55

A. The Post-Schempp Years
Though a few voices may have been calling for schools to teach
religion objectively prior to 1963,56 observers of the period seem to
agree that it was the Abington School Districtv. Schempp5 7 decision
in that year that sparked the beginnings of the movement to teach
about religion.58 In that case, which invalidated a practice of
55. This brief background, divided into three parts primarily for convenience rather than
to indicate any fundamental difference between historical periods, is intended only to
highlight the most important developments of the last forty years. It is certainly not intended
as a formal "history" of the period.
56. E.g., CLAIRE COX, THE FOURTH R: WHAT CAN BE TAUGHT ABOUT RELIGION IN THE

PUBLIC SCHOOLS 11-12 (1969) (reprinting 1951 statement of National Education Association
in favor of teaching about religion); STEPHEN MACEDO, DIvERsrrY AND DISTRUST. Civic
EDUCATION IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 70 (2000) (noting that in the mid-nineteenth
century some proposed to "present the various versions of religious truth present in the polity
to children in an evenhanded way"); PHILIP H. PHENIX, RELIGIOUS CONCERNS IN
CONTEMPORARY EDUCATION: A STUDY OF RECIPROCAL RELATIONS 52-54 (1959) ("Instead of
teaching religion the teacher may teach about religion. By this is meant a factual, intellectual,
objective treatment of the subject of religion."); Nicholas Piediscalzi, Public Education
Religion Studies Since the Schempp Decision (1963), in FOUNDATIONS FOR CHRISTIAN
EDUCATION IN AN ERA OF CHANGE 186, 188 (Marvin J. Taylor ed., 1976) (noting that there
were several efforts underway before 1963, such as The Educational Research Council of
America's Social Science Curriculum Project and the Nebraska Curriculum Center's English
Curriculum Project, which were "seriously considering including religion studies in their
materials").
57. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (striking down a Pennsylvania law requiring reading of Bible
passages at beginning of the school day).
58. See, e.g., Arthur Gilbert, Reactions and Resources, in RELIGION AND PUBLIC
EDUCATION, supranote 24, at 37, 40; Nicholas Piediscalzi, A Survey of ProfessionalEfforts to
Establish Public Education Religion Studies, in PUBLIC EDUCATION RELIGION STUDIES: AN
OVERVIEW 3, 3 (Paul J. Will ed., 1981); Piediscalzi, supra note 56, at 188; Elliott Wright,
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teacher-led Bible reading in public school classrooms, three different
Justices nonetheless spoke strongly in favor of teaching about
religion in the public schools.59 Justice Clark, writing for the Court,
said
it might well be said one's education is not complete without a
study of comparative religion or the history of religion and its
relationship to the advancement of civilization. ... Nothing we

have said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of
religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program
of education, may not be effected consistently with the First
Amendment. 0
Likewise, in his concurring opinion in the same case, Justice
Brennan explained:
The holding of the Court today plainly does not foreclose
teaching about the Holy Scriptures or about the differences
between religious sects in classes in literature or history. Indeed,
whether or not the Bible is involved, it would be impossible to
teach meaningfully many subjects in the social sciences or the
humanities without some mention of religion. 1
Finally, Justice Goldberg's concurrence stated:
Government must inevitably take cognizance ofthe existence of
religion and, indeed, under certain circumstances the First
Amendment may require that it do so. And it seems clear to me
Religion in the Public Schools: The Issue in Cultural and HistoricalPerspective (Jan. 14,
1994), availableat http://www.ihc4u.org/wright.htm; see also NmS C.NIELSEN, JR., GOD IN
EDUCATION: A NEw OPPORTUNITY FOR AMERIcAN SCHOOLS 153-54 (1966) (quoting Schempp
and noting ilt is our thesis that specific information about religion has a legitimate place in
the public school curriculum"). For general historical accounts of the role of religion in
education in American history, see generally NO D,supra note 3, at 63-97; Stephen L. Carter,
Parents,Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years Later,27 SETON HALL L. REV.
1194 (1997).

59. For an argument that the Court, in its doctrinal analysis, has relied not on the
distinction between teaching religion and teaching about religion but instead on the type of
school at issue, see Griffin, supra note 54, at 28 ("Instead of focusing on the curriculum, in the

First Amendment religion cases set in schools, the justices have been attentive to institutional
status, examining the nature of the schools instead of the content of the courses.").
60. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 225.
61. Id. at 300 (Brennan, J., concurring).

1174

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1159

... that the Court would recognize the propriety of... teaching
about religion, as distinguished from the teaching of religion in
the public schools.62

These pronouncements both echoed and foreshadowed other
statements made by members of the Court. For example, fifteen
years earlier, Justice Jackson, writing in concurrence in McCollum
3 observed that,
v. Board of Education,"
I should suppose it is a proper, if not an indispensable, part of
preparation for a worldly life to know the roles that religion and
religions have played [in our culture].... One can hardly respect
a system of education that would leave the student wholly
ignorant of the currents of religious thought."

Twenty-four years later, Justice Powell would write in Edwards
65
v. Aguillard:
As a matter of history, schoolchildren can and should properly
be informed of all aspects of this Nation's religious heritage. I
would see no constitutional problem if schoolchildren were
taught the nature of the Founding Fathers' religious beliefs and
how these beliefs affected the attitudes of the times and the
structure of our government. Courses in comparative religion of
course are customary and constitutionally appropriate.6 6
62. Id. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
63. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
64. Id. at 236.
65. 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 606-07 (footnotes omitted) (Powell, J., concurring). The full quotation is:
As a matter of history, schoolchildren can and should properlybe informed of all
aspects of this Nation's religious heritage. I would see no constitutional problem
if schoolchildren were taught the nature of the Founding Fathers' religious
beliefs and how these beliefs affected the attitudes ofthe times and the structure
of our government. Courses in comparative religion of course are customary and
constitutionally appropriate. In fact, since religion permeates our history, a
familiarity with the nature of religious beliefs is necessary to understand many
historical as well as contemporary events. In addition, it is worth noting that the
Establishment Clause does not prohibit per se the educational use of religious
documents in public school education. Although the Court has recognized that
the Bible is "an instrument of religion," ... it also has made clear that the Bible
"may constitutionally be used in an appropriate study of history, civilization,
ethics, comparative religion, or the like." Stone v. Graham,449 U.S., at 42 (citing
[Schempp]). The book is, in fact, "the world's all-time best seller" with undoubted
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Thus, although the Supreme Court has never directly considered
a case involving whether a public school may teach about religion,
several members of the Court, writing in different eras of the court's
history, have indicated that teaching about religion would be,
constitutional. No Justice, moreover, has cast any serious doubt on
this question.
In several states, formal legal action to promote teaching about
religion followed closely on the heels of the Court's decision. In the
same year that the Court handed down Schempp, for example, the
legislatures of California and Florida passed laws essentially
authorizing schools to teach, as the Florida legislature put it,
"secular courses in religion."' In addition, the Attorneys General of
four other states sent letters to their Commissioners of Education
indicating that schools within those states could teach religion in an
objective manner." The Boards of Education of at least three other
states authorized schools to do the same.69
Although many religious believers disagreed fervently with the
Court's separationist decisions on school prayer, several religious
groups-in the wake ofSchempp-nonetheless voiced their support

literary and historic value apart from its religious content. The Establishment
Clauseis properly understood to prohibit the use of the Bible and other religious
documents in public school education only when the purpose of the use is to
advance a particular religious belief.
Id (footnotes omitted).
67. Gilbert, supra note 58, at 40. California's law, added to the state's Education Code,
provided:
Nothing in this Code shall be construed to prevent or exclude from the public
schools' reference to religion or references to or the use of religious literature, art
or music ... when such references or uses do not constitute instruction in
religious principles or add to any religious sect, church or sectarian purpose and
when such references or uses are incidental or illustrative of matters properly
included in the course of study.
Id. at 40.
68. The four states were Delaware, Georgia, Maine, and West Virginia. Georgia's Attorney
General, for example, wrote a letter saying that reading or discussing the Bible as part of a
broad course in comparative religion or the history ofreligion would be permissible. Id. at 41.
69. Those states were: Illinois, whose superintendent advised that the Constitution "does
not prohibit the teaching of factual information on the history and tenets of religious bodies.
in the regular curriculum;" Indiana, whose Board of Education authorized a course in 1965.
in "The Bible as Literature," for high school seniors; and Texas, where the legal counselor to
the Education Agency in 1965 ruled that a Bible course "offered as an elective and presented
as a study of the Bible for its literary or historic qualities," would be constitutional. Id at 41.
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for the idea that schools should teach students about religion. 70 The
National Council of Churches, for example, hosted a conference in
1964 at which members gave their "full support" to the "objective
teaching about the influence of religion in history and in
contemporary society" and proposed that schools offer "elective
courses on the history of religion."7' Baptist and Lutheran groups
also voiced their support for such efforts.72 Cardinal Ritter, the
Archbishop of St. Louis, representing the Catholic Church, made a
similar point when he said in 1965 that recent Supreme Court
decisions "uphold the right and obligation of the schools to teach
about religion but not to teach religion itself."71 Jewish-groups too,
while generally remaining more skeptical than Christians of the
idea that schools should teach about religion,74 nonetheless issued
a joint statement endorsing the teaching of religion when "such
teaching is intrinsic to the regular subject matter being studied."'
In addition, several new organizations were founded specifically
to address the problem of how to encourage and improve teaching
about religion.76 The Religious Instruction Association, founded in
70. In addition to the ones discussed in the text, other organizations, including the
Religious Heritage of America, the Laymen's National Bible Committee, the American Bible
Society, the National Conference of Christians and Jews, and the Religious Education
Association, all voiced their support for teaching about religion. Cox, supra note 56, at 84-98.
71. Gilbert, supra note 58, at 43; see also Cox, supra note 56, at 49-57 (describing views
of the National Council of Churches).
72. Cox, supra note 56, at 57-64.
73. Gilbert, supranote 58, at 45. For more on the Catholic response, see COx, supra note
56, at 68-73.
74. According to Rabbi Arthur Gilbert, Director (in 1967) of the National Department of
Religious Curriculum Research, Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith in New York:
Jewish reactions to the proposals to teach about religion in the public school
have been more restrained than those of Protestants or Catholics. From bitter
memory, Jews fear that the religion to be taught in government-sponsored
schools, in a Christian-influenced environment, will short-change Judaism as a
relevant and vital contemporary faith.
Gilbert, supra note 58, at 47. For more on the Jewish reaction to teaching-about-religion
proposals, see Cox, supra note 56, at 73-82.
75. Gilbert, supra note 58, at 48. The Anti-Defamation League also supported teaching
about religion when such teaching would be intrinsic to the curriculum, though it did not
support the development of separate classes devoted entirely to religion. Id.
76. Also, existing educational organizations began paying attention to the issue of
whether schools should teach about religion. The American Academy of Religion, for example,
convened a meeting on the topic in 1974 to consider how the organization could serve the
needs of the emerging movement. Piediscalzi, supra note 58, at 16-17. The Academy
established a committee known as the Religion Studies in Public Education Group, which over
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the early 1960s to gather and disseminate information and
materials relating to teaching about religion," was headed by an
educator named James V. Panoch, an apartment building manager
and former Illinois school teacher.7' Panoch stressed the importance
of exposing students to religious ideas, rather than imposing
religious beliefs on students, 79 and received criticism from religious
fundamentalists for his approach. 0 The National Council on
Religion and Public Education, established in 1971, was founded to
provide "a means for cooperation among organizations and
institutions concerned with those ways of studying religion which
are educationally appropriate and constitutionally acceptable to a
secular program ofpublic education."8 ' Finally, the Public Education
Religion Studies Center, founded in 1972 at Wright State University
the next five years, studied topics such as "Public Education Religion Studies as a Discipline"
and "Paradigms for Public Education Religion Studies," id. at 17, and which published a full
volume, see PUBLIC EDUCATION RELIGION STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 58, and over
twenty-five papers on the subject, see Nicholas Piediscalzi, A CriticalReview of AAR Papers
(1970-1978) on PublicEducationReligion Studies, in PUBLIC EDUCATION RELIGION STUDIES:
AN OVERVIEW, supra note 58, at 97. All ofthese papers, according to Nicholas Piediscazi, one
of the earlyleaders of the teaching-about-religion movement, supported the "general goal that
religion studies should develop a critical understanding of the universal phenomenon of
human religiousness through a critical examination of its many and varied manifestations."
Id. at 101; see also id. at 98-100 (arguing that these papers also all mentioned or presupposed
that the legality of teaching about religion was settled by Sehempp and agreed that the only
justifiable rationale for teaching religion is an educational one).
Likewise, following a 1964 report, in which it endorsed the academic study of religion, the
American Association of School Administrators in 1965 convened a meeting of Jewish,
Catholic, and Protestant officials who, while disagreeing on many particulars, nonetheless
reached consensus on the general idea that schools should find appropriate ways to teach
students about the relationship between religion and other elements of human culture.
Gilbert, supra note 58, at 51-52; Piediscalzi, supra note 58, at 4 (noting that although the
various officials "did not reach agreement on philosophical issues, they achieved consensus
on the [need for quality materials for teaching religion in history]").
77. See Piediscalzi, supra note 58, at 14-15.
78. Gilbert, supranote 58, at 57.
79. Cox, supranote 56, at 92-93.
80. Gilbert, supranote 58, at 57.
81. Pieiscalzi, supra note 58, at 15 (quoting THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON PUBLIC
EDUCATION, BY-LAwS (1973)). The materials formerly housed at the National Council on
Religion and Public Education distribution center are now housed at The Religion and Public
Education Resource Center, which currently serves "both as a depository of existing materials
and as a catalyst for the development and distribution of new materials relating to
pedagogical and legal issues that arise in connection with teaching about religion in public
schools." FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 32, at 9*5. The Center's website is
http'//www.csuchico.edu/rs/rperc (last visited Feb. 12, 2002).
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to "encourage and facilitate increased and improved teaching about
religion within constitutional bounds,"82 conducted workshops and
conferences, provided curriculum materials and other resources,
consulted with governmental and educational groups, and published
a newsletter.s The organization even held a symposium recognizing
the tenth anniversary of Schempp at which Justice Clark, the
author of the opinion, delivered the keynote address.84
82. Piediscalzi, supra note 58, at 15 (quoting brochure from the organization).
83. Id.
84. For a record of the symposium, see RELIGION STUDIES IN THE CURRICULUM:
RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT, 1963-1983, passim (Peter Bracher et al. eds., 1974). It is
important to note that academic and religious writing on teaching about religion was not all
positive. In addition to the lukewarm reaction of Jewish groups, see supratext accompanying
notes 74-75, several participants at a Harvard conference in 1967 voiced serious doubts about
the endeavor. See, e.g., La Noue, supra note 24, at 22, 30-31 (noting several problems with
teaching about religion); Theodore R. Sizer, Introduction,in RELIGIONANDPUBLCEDUCATION,
supra note 24, at xv, xvii ("How such teaching is to be done in a public school baffles the
imagination; indeed, perhaps the public school ...is a poor place to attempt it."); id. at xvi
("The problems with [comparative religion courses] are that their organizers often fail to
recognize that many children do 'believe,' and thus have more than intellectual feelings about
the material, and that their teachers rarely face up to the issue of how one acquires criteria
for selecting among them

.... ");

Nicholas Wolterstorff, Neutrality and Impartiality, in

RELIGION AND PUBLIC EDUCATION, supranote 24, at 3, 18 ("But caution seems in order. For
a great many of us in our society consider the Bible the presentation of God's Word to man.
[Many of them] argue, if I understand them, that unless it is presented as such, it is bound
to be misunderstood."); id. at 20 ("We find ourselves, then, in the curious situation in which
courses in religion qua religion are likely to produce sharp dissatisfactions in society and an
overall gain in mutual understanding. Accordingly, I find it not at all clear, one way or the
other, whether such courses are desirable.").
Moreover, of course, many schools continued to teach religion in violation of Schempp and
other cases. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 56, at 8 ("Many [state] officials are prepared to order
a cessation of the singing of hymns, recitation of prayers, and reading of Bible passages only
when the first complaint is registered."); Ellis Katz, Patternsof Compliancewith the Schempp
Decision, 14 EMORY J. PUB. L. 396, 405 (1965) ("60 per cent of the states that required or
allowed Bible reading before the Schempp decision reported that Bible reading still takes
place in some school districts under their jurisdiction."). Several federal court cases from this
period deal with the distinction between permissible and impermissible teaching of the Bible
in elementary schools. E.g., Crockett v. Sorenson, 568 F. Supp. 1422, 1430 (W.D. Va. 1983)
("Although a stated purpose of the program is the objective teaching of the Bible, the evidence
is to the contrary. The fact is that the program was originally designed to inculcate religious
beliefs in the students."); id. at 1431 (listing eight guidelines for teaching the Bible
constitutionally, including "[t]he course should be taught in an objective manner with no
attempt made to indoctrinate the children as to either the truth or falsity of the biblical
materials"); Wileyv. Franklin, 497 F. Supp. 390,395-96 (E.D. Tenn. 1980) (finding some Bible
lessons constitutional and others unconstitutional); Wileyv. Franklin, 474 F. Supp. 525,531
(E.D. Tenn. 1979) ("The ultimate test of the constitutionality of any course of instruction
founded upon the Bible must depend upon classroom performance."); Wiley v. Franklin, 468
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As a result of these efforts, some progress was achieved in
introducing the objective teaching of religion into the public schools.
States and various organizations drafted guidelines and standards
to explain the difference between teaching about religion objectively
and conducting religious indoctrination. 5 Materials for use in the
classroom were developed,' although most fell far short ofthe ideals
articulated by the standards and guidelines.87 Though competent
F. Supp. 133,150 (E.D. Tenn. 1979) (Thus the Constitutional issue presented in teaching the
Bible study courses in the public schools is not the Bible itself, but rather the selectivity,
emphasis, objectivity, and interpretive manner, or lack thereof, with which the Bible is
taught."); Vaughn v. Reed, 313 F. Supp. 431,434 (W.D. Va. 1970) (noting that for Bible study
programs to be constitutional, "the teachers must conscientiously refrain from any action
which amounts to the indoctrination or practice ofreligion.... ").For a discussion of these and
other cases involving the teaching of the Bible in public schools, see Michael Clay Smith &
Richard A. Hartneti, TeachingBible in the PublicSchools, 32 EDUC. L. REP. 7 (1986).
85. The Public Education Religion Studies Center, for example, issued guidelines for
evaluating teacher education programs and teacher competency. See Public Education
Religion Studies Center, Guidelines for Teacher EducationPrograms, reprinted in PUBLIC
EDUCATION RELIGION STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 58, at 242-43 (providing, among
other things, that teacher education programs should "stress why and show how teachers
must be nonconfessional and pluralistic in their approach" and "help teachers discover the
complexities and problems involved in teaching about religion in a pluralistic society"); id. at
244-46 (providing that "[clompetent religion studies teachers should... be well-versed in the
legal issues surrounding religion studies in public education, academically qualified in
religion as an academic subject, and non-confessional in approach). The Boards of Education
of both California and Michigan established similar guidelines. CALIFORIA STATE BOARD OF
EDUCATION, TEACHING ABOUT RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: EDUCATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF SCHOOL PERSONNEL (1973), reprintedin PUBLIC EDUCATION RELIGION
STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 58, at 235,235-38 (stressing the need for factual accuracy
and empathy and the problem of oversimplification); STATE OF MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT SUGGESTIONS FOR TEACHING MINOR IN THE ACADEMIC

STUDYOFRELIGIONS (1976), reprintedinPUBLICEDUCATIONRELIGIONSTUDIES:ANOVERVIEW,
supra note 58, at 247, 249-50.
86. E.g., Gilbert, supra note 58, at 65-80 (describing and evaluating various efforts to
develop materials); Piediscalzi, supra note 58, at 10-12 (describing various integrated
curricula, textbooks, courses, and units developed by various organizations and projects);
Piediscalzi, supra note 56, at 187-88 (describing curricula developed in Pennsylvania and
Florida).
87. See Gilbert, supra note 58, at 59 (noting that the new materials "remain, in many
ways, faulty or inadequate"). Gilbert analyzed a number of Bible curricula and other
materials. His primary criticism of several Bible courses dealt with the inadequacy of the
materials from the perspective of Jewish students. For example, with respect to a Bible
studies curriculum developed at the University of Nebraska Curriculum Development Center,
Gilbert wrote:
Throughout most of the units, the religious material is objective; there is no
effort to impose a sectarian viewpoint or to proselytize. The Jewish student,
nevertheless, will be confronted with a serious problem for which the materials
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teachers remained in short supply, several courses, programs, and
institutes were established to train teachers to teach about
religion.88 And although we lack reliable data on exactly how much
teaching about religion was actually taking place, it appears that
the number of classes offered in religious subjects, including the
objective study of the Bible, increased somewhat in the years after
Schempp.89 Despite these improvements, however, most teachers
and administrators were not involved in the efforts to improve
teaching about religion,' and, by 1981, those who were involved in
offer no help.... The Christological interpretations of Old Testament material
... are given so forcefully that a Jewish student who does not believe that the
doctrine of original sin, for example, is the proper interpretation of the Adam
and Eve story will be confused and troubled ....
Id. at 71; see also id. at 66-68 (criticizing Bible study curriculum developed at Indiana
University for having Christian bias). Adequate world religion materials were also lacking.
Piediscalzi, supra note 58, at 11 ("To date, no adequate single text on the living religions of
the world has been published for use in public education.").
88. Piediscalzi, supra note 58, at 14 ("During the summer of 1978, according to an
informal survey conducted by PERSC, about fifteen summer institutes and workshops were
offered in different parts of the United States on various aspects of integrating religion
studies into the public school curricula."); Frank L. Steeves & Joseph Forcinelli, Certification
ProgramsforPublicEducationReligion Studies, in PUBLIC EDUCATION RELIGION STUDIES: AN
OVERVIEW, supra note 58, at 187, 187 ("Eight states provide for some form of certification in
religion studies."); id. at 188 (noting that in 1973, Michigan, Wisconsin, and California had
approved college teaching majors or minors leading to certification for teaching religion
studies in the public schools).
89. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 56, at 99-126 (surveying efforts to teach about religion in
over twenty states); William E. Collie, The Extent and Effect of Public EducationReligion
Studies in the Schools: Research Findings and Their Implications, in PUBLIC EDUCATION
RELIGION STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 58, at 173, 173 ("Formal and informal reports
from numerous parts of the United States point to a growth pattern in public education
religion studies since 1963."); Henry J. Hoeks & Michael H. McIntosh, Religion Studies in
MichiganSecondary Schools: Prevalence, Practices,and Propensities,in PUBLIC EDUCATION
RELIGION STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW, supra note 58, at 153, 158 ("Speaking positively, there are
signs of increased activity in some schools regarding recent or proposed introduction of
curricular offerings in religion studies. Negatively, however, a significant number of senior
high school department chairpersons and principals reported that curricular offerings in
religion studies were being dropped."); John T. Leahy, IllinoisReligion and PublicEducation
Survey: Background and Analysis, in PUBLIC EDUCATION RELIGION STUDIES: AN OVERVIEW,
supra note 58, at 163, 170 (noting that "[in 1977, the Illinois Religion and Public Education
survey of junior and senior high schools was undertaken to provide the first accurate
information on religion studies in public education," and concluding that the total number of
schools teaching about religion as separate courses, units, or informal approaches was
35.55%); Piediscalzi, supranote 58, at 8 ("Reports from many different sections of the United
States reveal that religion studies have been increasing in public schools."); id. at 8-9
(describing the situation in various states, including Ohio, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Kansas).
90. See Gilbert, supranote 58, at 59 ("[Elducators, too, have warned the nation that any
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such efforts made up what one contemporary commentator
described as merely a "small, quiet, and almost unrecognized
movement."9 1
B. Efforts in the Eighties
Although the late seventies and early eighties saw a dip in
interest in teaching about religion, 92 several studies conducted in
the mid-eighties gave a boost to the movement by demonstrating
that history and other social studies textbooks systematically
ignored religious topics and themes. 93 Perhaps the most influential
of these studies was Paul Vitz's Censorship:Evidence of Bias in our
Children'sTextbooks.9 Vitz, a professor of psychology at New York
program to teach about religion needs to be undertaken carefully."); Piediscalzi, supra note
76, at 107 ("[M]ost of those in the American Academy of Religion who are involved in public
education religions studies have not had any working experience in or ongoing contact with
the public school classroom and teacher education programs."); id. ("[R]eligionists who seek
to establish working relationships with educators and classroom teachers must sacrifice the
luxury of their liberal arts snobbery which holds educators and teachers to be lower than the
lowest of illiterate technicians."); Piediscali, supranote 58, at 18 ("On the whole, the majority
of public school teachers and administrators, members of colleges and departments of
education, and state board of education officials are notably absent from these efforts.").
91. Piediscalzi, supra note 58, at 19. Likewise, Gilbert argued in 1967 that "[tihe degree
to which any information about religion is now communicated within the public schools' social
studies or literature curriculum is minimal." Gilbert, supra note 58, at 58.
92. E.g., THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF SCHOOL ADMINISTRATORS, RELIGION IN THE
PUBLIC SCHOOLS 27 (1986) [hereinafter RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS] (noting a decline

in interest in the early eighties); Wright, supranote 58 (questioning whether "the momentum
for religious studies in the public schools curriculum" will "grow or again fade out as it did in
the 1970s"). Of course, this is not to say that the early eighties were completely devoid of
interest. For papers dealing with teaching about religion from this period, see WISCONSIN
DEPARTMENTOFPUBLICINSTRUCTION, RELIGIOUS STUDIES GUIDELINES (1982);WesleyJ.Bodin

& Robert J.Dilzer, Ideas and Resourcesfor Teaching About Religions in Secondary Schools,
SOCIAL EDUC., Jan. 1981, at 17; Walter Nelson, Religion in the Social Studies Curriculum,
SOCIAL EDUc., Jan. 1981, at 28; Robert J. Dilzer, Including the Study About Religions in the
Social Studies Curriculum: A Position Statement and Guidelines (Nov. 1984) (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
93. E.g., PAUL GAGNON, DEMOCRACY'S UNTOLD STORY: WHAT THE WORLD HISTORY

TEXTBOOKS NEGLECT (1987); CHARLES C. HAYNES, TEACHING ABOUT RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN
AMERICAN SECONDARYSCHOOS (1985); PEOPLEFORTHEAMERICAN WAY, LOOKINGATHISTORY:
A REVIEW OF MAJOR U.S. HISTORY TEXTBOOKS (1986); VITz, supra note 26; see also John W.

McDermott, Jr., The Treatment of Religion in Public School Textbooks: A PoliticalAnalysis
and a Modest Proposal, 13 RELIGION & PUB. EDUC. 62 (1986) (detailing the ongoing
controversy about public school textbooks).
94. Vriz, supra note 26.
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University, examined eight American History secondary school
textbooks, each of which had been listed on the textbook adoption
lists of five or more states.95 Though Vitz found no evidence to
suggest the existence of "any kind of conscious conspiracy operating
to censor textbooks,"' he nonetheless found that "a very widespread
secular and liberal mindset appear[ed] to be responsible" for the fact
that "[r]eligion, traditional family values, and conservative political
and economic positions [had] been reliably excluded from children's
textbooks."9 7 Specifically, with respect to religion, Vitz found that:
[Niot one of these texts acknowledges, much less emphasizes,
the great religious energy and creativity of the United States....
For all practical purposes, religion is hardly mentioned as
existing in America in the last seventy-five to one hundred
years; in particular, none of these books includes any serious
coverage of conservative Protestantism in this century, although
a few books mentioned the Scopes Trial.... None of them offers
any serious appreciation of positive Catholic contributions to
American life. Prejudice against Catholics is commonly noted,
but positive contributions in terms of the assimilation of
countless immigrants, the many hospitals and orphanages built
by Catholics, and the significance of the Catholic school system
are (with one exception) not mentioned. Likewise, the very many
positive contributions of American Jews receive almost no
notice.9"
Other studies came to similar conclusions. One of these studies-an
examination of world history textbooks published by the American
Federation of Teachers-found, for example, that "one of the most
serious failures" of world history textbooks was their failure to treat
seriously "the basic ideas of Judaism and Christianity."99
The publication of these studies spurred several influential
educational groups and associations to reexamine the question of
whether public schools should teach students about religion and to
95. Vitz also examined social studies texts used at the elementary school levels and
concluded that, like the high school history books, they ignored religious themes, facts, and
ideas. Id. at 5-44.
96. Id. at 1.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 56-57.
99. GAGNON, supra note 93, at 59.
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articulate in strong terms the need to include the objective study of
religion in the curriculum.' °° The Association of Supervision and
Curriculum Development (ASCD), for example, responded to the
studies published in 1985 and 1986 by convening a policy panel to
address the issue.1 ' In the 1987 report that grew out of this panel
discussion, the ASCD decried the failure of textbooks to discuss
religion' 2 and called for a "major research and development effort
... to develop new curricular materials and instructional designs for
teaching about religion within ... various subject areas."0 3 The

Association insisted that it "and other education groups must
educate the community about the need to include religion in the
curriculum" in order to bring America's public school system "a step
closer to reflecting [religious] diversity in the curriculum and
honoring the basic principles of our democracy."' Othergroups and
interested individuals reached similar conclusions. 0 5
100. See HAYNES, supra note 93, at ix (noting that the textbook studies of the mid-1980s,
among other things, gave steam to the movement to teach about religion); Wright, supranote
58:
As important as the publications was the incentive the process gave to the
several groups to revisit policies and practices on religion in public education,
and to do so aware of the great diversity reflected at the roundtable. Major
educational groups, including the American Association of School Boards, the
National Education Association, and the Association of Supervision and
Curriculum Development (ASCD) issued new publications on the subject.
101. RELIGION IN THE CURRIcULUM, supra note 26, at 7-8 (citing Vitz's studies, among

others).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 35.
104. Id. at 34.
105. For example, Charles R. Kniker, an Iowa State professor of education and editor of the
journal Religion and PublicEducation,wrote a report for the Phi Delta Kappa Educational
Foundation (cited by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion in Edwards u. Aguillard,482
U.S. 578, 607 n.7 (1987)), in which he stated that:
Social studies teachers have an obligation to help students understand the role
of religion in various cultures throughout history. This would include the impact
of religion on historic events and the influence of religion on law, art, music, and
literature, as well as traditional religious topics taught in history courses such
as the Crusades and the Reformation.
CHARLES R. KNIKER, TEACHING ABOUT RELIGION IN THE PuBLIc ScHooLs 26-27 (1985). Also,
the American Association of School Administrators issued a report in 1986 in which it argued
that:
Teaching about religions, as the McCollum case illustrates, is constitutionally
permissible. In addition, it is sound educational policy. One of the principal roles
of the public schools is studying our culture and passing on the rich heritage of
the American people. Religions have played a significant part in that cultural
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Two important events in the late eighties provided new
momentum for the teaching about religion movement. First, in
1988, a group of religious, political, business, and educational
leaders-including Presidents Carter and Ford, Chief Justices
Rehnquist and Burger, and several university Presidents-came
together in Williamsburg, Virginia to sign the Williamsburg
Charter, a document prepared by religious leaders over the course
of two years that, in the words of author James Davison Hunter,
"celebrates religious liberty, sets out the place of such liberty in
American public life, and reaffirms the place of such liberty for
people of all faiths or none."' At the same time, the drafters of the
Charter also produced a new curriculum for all school age levels
focusing on religious pluralism and the role of religion in American
life. The curriculum, Living With Our DeepestDifferences:Religious
Liberty in a PluralisticSociety,"1 was one of the first comprehensive
curricula dealing with these topics, and has been used in a number
10 8
of school districts around the country.
The second important development occurred the same year, when
seventeen religious and educational organizations, including the
American Academy of Religion, the American Jewish Congress, and
the National Educational Association, jointly sponsored a set of
guidelines for teaching about religion in public schools. °9 The joint
heritage.
RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, supra note 92, at 26-27; see also id. at 28 (noting the

developments in the field since its last discussion of the problem in 1964 and concluding that
.a number of curriculum development projects ha[d] created materials" to meet the goals of
providing "objective, balanced, and educationally sound materials for teachers").
106. JAMEs DAviSON HUNTER, CULTURE WARS: THE STRuGGLE TO DEFINE AMERICA 392 n.6
(1991). For a list of signers of the Charter, see FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 32, at
2*6-2*9. To read the Charter itself, see id. at A*1-A*14. See also CARTER, supra note 1, at 20809 (noting that the Williamsburg Charter and its associated curriculum signaled that
'matters are beginning to change").

107. MICHAEL D. CAsSY ET AL., LIVING WITH OUR DEEPEST DIFFERENCES: RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY INA PLURALISTIC SOCIETY (1990).
108. HUNTER, supra note 106, at 392 n.6 ("The most practical outcome of the Williamsburg
Charter is a new curriculum on religious liberty in a pluralistic society. It has been introduced
in many public schools and is making an important contribution to the education reform
movement and to the maintenance of a responsible, civil society.")

109. RELIGION IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL CURRICULUM: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, reprinted
in FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 32, at 6*1-6*4. The other signers included the
American Association of School Administrators, the American Federation of Teachers, the
Americans United Research Foundation, the Association for Supervision and Curriculum
Development, the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs, the Christian Legal Society, the
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statement, which encourages including religion "[wiherever it
naturally arises"1' in the curriculum because "study about religion
is essential to understanding both the nation and the world,""'
articulated the following six guidelines for"distinguish[ing] between
teaching about religion in public schools and indoctrination":
1. The school's approach to religion is academic, not
devotional.
2. The school may strive for student awareness of
religions, but should not press for student acceptance of
any one religion.
3. The school may sponsor study about religion, but may
not sponsor the practice of religion.
4. The school may expose students to a diversity of
religious views, but may not impose any particular view.
5. The school may educate about all religions, but may not
promote or denigrateany religion.
6. The school may inform the student about various
beliefs, but should not seek to conform him or her to any
particular belief."
These guidelines proved to be quite important in helping schools
develop religious studies programs, most notably in California,
where they were reprinted in a newsletter outlining that state's
approach to teaching about religion as a larger part of a program of
3
civic education.1

Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, the Islamic Society of North America, the
National Association of Evangelicals, the National Conference of Christians and Jews, the
National Council of Churches of Christ in the USA, the National Council on Religion and
Public Education, the National Council for the Social Studies, and the National School Boards
Association.
110. Id. at 6*3.
111. Id. at 6*2.
112. Id.
113. BARBARAB. GADDYETAL., SCHOOLWARS: RESOLVING OUR CONFMICTS OVER RELIGION
AND VALUEs 296 n.11 (1996).
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C. CurrentDevelopments
Reformers like Charles Haynes, Warren Nord, and Oliver
Thomas"" have built upon these consensus efforts of the late
eighties to garner even stronger support over the last decade for
teaching about religion." 5 The centerpiece of this new movement is
a volume called Taking Religion Seriously Across the Curriculum,
authored by Nord and Haynes in 1998.116 In the book, Nord and
Haynes articulate why they think schools should teach students
about religion, how schools should implement a program to teach
about religion, and what schools should actually teach about
religion. With respect to justifications, Nord and Haynes stress both
"civic" and "educational" reasons for teaching about religion:
We will argue there are two fundamental reasons-or families
of reasons-for including religion in the curriculum, for taking
it seriously. First, there are civic reasons. The American
experiment in liberty is built on the conviction that it is possible
to find common ground in spite of our deep religious differences.
It is rooted in the civic agreement we share as citizens, in our
principled commitment to respect one another. Properly
understood, this means that we not exclude religious voices from
the public square or from public education, but that we take one
another seriously. ... Second, there are educationalreasons for
taking religion seriously. A good liberaleducation should expose
students to the major ways humanity has developed for making
sense of the world-and some of those ways of understanding
the world are religious. An exclusively secular education is an
illiberal education.1 17

114. See supra note 28.
115. See Lynne S. Dumas, The Top Ten EducationalTrends in America Today, FAMILY PC
FROM ZDWIPE, May 1, 2000, at 98,103 (noting that teaching about religion might become one
of the top ten trends in American education in the near future).
116. NORD & HAYNES, supra note 3; see also Larry Witham, New Tack Taken on Religion
in Schools: Group Seeks End to Secular Bias, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1998, at A5 (noting that
the plan behind the "new consensus" to teach about religion is found in the book and that a
San Diego high school teacher said that the book should be "mandatory reading' for all public
school instructors").
117. NORD & HAYNES, supra note 3, at 8.
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Recognizing that, in many communities, trying to introduce
religion into the curriculum will likely create controversy, Nord and
Haynes suggest a specific set of steps for school districts to follow to
minimize discord. These steps include appointing a community task
force, identifying shared civic principles "that can serve as ground
rules for negotiating differences and working for consensus,"
involving people of diverse views in the decision-making process,
and implementing the program with careful follow-through." 8
Following these steps, the authors argue, will provide school
districts with a "framework for constructive
dialogue and a basis for
119
agreement across deep differences."
Finally, with respect to what schools should actually teach about
religion, Nord and Haynes suggest specific religious facts, themes,
ideas, and perspectives that students should be exposed to both in
their existing classes in subjects such as history, science, economics,
civics, and literature,2O as well as in special classes devoted entirely
to religion.'" More importantly, the authors set out general
principles to guide the introduction of these religious ideas into
the classroom. Specifically, they argue that teachers should
present religion fairly and without making judgments about the
material; that the major religions should be emphasized but that
"minor" religions should be discussed as well; that teachers should
not convey the message that the major religions are somehow
normative; and that in choosing among the less influential
religions, teachers should choose those that are practiced locally.122
The authors argue that schools should introduce students to the
many dimensions of religion, including religious doctrine, ethics,
experience, art, and social institutions, 3 and that they should
emphasize primary sources in doing so. 4 Finally, they argue that
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 28-30.
Id. at 29.
Id. at 77-163.
Id. at 164-80.
Id. at 4748.
Id. at 49-50. For this point, the authors rely on the work of Ninian Smart. E.g., NuIAN

SMART, THE RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE OF MANKIND 6-18 (2d ed. 1976).

124. NORD &HAYNES, supra note 3, at 50-53. The authors argue that if texts and teachers
are to take religion seriously, they "must let the advocates of that religion speak for
themselves, using the cultural and conceptual resources of their own traditions." They call
this "understanding religion from the inside." Id. at 50. The authors do, however, recognize
that students should also "understand religion from the outside" and that secondary sources

1188

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1159

students must learn about the deep differences among religions, as
well as how different religious and secular traditions criticize each
other.12
Although written materials such as Taking Religion Seriously
Across the Curriculum12 have played a central role in the teaching
about religion movement, the movement is by no means limited to
these materials. Haynes, Thomas, and others have also taken their
"common ground" message around the country, holding training
workshops and mediation sessions to help troubled school districts
implement new programs." 7 Though the reformers certainly have
a long way to go,' they apparently have achieved quite a bit of
success.' 9 As a result of these workshops and mediation sessions,
such as textbooks "have their place as well." Id. at 51-53.
125. Id. at 53-55. For example, the authors suggest that students should consider such
issues as: "Why do Muslims believe Islam to be superior to Christianity-and how do
Christians argue otherwise? How do neo-Darwinians and various kinds of theologians criticize
one another's positions?" Id. at 55.
126. Taking Religion Seriously Across the Curriculum is supported by two other key
publications-Warren Nord's Religion and American Education, see NORD, supra note 3,
which provides an historical and more deeply theoretical defense of teaching about religion
in the public schools, and Finding Common Ground, see FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra
note 32, which offers practical assistance to teachers and school districts seeking to include
teaching about religion in their curricula, including sample policies and guidelines from school
districts around the country.
127. David Ruenzel, Old-Time Religion,EDUCATION WEEK ON THE WEB (Mar. 27, 1996), at
http//www.edweek.org/edsearch.cfin (describing workshops given by Haynes and Thomas in
several states).
128. See, e.g., id. (noting that, despite various programs, most teachers still "shun any
discussion of religion").
129. For example, Haynes was once called upon to mediate a dispute in Orangetown, New
Jersey over whether a nativity scene, instead of a Christmas tree, should have been displayed
next to a menorah. Through his efforts, Haynes helped the school district realize, as the
superintendent put it, "that the question wasn't if we should teach about religion in the
schools but how do we best teach about it," Edward Felsenthal, Cease-Fire:End of a Culture
War?, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 1998, at Al (quoting Morton Sherman), and, by the time Haynes
left, teachers were telling students the story of Christmas in front of a display case containing
not only a creche, but symbols of other religions as well. See id. Likewise, when the school
district in Modesto, California sought help dealing with a dispute over whether sexual
orientation should be included in a newly drafted tolerance statement, it brought in Haynes
to present a common ground training workshop for the committee that had been appointed
to deal with the controversy. See Wayne Jacobsen, Why Common Ground Thinking Works,
EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Dec. 1, 1999, at 76, 76-77. After Haynes left, committee members agreed
that his workshop had "saved the process and provided the framework not just for consensus,
but also for unanimity" by convincing the participants that one need not accept the religion
or lifestyle of others to agree that no student should be harassed or discriminated against on
the basis of his or her race, religion, or sexual orientation. Id. at 77.
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Haynes, as one commentator puts it, has "reshaped the way religion
is treated in thousands of schools" around the country."
Teaching about religion programs have been particularly
successful in California and North Carolina. As early as 1991, the
state of California implemented a program known as the "3 Rs
Project"-referring to "rights, responsibilities, and respect"-that
provides support for teaching about religion in the public schools.
The project trains teachers on how to teach about religion
constitutionally and has established links between religious studies
scholars at local colleges and school districts, in order to support
those districts in their efforts to introduce religious topics into the
classroom. 3 ' Moreover, California's statewide guidelines for social
science education emphasize the importance of teaching students
about various world religions," 2 as well as religion's influence on the
development of America's political culture and institutions. 3 ' In
North Carolina, it appears that the development of courses about
religion has taken place primarily at the county level, rather than
the state level. One of the most successful programs has been
developed by the Wake County School District, which, with the help
of Nord and others, has developed two elective courses called "The
Bible in History" and "Religions in World Cultures."'34 The courses
130. Felsenthal, supra note 129, at Al ("Mr. Haynes runs a mediation and training
program that has already reshaped the way religion is treated in thousands of schools."); see
also Ruenzel, supra note 127 (noting that Haynes "travels across the country working with
teachers").
131. See GADDYETAL., supranote 113, at 205-06. Other states, such as Georgia, Oklahoma,
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Utah have implemented similar programs. NORD & HAYNES, supra
note 3, at 92.

132.

CALIFORNIA STATE BoARD OF EDUCATION, HISTORY-SOCIAL SCIENCE FRAMEWORK FOR

CALIFoRNIA PuLIc ScHooLs KINDERGARTEN THROUGH GRADE TWELVE, 1997 UPDATED
EDITION 80-81 (1997) (describing an elective course for ninth graders in which "students
consider the principal religions of the world that are active today, influencing the lives of
millions and impressing their image on the contemporary world"); id. at 7 ("When studying
world history, students must become familiar with the basic ideas of the major religions and
the ethical traditions of each time and place.").
133. Id. at 7:
Students are expected to learn about the role of religion in the founding of this
country because many of our political institutions have their antecedents in
religious beliefs. Students should understand the intense religious passions that
have produced fanaticism and war as well as the political arrangements
developed (such as separation of church and state) that allow different religious
groups to live amicably in a pluralistic society.
134. Ruenzel, supra note 127. Ruenzel also quotes Nord as saying:
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appear to be popular among students and successful both in
imparting knowledge of various religious traditions and in
encouraging mutual respect among students of different faiths.3 As
one conservative Christian student responded when asked whether
Christians might disapprove oflearning about other religions: "That
argument makes no sense to me. I come from a strong Baptist
background, and one of the reasons I took this class was just so I
could learn about other religions. Otherwise it's like eating one
cereal your entire life and saying this is the best cereal."'36
The last decade has also seen significant gains in the
development of materials and in teacher training. New materials for
teaching about religion include a seventeen-volume set of reference
books developed by Oxford University Press called Religion in
American Life; 7 a CD-ROM called On Common Ground: World
Religions in America, prepared by Harvard Professor Diana Eck; 38
materials on Islam developed by the Council on Islamic
Education;. 9 and materials on Indian faiths developed by a group
called Education about South Asia-Vidya. 4 ° As for teacher
training, in addition to the common ground workshops led by
Haynes and others,' at least two universities-Harvard and the
University of Pennsylvania-have recently introduced certificateWake County went about this the right way.... They got advice from scholars
in putting a curriculum together, which helped ensure that it passed
constitutional muster. And they offered the world-religion course alongside the
Bible course so that students would have an opportunity to be exposed to more
than just the Judeo-Christian tradition.
Id.
135. Id. (noting that all but one student interviewed said that the course had made them
more respectful of religion).
136. Id.
137. The books, which deal with such topics as African-American religions, American
Indian religions, women and American religion, Mormons in America, and Alternative
American Religions (such as Quakers, Shakers, Christian Scientists, and Scientology), were
edited by prominent university scholars such as Jon Butler of Yale University. Wicker, supra
note 23, at 1G.
138. See NORD & HAYNES, supra note 3, at 93 ("Using the CD-ROM, students can find out
about the practices and beliefs of America's many faith traditions and explore the religious
diversity of 18 cities and regions. Fifteen different religions are represented, from the longestablished Native American, Christian, and Jewish traditions to more recent arrivals such
as Hinduism and Buddhism.).
139. Id. at 95.
140. Id.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 127-30.
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granting programs for future teachers seeking to learn how to teach
students about religion."
Thus, the movement to encourage public schools to teach about
religion is at its strongest point in the last forty years.' As
described in the next Part, this development should be welcomed
because, if students are going to learn the skills, knowledge, and
dispositions they need to participate most effectively and fairly in
our pluralistic, liberal democracy, American schools must begin
doing a better job of teaching them about religious ways of life.

II. TEACHING ABOUT RELIGION

AS CiviC EDUCATION

A. The Theory of Civic Education
To reiterate William Galston's definition, civic education takes as
its purpose the "formation ofindividuals who can effectively conduct
their lives within, and support, their political community." 1' Unlike
other theories of education that have as their purposes the pursuit
of certain kinds of truth (e.g., scientific, historical, etc.), and are
therefore at least theoretically independent of the reigning political
regime, the content of civic education is by definition inherently
linked to the political system that it seeks to support.1 45 Thus, civic
education in a monarchy would seek to instill in students the skills,
knowledge, and dispositions necessary for political life under the
142. FINDiNGCOMMON GRoUND, supranote 32, at 9*4-9*5 (describingthe Harvard Divinity
School's Program in Religion and Secondary Education and the University of Pennsylvania's
Religion in Public Life Certificate Program).
143. Of course, the movement to teach about religion is not without its critics or its
problems. As described and discussed in more depth below, see infra text accompanying notes
323-27, 375-81, criticism comes from both devoutly religious people who object to the

relativism encouraged by religious studies classes, e.g., MACEDO, supra note 56, at 70 (noting
that Catholics in the 1840s objected to proposals to teach various religions in an objective and
evenhanded way because they believed "this would imply that religion is a mere choice, like
styles of dress"), and by those who believe such classes will inevitably result in indoctrination,
see, e.g., Edd Doerr, Religion and PublicEducation, PHI DELTA KAPPAN, Nov. 1, 1998, at 225
("The probability that attempts to teach about religion will go horribly wrong should caution
public schools to make haste very slowly in this area."). The latter situation is currently
occurring, according to a report on Bible teaching in the public schools in Florida written by
the People for the American Way. See infra text accompanying notes 325-26.
144. Galston, supra note 51, at 89.
145. WILjAM A. GASIZN, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GooDs, VIRTUEs, AND DIVERsrIY IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 242-43 (1991).
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rule of a king or queen. Civic education in a Communist country
might, as Chinese scholar Liu Guohua explains, "attempt to
enlighten students by intensifying their consciousness of
communist ideals, such as unselfishness and public-regarding
behavior, as well as faith in the coming existence of a communist
society."146 Civic education in America, then, generally would seek
to teach students the skills, knowledge, and dispositions 4 '
necessary for life in (to borrow again from Galston), "a community
possessing to a high degree the following features: popularconstitutional government; a diverse society with a wide range of
individual opportunities and choices; a predominantly market
economy; and a substantial, strongly protected sphere of privacy and
individual rights.""'
In theory, there are as many models for civic education in a
liberal democracy as there are models of liberal democracy. 49 One
146. Liu Guohua, Civic Education in China: Past, Present, and Future Challenges 5 (1998)
(unpublished manuscript on file with author).
147. The emphasis on teaching skills, knowledge, and dispositions is typical of those who
support civic education. E.g., Margaret Stimman Branson, Project Citizen:An Introduction
(Feb. 1999), at http:I/www.civiced.org/articles_branson99.html ("As Alexis de Toqueville
pointed out, each new generation is a new people that must acquire the knowledge, learn the
skills, and develop the dispositions or traits of private and public character that undergird a
constitutional democracy."); Michael Engel, The Meanings of Civic Education: Theoretical
Perspectives on Classroom Practice 1 (1998) (unpublished paper presented at the Annual
Meeting of the American Political Science Association) (on file with author) ('The need to
develop the values, knowledge, and skills required for democratic citizenship... has taken on
greater urgency and received considerable public attention."); John J. Patrick, Community
and Individuality in Civic Education for Democracy 9 (1996) (unpublished paper presented
at the International Conference on Individualism and Community in a Democratic Society,
on file with author) (recommending that schools "It]each civic knowledge, skills, and virtues
that constitute a common core of learning by which to maintain the culture of the
community").
148. GAISTON, supra note 145, at 220. Indeed, civic education has had a long history in the
United States. See generallyR. FREEMAN BUTTS, THE CIVICMISSION IN EDUCATIONAL REFORM
PERSPECTIVES FOR THE PUBLIC AND THE PROFESSION (1989) (discussing the history of
citizenship education); R. FREEMAN BUTIs, THE REVIVAL OF CMC LEARNING:A RATIONALE FOR
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IN AMERIcAN SCHOOLS 51-88 (1980) (providing historical perspective

on civic education); MACEDO, supra note 56, at 45-157 (chronicling civic education in
America);.
149. The Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the idea that public schools should
prepare students for citizenship in a liberal democracy. E.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v.
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) ("The process of educating our youth for citizenship in public
schools is not confined to books, the curriculum, and the civics class; schools must teach by
example the shared values of a civilized social order."); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853,
864-65 (1982) (holding that schools should allow students to exercise independent judgment
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important distinction that emerges from the literature on civic
education,o however, is the distinction between what can be
roughly characterized as the liberal-or perhaps more precisely, the
"political liberal," except that the term "civic" in "civic education"
likely already captures this distinction-and the republican, or
participatory, approaches to civic education.'5 1 Scholars have noted
that the political theories that form the basis for these two models
of civic education-liberalism and civic republicanism-often can be
difficult to differentiate.' 5 2 Like the underlying theories on which
they rest, the specific expressions of the liberal and republican
models of civic education are themselves not always easy to
distinguish from each other and seem generally to exist along a
gradual continuum, rather than as two distinct and irreconcilable
poles. Nonetheless, in theory, the two models do emphasize

and express individual political viewpoints); Ambachv. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68,76 (1979) ("The
importance ofpublic schools in the preparation ofindividuals for participation as citizens, and
in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, long has been recognized by our
decisions .... "); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969)
(noting that schools should expose students to a "robust exchange of ideas" as part of
education for citizenship).
150. There are, of course, positions other than the two described here. E.g., Engel, supra
note 147, at 12 (advocating a "transformative" rather than a "conservative" model of civic
education).
151. E.g., Bruce Jennings, Foundations of Citizenship Education, CMc ARTS REv.,
Winter/Spring 1991, at 3 (noting that "achieving consensus on the normative foundations of
civic education is ... difficult because of two different views of citizenship: "a civil conception
of citizenship, drawn largely from the liberal tradition of political theory, and a civic
conception of citizenship, drawn from either the republican or the participatory democratic
traditions"); Richard M. Battistoni, Civic Education in America 6 (1983) (unpublished paper
presented at the Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Social Science Association, on file with
author) (looking at the question of American civic education by looking at political philosophy
and noting that "[tiwo 'models' of democratic politics and citizenship immediately suggest
themselves as alternative conceptions running through American political life: what I call the
'liberal' and the 'participatory-republican' models.").
152. E.g., JoHNRAwLs, PouicALLiBERAIuSM205 (1996) (arguing that nothingin classical
republicanism is incompatible with political liberalism); Suzanna Sherry, Responsible
Republicanism:Educatingfor Citizenship, 62 U. CHI. L. REv. 131,137 (1995) (observing that
"[r]econciling liberalism and republicanism-or rights and virtue-is thus the newest cottage
industry among constitutional law professors); Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle
ThatShut Me Out":Assimilation,Indoctrination,and the ParadoxofaLiberalEducation,106
HARv. L. REv. 581, 657 (1993) (arguing that civic republicanism "permits the imposition of
those values, habits, and manners characteristic of a liberal society. open-mindedness,
tolerance of diverse opinions, and the critical-objective mindset that underlies individual
freedom of choice").
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different approaches to civic education and are therefore worth
considering individually.
Political liberalism, according to Stephen Gardbaum, is a political
theory that responds to the lack of consensus on moral ideals in
pluralistic societies by ensuring that "the actions of the state do not
privilege or presuppose the superiority of any of the competing
moral ideals affirmed by its citizens." 5 ' Although the proponents of
liberal theories of civic education such as John Rawls, Stephen
Macedo, and William Galston,"' differ somewhat in the details they
espouse, they generally share the view that, although the liberal
state should not support or endorse any one comprehensive vision
of the good life, it must nonetheless instill in its citizens certain socalled "political virtues" necessary for its own survival and
flourishing.'5 5 Further, these thinkers recognize that a state which
promotes such virtues will tend to disadvantage some visions of the
good life that are inconsistent with those virtues. 5 6 Thus, for
153. Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism,Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REV. 385,
385-86 (1996). Political liberalism is distinguished from so-called "comprehensive liberalism,"
which, according to Gutmann, "offers not only political principles but also a conception of the
good life, typically as a life of individuality or autonomy, that complements its political
principles." Amy Gutmann, Civic Educationand Social Diversity, 105 ETHICS 557,558 (1995).
For the classic account of political liberalism, see generally RAWLS, supra note 152. For
analysis of political liberalism as a response to communitarian critiques of Rawls' earlier
work, see STEPHEN MULHALL & ADAM SwIFT, LIBERALS & CommuNrrARLAs 167-205 (1992).
For a critique of Rawls' political liberalism, see Michael J. Sandel, PoliticalLiberalism, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1765 (1994). For an example of comprehensive liberalism, see JOSEPH RAZ, THE
MORALITY OF FREEDOM (1986).
154. Characterizing William Galston's position is problematic. Compare Gutmann, supra
note 153, at 560 (characterizing Galston as a supporter of political liberalism), with
Gardbaum, supra note 153, at 386 n.4 (characterizing Galston as a supporter of
comprehensive liberalism). Regardless of how he may be characterized as a matter of political
theory, I characterize him as a proponent of political liberal civic education, as opposed to
liberal education, as defined by Gutmann, supra note 50, because he views civic education as
a method primarily to promote political virtues as a way of supporting liberal democratic
political institutions, rather than as a method to promote the individual autonomy of
students.
155. Compare this view to the neutrality theory of liberal education espoused by Bruce
Ackerman, who argues that "[t]he ideal liberal education is one that permits the child to move
from his initial resistances to an ability to define his own objectives in the light of the
universal culture defined by all humankind." BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOcIAL JUSTICE IN THE
LIBERAL STATE 160 (1980).
156. For example, it will disadvantage those who hold religious beliefs that are inconsistent
with liberal values. See, e.g., GALSTON, supra note 145, at 14-15 (noting that an appropriate
understanding of liberal virtues can reduce the tension between "traditionalists" and
"liberationists" but acknowledging that it cannot "be altogether dissolved"); id. at 177 (noting

2002]

PREPARING FOR THE CLOTHED PUBLIC SQUARE

1195

example, Macedo argues in favor of what he calls a "tough-minded
version of liberalism ... a liberalism with spine."157 He rejects the
view that liberal political institutions and public policies should be
neutral with respect to all visions of the good life,"5 and instead
contends that they should embody and promote "the capacities and
dispositions conducive to thoughtful participation in the activities
of modern politics and civil society."159 Likewise, although Galston
acknowledges that the "liberal conception of the good ... allows for
a wide ... pluralism among ways of life,""6 he nonetheless insists
that it is "far from fully neutral with respect to conceptions of the
good,"' 6 1 and that "the liberal state must become far more aware of,
and far more actively involved in reproducing, the conditions
necessary to its own health and perpetuation." 6 2 Such active
reproduction, Galston claims, "is fully consistent with the historic
liberal commitment to freedom and diversity. " '
Although the specifics differ in each case, supporters of liberal
civic education generally emphasize that schools should educate
students about liberal political institutions, procedures, and rights;
impart in students the ability to think rationally and critically about
public issues; and, most importantly, instill in them the liberal
virtues of tolerance, mutual respect, and empathy for different ways
of life. Thus, Rawls, in distinguishing his political liberalism from
comprehensive liberal theories such as those advanced by Kant and
Mill, argues that education should not aim at fostering autonomy
and individuality as a way of life, but instead should teach students
about their constitutional rights and promote political virtues'
that his liberal account of the good is deliberately thin, but thick enough to rule out certain
visions of the good life, such as secular nihilism, theological withdrawlism, moral monism,
Nietzscheanirrationalism, andbarbarism);MACEDO,supra note 56, at228 ("[IManybelievers,
fundamentalists included, pay a substantial price for life in a liberal society. It cannot be the
case that all religions prosper equallyin a liberal regime, and Galston certainly admits this.");
RAWLS, supra note 152, at 193 ("[1It is surely impossible for the basic structure of a just
constitutional regime not to have important effects and influences as to which comprehensive
doctrines endure and gain adherents over time....").
157. MACEDO, supra note 56, at 5.

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 10.
GALSTON, supra note 145, at 10.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 6.
Id.
RAWLS, supra note 152, at 199. As Rawls explains:
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such as tolerance and a sense of fairness.'65 Other thinkers, such as
Galston and Macedo, offer thicker, more substantive accounts of
liberalism and thus encourage schools to impart a somewhat
broader set of political virtues to their students, including not only
tolerance and mutual respect, but also such virtues as familial
fidelity, a strongwork ethic, adaptability, self-criticism, moderation,
and respect for the norms of public reasonableness. 66
[Plolitical liberalism has a different aim and requires far less. It will ask that
children's education include such things as knowledge of their constitutional and
civic rights so that, for example, they know that liberty of conscience exists in
their society and that apostasy is not a legal crime, all this to insure that their
continued membership when they come of age is not based simply on ignorance
of their basic rights or fear of punishment for offenses that do not exist.
Moreover, their education should also prepare them to be fully cooperating
members of society and enable them to be self-supporting, it should also
encourage the political virtues so that they want to honor the fair terms of social
cooperation in their relations with the rest of society.
Id.
165. Id. at 157 (pointing to "the virtues of tolerance and being ready to meet others
halfway, and the virtue of reasonableness and the sense of fairness."); see also id. at 224
(noting that political virtues include reasonableness and a readiness to honor the duty of
civility, "which as virtues of citizens help to make possible reasoned public discussion of
political questions"). Moreover, though he does not explicitly say so, Rawls, like all other
proponents of civic education, also surely thinks that schools should teach students to use
reason to organize their lives and the life of the political community, for he observes that "any
workable political conception of justice ... must ... endorse rationality as a basic principle of
political and social organization." Id. at 177. The necessity of developing basic skills such as
the ability to think rationally is often not explicitly discussed by theorists, in large part
because everyone agrees on their value. Sherry, supra note 152, at 157 n.111. Sherry
indicates:
I consciously pass over the need to learn and teach basic skills-which now must
include computer literacy as well as the traditional "three Rs--since it is
uncontroversial .... One reason that basic skills education is uncontroversial
may be that it is necessary to prepare children to become self-sufficient and
economically productive individuals, regardless of how citizenship is defined or
whether particular children are or will become citizens.
Id. Some scholars do, of course, focus on such skills. E.g., Battistoni, supra note 151, at 23
(noting that "many of the analytical and reasoning skills essential to good citizenship are
better taught outside the social studies, in areas such as science and mathematics").
166. See GALSON, supra note 145, at 246 (noting liberal virtues such as "independence,
tolerance, and respect for individual excellences and accomplishments"); id. at 222 ("I turn
now from individualism to diversity, the second defining feature of liberal society. The
maintenance of social diversity requires the virtue of tolerance."); id. at 221-25 (discussing
adaptability, courage, loyalty, and other virtues); id. at 246:
Still other[] [virtues necessary to sustain the liberal state] are entailed by the
key features of liberal democratic politics. For citizens, the disposition to respect
the rights of others, the capacity to evaluate the talents, character, and
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Proponents ofso-called republican or participatory civic education
agree with liberals about the importance of teaching critical
thinking, tolerance, mutual respect, and empathy,'6 7 but they add
to these skills and virtues a number of skills and virtues drawn
specifically from the civic republican tradition.'c First and foremost,
republicans argue that schools should teach students to participate
performance of public officials, and the ability to moderate public desires in the
face of public limits are essential. ... And the developed capacity to engage in
public discourse and to test public policies against our deeper convictions is
highly desirable for all members of the liberal community, whatever political
station they may occupy.
See also MACEDO, supra note 56, at 125 (advocating the teaching of a"range of liberal virtues:
not only tolerance and mutual respect, but also openness to change, self-criticism, moderation,
and respect for the norms of public reasonableness"). Macedo also explains:
Liberals cannot ... leave aside altogether the project of moral education. A
system of free self-government needs to encourage widespread convergence on
certain shared attitudes and character traits, as well as the patterns of social life
that support them. No liberal democracy can survive without citizens prepared
to tolerate others, to act more or less responsibly, to take some part in public
affairs, to stayinformed, and to act for the good of the whole at least sometimes.
For a liberal democracy to thrive and not only survive, many of its citizens
should develop a shared commitment to a range of political values and virtues:
tolerance, mutual respect, and active cooperation among fellow citizens of
various races, creeds, and styles of life; a willingness to think critically about
public affairs and participate actively in the democratic process and in civil
society....
Id. at 10-11.
167. See, e.g., CENTER FOR CIVIC EDUCATION, THE ROLE OF Cvc EDUCATION: A REPORT OF
THE TASK FORCE ON CIVIC EDUCATION 5-6 (1995) (noting that civic education is necessary to
teach empathy); Sherry, supra note 152, at 168-71, 177 (noting the importance of tolerance
to a republican education for citizenship). Amy Gutmann, whom Suzanna Sherry
characterizes as espousing a republican version of civic education, see Suzanna Sherry,
Republican Citizenship in a Democratic Society, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1229, 1229 (1988) (book
review) ("Amy Gutmann's DemocraticEducation might equally well be entitled Republican
Education, for its central theme is how to produce true republican citizens-citizens who
possess both the ability and the motivation to participate in their deliberative political
communities."), also emphasizes the importance of teaching mutual respect and toleration.
E.g., Amy Gutmann, Undemocratic Education, in LIBETAIhSm AND THE MORAL LIFE 71, 79
(Nancy L. Rosenblum ed., 1989) (noting the need for teaching virtues such as religious
toleration and "mutual respect for reasonable differences of opinion7); Gutmann, supranote
153, at 567 (endorsing Rawls' emphasis on teaching political virtues such as toleration and
mutual respect); id. at 577-78 (arguing that democratic governments have a duty to teach
students mutual respect).
168. For classic discussions of civic republicanism in the legal literature, see, for example,
Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988) and Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
the RepublicanRevival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). For a critique of civic republicanism, see
Steven G. Gey, The UnfortunateRevivalof CivicRepublicanism, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 801 (1993).
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actively in public life through deliberation with fellow citizens about
matters of public importance. As one supporter of such a version of
civic education puts it: "Civic education for the common good aims
to equip citizens with the capacity for civic deliberation. That is, to
carry on discussion of the question first formulated by Aristotle:
'Given our circumstances, how ought we to live together?"'16 9
Accordingly, republicans urge schools to equip students with the
skills and the dispositions to forge a common culture, despite the
diversity that often makes such a common project so difficult to
achieve. Thus, for example, R. Freeman Butts, a leader in the
movement to promote civic education over the last fifty years,
describes the republican tradition that informs his theory of civic
education as
requir[ing] aformative politics in which citizens are expected to
deliberate about the common good on the basis of a knowledge
of public affairs and also a sense of belonging, a concern for the
whole, a moral bond with the community whose fate is at stake,
and thus they are enabled to shape the destiny of the political
community .... 170
In order to enable students to participate effectively as public
citizens and to forge common bonds across such a diverse
population, supporters of republican or participatory civic education
often encourage schools to require students to participate in group
projects and community service in a way not generally emphasized
by proponents of liberal civic education.1 7 They also tend to
emphasize the importance of teaching persuasion, negotiation,
and other rhetorical skills necessary for public deliberation. 7 2
169. William M. Sullivan,EducationfortheCommon Good, CivicARTSREV., Winter/Spring

1991, at 19, 20.
170. R. Freeman Butts, Educationfor Civitas: The Lessons Americans Must Learn (May
1997), availableat http'//www.civiced.org/papers-butts0l.html.
171. See, e.g., Benjamin R. Barber, Civic Education and Community Service, CMc ARS
REV., Winter/Spring 1991, at 10, 10-12 (noting importance of community service to civic
education); David Johnston, Individualismand Civic Virtue, CVIC ARTS REV., Winter/Spring

1991, at 4, 8 (suggesting that institutions of higher learning "develop and encourage group
projects and allocate responsibility for these projects to the group as a whole").
172. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 171, at 7 (encouraging institutions of higher learning
to "take steps to revive interest in the art of persuasion); Battistoni, supra note 151, at 22
(indicating that "the social studies curriculum ought to integrate materials leading to the
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Prominent proponents of the republican approach to civic education
include Professor Suzanna Sherry of the Vanderbilt Law School17
and the Center for Civic Education, the nation's largest and most
active civic education organization and the publisher of both the
NationalStandardsfor Civics and Government' 4 and Civitas,"'5 a
600-plus page "framework" for civic education." 6

development of communications and rhetorical skills. The importance of discussion and
debate to the participatory-republican model of democratic politics makes these verbal
reasoning skills mandatory to future citizens" and that the "rhetorical skills of persuasion and
bargaining... are necessary citizen attributes in a diverse society where conflict is seen as
legitimate but yet surmountable."); Sandra Stotsky, Literature and the Development of Civic
Consciousness: Questions from the 1987 Institute on Writing, Thinking, and Citizenship
Education 4 (1987) (unpublished paper, on file with author) (arguing that literature programs
can teach students the written skills needed for direct participation in public life).
173. See Sherry, supra note 152, at 157. In that article, Professor Sherry argues in favor
of an educational program that will 'prepare children to become responsible anddeliberative
citizens in a diverse republic of rights" by teaching them moral character, critical thinking,
and cultural literacy. Id. More specifically, she contends that students should be trained to
participate in their republic by engaging in rational deliberation, id. at 176, to act in
accordance with cultural norms, such as individual responsibility, honesty, hard work, and
tolerance, id. at 177, to think critically about authority and social norms, id. at 172-73, and,
most controversially, to gain a knowledge of and an attachment to their own common culture,
id. at 157. With respect to this last point, Sherry acknowledges that schools should (indeed,
must) acknowledge diversity, embrace a pluralistic and inclusive multiculturalism, and
encourage tolerance of diverse belief systems, id. at 166, 170, but she argues that schools
should focus foremost on fostering in students a commitment to forging a common culture, id.
at 162-63.
174. CENTER FOR CMc EDUCATION, NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR Civics AND GOVERNMENT
(1994) [hereinafter NATIONAL STANDARDS].
175. CENTER FOR CMc EDUCATION, CiVrTAs: A FRAMEWORK FOR Civic EDUCATION (1991)
[hereinafter CITASI.
176. The National Standards, for instance, in its content standards for secondary school
students urges schools not only to instruct students about the fundamentals of the American
political system, the relationship between political institutions and democratic values, and
the relationship of the United States to the rest of the world, NATIONAL STANDARDS, supra
note 174, at 89-124, but also to encourage them to take part in civic life, explaining that"[t]he
well-being of American constitutional democracy depends upon the informed and effective
participation of citizens concerned with the preservation of individual rights and the
promotion of the common good." Id. at 80. The Civitas framework goes even further than the
National Standards,noting:
The ultimate goal of civic education is the widespread participation in the
governance of the groups to which they belong by citizens ... [who must learn]
the knowledge, skills, dispositions, and moral commitments required for
competent and responsible participation in monitoring and influencing the
formulation, implementation, adjudication, and enforcement of public policy.
CIVrrAS, supra note 175, at 39.
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As I argue in the next section, regardless of the theoretical
differences between these two models of civic education, teaching
students about religion is consistent with-and supportive
of-either model.
B. TeachingAbout Religion as Civic Education
Teaching about religion in the public school classroom can
prepare students for citizenship in at least five distinct and
important ways. This subpart examines these ways in turn.
1. IntellectualReasoning Skills
First, by studying about religion, students will have the
opportunity to learn a set of civically important intellectual
reasoning skills that they might not develop in their other classes
and pursuits. Participation in democratic life-whether it be
through holding public office, deliberating in the public square,
arguing with friends (or foes) in private about public issues, or just
deciding which candidate or policy initiative to support or vote
for-will often require a citizen to consider how other citizens, who
may very well approach basic moral or ethical questions from
significantly different starting points, might view the public issue
at stake. For example, a political representative might want to
consider, when deciding how to vote on a proposed piece of
legislation, whether and why some of her constituents (perhaps a
minority of them) would find that legislation to be morally offensive.
A community leader might want to convince other members of the
community to support a particular policy initiative by appealing to
arguments that those members might find attractive, even if the
leader herself finds them irrelevant. In addition, a person heading
for the polls might want to consider whether voting "yes" on the
referendum of the day would negatively affect people whose views
on fundamental questions differ from his own. In each of these
cases, the citizen must be able to think about the relevant public
issue from a perspective different from his or her own and to reason
about the desirability of the proposed government action from
within a different world view. Classes such as math and science may
teach students to reason analytically, but they hardly teach
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students to think about questions from a variety of intellectual
angles.
Teaching about religion can help fill this void by training students
to analyze, evaluate, and articulate positions on public issues from
within very different fundamental paradigms. In a class about
religion, students will learn how different religious traditions
approach basic ontological, epistemological, sociological, and moral
issues. They will explore how these traditions' approaches to these
basic questions might differ and, if Nord and Haynes' prescription
is followed, how they differ from certain important nonreligious
viewpoints." In doing so, students will be forced to consider how
people from all over the world, throughout many historical periods,
have thought about issues; to compare these different viewpoints;
and to articulate them in discussions, assignments, and
examinations. Such a program not only will provide students with
important bodies of knowledge-as discussed below-but also
presumably with an improved ability to understand and
communicate with contemporaries who do not share their basic
assumptions. This understanding and communication will be
facilitated regardless of whether their differences are religious or
nonreligious in nature, 178 and regardless of whether the relevant
discourse concerns a major policy issue of national importance or a
local issue of relevance only to a county, city, or school district. 7 9

177. See supranote 124 and accompanying text.
178. In other words, this general skill will allow students to think about problems from
different comprehensive viewpoints, even nonreligious ones. For example, it might help a
student more or less dedicated to a form of Kantian liberalism (even if she does not identify
her position as such) to understand a libertarian perspective on a disputedissue. It also might
help a utilitarian understand how a Marxist might approach such an issue.
179. Such a skill might come in useful, in other words, regardless of whether the dispute
is about a major national issue such as abortion or about a local issue such as whether a
school should perform a Christmas play or display religious symbols as part of a holiday
celebration.

1202

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:1159

2. Knowledge of Religious History
Second, as many have observed, 80 by teaching students about the
role that religious believers, religious communities, and religious
ideas have played over the course of history, schools can improve
those students' currently inadequate understanding of historical
events, better preparing them for civic life. An accurate knowledge
of history is critical to understanding present issues of public
concern. Citizens of a particular culture or nation inevitably consult
their knowledge of history, not only in thinking about how public
issues ought to be approached and resolved, but also in articulating
their positions on those issues to other citizens. As one scholar of
civic education explains, "[a] thorough historical understanding
allows us to better judge current problems, institutions, and values
by showing us similar political situations over time, where we can
disinterestedly examine them in all of their complexity and with all
of their ramifications."' 81
Given the extremely significant role that religion has played in
American life over the past four centuries, students must gain some
understanding of American religious history to understand their
own history. For example, anyone considering the issue of whether
religious communities ought to take a public stand on civil rights
issues would, at some point, naturally try to remember what he or
she knows about how religious communities have participated in
civil rights issues in the past. If that person were also involved in a
public (or semipublic) debate over the same issue, he or she might
also cite historical examples to convince his colleagues or opponents
of the correctness of his position. Thus, a student who never learned
about the role of Christianity in the civil rights movement of the
1960s 82 or in the abolitionist movement of the mid-nineteenth
century 8 would have no choice but to rest his opinion on this very
important public issue on a radically incomplete knowledge of
180. This appears to be the position of those Supreme Court Justices who have weighed in
on the issue. See supra text accompanyingnotes 59-66. Nord and Haynes certainly believe this
to be the case. NORD & HAYNES,supranote 3, at 35-39; id. at 38-39 ("[F]or most of history the
sacred and the secular were pervasively entwined, and religion pervaded all of life ....
If
students are to understand history they must understand religion.This is not controversial.").
181. Battistoni, supra note 151, at 21.
182. See CARTER,supra note 1, at 227-29.
183. See HAYNES, supra note 36, at 7.
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the facts that are necessary to the problem's resolution. The same
analysis applies to teaching students about religious contributions
to foreign cultures. A failure to understand the role that
Confucianism has played in Chinese civilization, or that Islam has
played in many Middle Eastern civilizations, will undermine public
decision making and discourse about issues relating to those
cultures and nations. Teaching students about religion will certainly
not ensure that every public decision will rest on full knowledge of
the relevant facts, but surely it will help.'8 '
3. Informed Evaluationof Government Laws and OtherAction
Affecting Religion
Third, schools should teach about religion to prepare students to
evaluate thoughtfully and intelligently laws and other government
actions that affect religious believers and communities. In a sense,
this argument for teaching about religion for civic purposes
resembles the argument in favor of teaching science for civic
purposes. According to some educational theorists, schools should
teach students science, not simply to ensure that some students will
eventually become scientists (a small number of students in any
event), or to improve our long-term national economic productivity
and competitiveness, or to give students the pleasure of learning
about the natural world, but rather to create a scientifically literate
citizenry that can, as the National Research Center's National
Science EducationStandardsputs it, "engage intelligently in public
184. Schools should also consider teaching what Carter calls "the negative side" ofreligion.
CARTER,supranote 1, at 207. Carter argues:
Of course, children should study the negative side as well: from the religion-

based prohibition movement that culminated in the EighteenthAmendment and
the Volstead Act to the destruction ofmanyNative American religious traditions
to what the historian Jon Butler has called the "African spiritual
holocaust"-that is, the willed destruction during the nineteenth century of the
African religious traditions that the slaves brought with them and tried to
preserve.
Id.; see also NORD & HAYNES,supranote 3, at 39 (citing as another tremendously important
reason to study religion's role in history the fact that, "Ifhistory is replete with examples of
ways in which religion has ennobled humanity and enabled people to flourish, it is also all too
filled with examples of religious warfare and persecution. This makes the story of religious
liberty.., important for students to understand."); William P. Marshall, The Other Side of
Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 845 (1993) (examining the "psychological and sociological
forces inherent in religious experience that can lead to intolerance and persecution").
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discourse and debate about matters of scientific and technological
concern. "las In our increasingly complex and technological society,
the argument goes, citizens must possess at least a basic knowledge
of fundamental scientific concepts and an understanding of the
scientific method to debate and evaluate thoughtfully such public
policy issues as improving public health, protecting the natural
environment, and developing ethical rules to govern the use of new
technologies such as cloning and genetic engineering."' Just as
schools should teach science to promote a scientifically literate
society that can evaluate important public questions involving
science and technology, so too they should teach about religion to
promote a religiously literate society that can evaluate important
public questions involving religious belief and practice.
Government action-legislation, regulation, and policymaking at
all levels of formality-affects religion in countless ways.
Government programs in the United States provide financial and
other sorts of aid to religious organizations, in varying levels of

185. NATIONAL RESEARCH CENTER, NATIONAL SCIENCE EDUCATION STANDARDS 13 (1996)
[hereinafter NATIONAL SCIENCE EDUCATION STANDRARDS]; see also Why and How You Should
Learn Math and Science: HearingBefore the House Committee on Science, 106th CONG. 70
(1999) (statement of Rodger Bybee) ("[E]ducation has a goal of preparing students to exercise
their rights, duties, and responsibilities as citizens .... Justification for teaching mathematics
and science rests on the utility ofmathematics and scientific knowledge to individuals in their
work and responsibilities as citizens .... "); W. Wayt Gibbs & Douglas Fox, The FalseCrisis
in Science Education,SCI. AM., Oct. 1999, at 87,88 ("A consensus has begun to emerge among
science education researchers, teachers and practicing scientists that schools should turn out
scientifically literate citizens, not more candidates for the academic elite.").
186. See, e.g., NATIONAL SCIENCE EDUCATION STANDARDS, supra note 185, at 11 ("Why is
science literacy important? ... Americans are confronted increasingly with questions in their
lives that require scientific information and scientific ways of thinking for informed decision
making. And the collective judgment of our people will determine how we manage shared
resources-such as air, water, and national forests."); Rhonda Miller, Science Books are Out,
Hands-On is In, PITT. POsT-GAzETE, Aug. 26, 1999, at Al ("The top students who are
predisposed to science are doing very well. We're worried about the bottom three-quarters of
the class, the ones who will need basic science literacy to be productive and successful
citizens, to make good technological and political decisions.') (quoting George Nelson, director
of Project 2061, a Washington, D.C.-based organization that encourages science, math, and
technology literacy); id. (stating that people need a better understanding of science in order
to make decisions about issues in their daily lives, including the environment, cloning, and
DNA fingerprinting. "People have to make decisions about products that they buy and their
health. The change in science education is based on the idea that everyone can and needs to
understand these complex issues to a certain extent.'") (quoting Karen Stamp, director of
laboratories for Carnegie Mellon University's chemistry department).
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directness.' 87 Statutes that are facially neutral with respect to
religion nonetheless often place substantial burdens on the exercise
of religious practice.' Other regulatory and criminal statutes-over
two thousand by one count-specifically provide exemptions or
accommodations for religion.'8 9 Congress and state legislatures have
passed general legislation to protect the free exercise of religion.'9 0
Government sells public land to religious institutions 9 ' and places
187. E.g., Personal Responsibility andWork OpportunityReconciliationAct, 42 U.S.C. 604a
(Supp. V 1999); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 798 (2000) (describing Chapter 2 of the
Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 469).
188. General laws and policies regulating drug use, prison activities, and animal sacrifice,
for example, can burden religious belief and practice. E.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (involving claim that drug laws infringed on religious ritual
of smoking peyote); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (challenging prison
regulation prohibiting Muslim prisoners from attending weekly congregational services);
Hamilton v. Schriro, 74 F.3d 1545 (8th Cir. 1996) (challenge to prison regulations denying
Native American prisoners access to sweat lodges). General regulations can also deny
religious believers access to religious symbols in some cases. E.g., Cheema v. Thompson, 67
F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding preliminary injunction under Religious Freedom
Restoration Act [RFRA] when school district weapon ban prohibited students from carrying
ceremonial knives at all times as required by their religious beliefs); Werner v. McCotter, 49
F.3d 1476 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding no RFRA violation when prison officials refused to provide
prisoner with Cherokee Native American religious literature or symbols); cf Sasnett v.
Sullivan, 908 F. Supp. 1429 (W.D. Wis. 1995) (finding violation of RFRA when prison
prohibited prisoners from wearing crucifixes). Such general laws and regulations can also
interfere with religious rules regarding sacred time. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963) (invalidating state law denying unemployment compensation to worker who refused
to work on the Jewish Sabbath); see also Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175 (7th Cir. 1996)
(finding that Muslim prisoner had stated RFRA claim by alleging that prison officials refused
to accommodate needs of Muslim inmates during holy period); Rust v. Clarke, 883 F. Supp.
1293 (D. Neb. 1995) (upholding denial of requests by adherents of Asatru religion for weekly
worship time in prison), affd, 89 F.3d 841 (1996); Woods v. Evatt, 876 F. Supp. 756 (D.S.C.
1995) (upholding against RFRA attack prison policy permitting Muslim inmates to receive
gifts during Christmas but not during their primary holidays), affd, 68 F.3d 463 (4th Cir.)
(table).
189. Michael W. McConnell, The Problem ofSingling Out Religion, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 1,
5 (2000) (citing study showing that over 2000 federal and state statutes included a specific
accommodation for religion).
190. For federal statutes, see for example, Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42
U.S.C. § 2000bb to bb-4 (1994); Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000,
42 U.S.C.S. § 2000cc to cc-5 (2001). The Supreme Court has held that Congress exceeded its
section 5 enforcement powers when promulgating RFRA with respect to its application to
state laws. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). On state RFRAs, see Alan E.
Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and Freedomof Speech, 32 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 605 (1999).
191. E.g., MarciA. Hamilton, Religionand the Law in the ClintonEra:AnAnti-Madisonian
Legacy, 63 LAW& CoNTEmp. PROBS. 359,380 (2000) (describing sale offederal land to Catholic
University).
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religious symbols on public property. 9 2 Disputes over the proper
role ofreligion in public schools arise daily.19 Public land regulation
interferes with sacred spaces such as sacred forests, churches, and
gravesites. 19 ' Congress has passed domestic legislation to promote
religious liberty abroad,'9 5 and the United States, through its
participation in the United Nations, has adopted an international
192. E.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989)
(holding unconstitutional a freestanding display of a nativity scene in front of a county
courthouse but holding constitutional the display of a menorah placed next to a Christmas
tree); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (upholding a display of a creche in Providence,
Rhode Island against Establishment Clause challenge).
193. For an attempt to summarize the current state of the law regarding the various
controversies that arise in connection with religion in the public schools, see Religion in the
Public Schools: A Joint Statement of Current Law (Apr. 1995), available at
http:/Avww.ed.gov/Speeches/04-1995/prayer.html.
194. Historically, many government regulations and laws have infringed upon sacred
Native American land. The case of Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439 (1988), in which the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not
prohibit the United States Forest Service from building a road through sacred Native
American land, is perhaps the most memorable example. See also Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d
735 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Northern Arizona); Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983) (holding
that South Dakota could develop Bear Butte into a public park); Badoni v. Higginson, 638
F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980) (flooding of the Rainbow Bridge area on Lake Powell); Sequoyah v.
Tennessee Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1980) (flooding of the Little Tennessee
River behind the Tellico Dam); John T. McQuiston, Way Clearedfor Development Fought by
Tribe, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2000, at B4 (reporting that judge in Long Island cleared the way
for the construction of thirty-eight homes on sixty-two acres of land considered by the
Shinnecock Indian Nation to be sacred). Zoning and other land regulation has also often
interfered with other types of sacred land and space. E.g., Thiry v. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491 (10th
Cir. 1996) (holding that parents' religious beliefs would not be substantially burdened by
relocation of the daughter's gravesite and use of existing gravesite for public highway);
International Church of the Foursquare Gospel v. City of Chicago Heights, 955 F. Supp. 878
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (denyingpreliminary injunction under RFRA sought by church seeking special
use permit to build in area zoned for business and manufacturing); Abierta v. City of Chicago,
949 F. Supp. 637 (N.D. 11.1996) (holding that church had sufficiently alleged violation of
RFRA when city sought to rezone property that church sought to purchase), rev'd, 129 F.3d
899 (7th Cir. 1997); First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174 (Wash.
1992) (en banc) (holding that Free Exercise Clause prohibits application of landmark
ordinance to restrict church's ability to alter its exterior); Editorial, Religion and Its
Landmarks, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2000, at A24 (describing controversy over law that would
limit the power of zoning boards to interfere with the practice of religion by, for example,
denying a permit to an Islamic center in an area where there were Christian churches);
Charles C. Haynes, GovernmentEncroacheson Freedom, DAYTON DAILYNEWs, Mar. 21,2000,
at 6A (describingland use disputes in many towns that have arisen when government officials
have tried to limit what can be done in churches and other religious spaces-for example, by
applying height restrictions to prohibit a Mormon temple from building a spire).
195. See International Religious Freedom Act, 22 U.S.C. 6401(b) (Supp. V 1999).
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declaration to do the same. ' In sum, in nearly every area of public
law, actions taken by governments at the international, federal,
state, and local level significantly affect religious belief and practice.
Evaluating this government activity requires knowledge of
religion because of the special nature of religious belief and practice.
As law and religion scholars have explained, religious beliefs are
special 9 in that, to those who hold them, they are often experienced
as (1) involuntary, in the sense that they are experienced as
stemming from an external source or command;1 9 (2) fundamental,
in the sense that they play an overriding role in the believer's
approach to life;' 99 and (3) comprehensive, in that they imbue the
196. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination
Based on Religion or Belief, GA Res. 36I,5, UN GAOR, 36th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 881, UN
Doc. A/36/51 (1981).
197. The idea that religion is special is not uncontroversial. See Steven G. Gey, Why is
Religion Special?:Reconsideringthe Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses
of the FirstAmendment, 52 U. PImt. L. REV. 75 (1990); William P. Marshall, In Defense of
Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308,319-23 (1991) (suggesting that
religious beliefs are not more deeply held and important to individuals than other deeply
rooted social, political, and cultural beliefs); McConnell, supra note 189, at 42 (rejecting
arguments that religion is not special); Jane Rutherford, Religion, Rationality,and Special
Treatment, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 303, 304 (2001) (arguing that religion is special
because "of the role it plays in balancingpower, providingvoices for outsiders, advancingnonmarket values, and fostering individual identity and spirituality"); Jay D. Wexler, Cleaning
the Mess?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 667,669-70 (1997) (book review) (observing that scholars have had
to grapple with religion's specialness).
198. E.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, GOD'S NAME INVAIN: THE WRONGS AND RIGHTS OF RELIGION
IN POLIcs 44 (2000) (noting that for "millions of Americans, moral rules are God given");
JOHNH. GARVEYWHATARE FREEDOMS FOR 46 (1996) ("The individual does not have complete
control over choosing the religious option. It is God who makes the choice. I might have to
accept choice and cooperate in carrying it out, but I am cast as the supporting actor.");

MICHAELJ. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT. AMERICA IN SEARCH OFA PUBLIC PILOSOPHY
63-65 (1996) (noting that many religious believers regard themselves as "claimed by religious
commitments they have not chosen"); see also Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at
a Crossroads,59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115, 125 (1992). In response to a decision by the Supreme
Court striking down a statute requiring employers to accommodate their employees'
observance of the Sabbath, McConnell noted that:
It would come as some surprise to a devout Jew to find that he has "selected the
day of the week in which to refrain from labor," since the Jewish people have
been under the inpression for some 3000 years that this choice was made by
God. Jewish observers do not seek the right to "select the day" in which to
refrain from labor, but only the right to obey laws over which they have no
control.
Id.; see also id. at 172.
199. See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 198, at 25 (noting that religions "provide meanings to
their adherents, meanings of a deep and transcendent sort"); id. at 73 (noting that religious
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believer's approach to all of life, rather than only to some part of
life.2" 0 Moreover, these beliefs are manifested in practice in a variety
of public dimensions, both individual and communal, such as
through religious symbol, 2 1 religious ritual, 2 2 and notions of sacred
space 2 3 and sacred time. 204 These religious practices, stemming as
believers owe their "first allegiance" to those religious beliefs); HUNTER, supra note 106, at
126 (noting that religiously orthodox communities "order themselves, live by, and build upon
the substance of a shared commitment to transcendent truths"); McConnell, supra note 198,
at 126 (observing that for "most ordinary citizens ... religion commonly remains a central
aspect of life").
200. E.g., CARTER, supra note 198, at 73 (observing that the principal Western religious
traditions do not "conceiv[e] of the world as divided into that which God created and therefore
rules and that which God did not and does not"); id. at 25 ("To the faithful, there is no part
of the day that is outside of God's view.").
201. For a consideration of religious symbol by someone who is both a lawyer and a
religious studies scholar, see WINNIFRED FALLERs SULLVAN, PAYING THE WORDS EXTRA:
RELIGIOUS DISCOURSE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 53-58 (1994).
202. Rituals-prayers, ceremonies, recreations of events, offerings, and dances, among
many others-are a ubiquitous part of religious life. Ritual is, according to Jonathan Z. Smith
(one of The University of Chicago's many important post-Eliadean historians of religion),
among other things, a way of creating perfection out of ordinary existence, "a means of
performing the way things ought to be in conscious tension to the way things are." JONATHAN
Z. SMITH, IMAGINING RELIGION: FRtOM BABYLON TO JONESTOWN 63 (1982).

203. "Sacred space" roughly refers to the idea that many, if not most, religious traditions
believe that certain areas or places have sacred significance-that there are some limited
number ofplaces where human beings can become close with whatever they consider to be the
divine. As Mircea Eliade explains: "Every sacred space implies a hierophany, an interruption
of the sacred that results in detaching a territory from the surrounding cosmic milieu and
makingit qualitatively different.... [These spaces are] sanctuaries that are'doors of the gods'
and hence places of passage between heaven and earth." MIRcEA ELIADE, THE SACRED &THE
PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION 26-27 (1957); see alsoRobert S. Michaelsen, Is the Miner's
CanarySilent? Implications of the Supreme Court'sDenial ofAmerican Indian Free Exercise
of Religion Claims, 6 J.L. & REL. 97, 100 (1988). The author explains:
The power of sacred space stems from the fact that as a unique reality it is a
channel or "means of communication with the gods and about the gods," that, as
such, it is a special "place of divine power," and that, consequently, it affords a
model or "icon of the world" and thereby gives form to the world and structure
and meaning to the inhabitants of the world.
Id.
204. "Sacred time" refers to the idea that many, ifnot most, religious traditions believe that
certain times of the day, week, month, or year are imbued with sacred significance. As Eliade
explains, sacred time allows the religious believer to recreate and reactualize a sacred event
that took place in the mythical beginning of the religion's history:
Hence religious man lives in two kinds of time, of which the more important,
sacred time, appears under the paradoxical aspect of a circular time, reversible
and recoverable, a sort of eternal mythical present that is periodically
reintegrated by means of rites. This attitude in regard to time suffices to
distinguish religious from nonreligious man; the former refuses to live solely in

20021

PREPARING FOR THE CLOTHED PUBLIC SQUARE

1209

they do from religious belief, share the significance ofthat belief and
are often experienced as involuntary and fundamental, in the senses
described above.
Because religious belief and practice are special, laws and other
government action that affect religion have unique effects. For
example, when the government enacts a regulatory program that
has the effect of destroying sacred Native American forest land," 5
it does something different from when it condemns or destroys
ordinary forest land, and the effects of its action are qualitatively
different from these ordinary activities. Likewise, as the Supreme
Court has recognized, 2" when government places religious symbols
such as a cross or a creche on public lands; it does something
different from when it places secular symbols, such as a depiction of
the scales of justice or a statue of a famous historic figure, on its
property. When government provides public funds to religious
organizations, the effects are somewhat different from when it
provides such funds to nonreligious organizations, such as public
schools and secular social welfare agencies.
To evaluate laws and other government action that affect religion
students must know something about the special nature of religious
belief and practice. For example, to know whether to support a
policy to place religious symbols on public property, 0 7 students must
know how that policy will affect those who hold religious beliefs not
represented by those symbols, as well as how a decision not to place
those symbols on public property will affect those who do believe in
the religion represented by the symbols. 0 8 If a student is to decide
what, in modem terms, is called the historical present; he attempts to regain a
sacred time that, from one point of view, can be homologized to eternity.
ELIADE, supra note 203, at 70.
205. E.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451 (1988)
("The Government does not dispute, and we have no reason to doubt, that the logging and
road-building projects atissueinthis case could have devastating effects on traditional Indian
religious practices.").
206. E.g., County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 579-84
(1989).
207. Within constitutional limits, of course. Id. at 598-601.
208. Criticism of the Court's decision in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), has often
centered on the Court's failure to understand the true significance of the religious symbolism
at issue. See, e.g., SuivAN, supra note 201, at 88 (stating that "Burger's opinion purports to
encompass and define for American culture the meaning of a publicly displayed creche, while
it denies the religious experience of millions of Americans.... Display of the criche, it is now
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intelligently whether to support a law mandating destruction of
sacred lands, he or she not only must understand the economic and
environmental impact of such a decision, he or she also must
understand how the destruction of those lands will affect those who
believe the land is sacred. This is certainly not to say that schools
should teach about religion to convince students that when
government takes action that has the effect of disadvantaging
religion, religion should always win out. Rather, the idea is simply
that schools should give students enough information to know what
is at stake in issues involving legislation (or regulation) and
religion. This is also not to say that teaching students something
about religion will ensure that decisions about public issues
involving religion will always be made on full information. Such a
goal is not possible within the limits of a public school curriculum
and is undoubtedly not achieved even in more established subjects
such as science or economics. But every bit helps, and given the
importance of religion in American life-and in the life of all the
world's cultures-and the virtual absence of any coverage of religion
in the current public school curriculum," 9 schools should at least
start informing their students about religion.
By leaving the evaluation of laws and government actions
affecting religion in the hands of politically accountable officials,
Supreme Court decisions over the past fifteen years have
exacerbated the need to teach students about religion for civic
purposes. For example, in the Free Exercise context, prior to 1990,
the Court reviewed generally applicable laws that burdened religion
under a strict scrutiny standard, requiring the State to demonstrate
that the law served a compelling interest and was narrowly tailored
to serve that interest.2 10 If the State could not make such a showing,
the complainant would be entitled to an exemption from the law. In
ordained, is to communicate nothing more than a spirit of holiday goodwill," and that, further,
Burger "flattens and demystifies religious experience. He domesticates it, refusing to allow
that it is a live option,' in William James's words .... [T]he effect of Burger's opinion is that
of a steam roller.") (footnotes omitted); Mark Tushnet, The Constitutionof Religion, 18 CONN.
L. REv. 701, 712 n.52 (1986) ("Indeed it is difficult to believe that the Lynch majority would
have reached the same result had there been a Jew on the Court to speak from the heart
about what public displays of creches really mean to Jews.").
209. See supra text accompanying notes 22-27.
210. E.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd. of
Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
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its 1990 decision in Smith, however, the Court reversed course and
held that generally applicable laws that incidentally burdened
11
religion would be reviewed under an extremely lenient standard.
By making it almost impossible for a plaintiff to obtain a religionbased exemption to a generally applicable law, Smith makes it more
important that students learn about religion, because it means that
politically accountable actors must consider the costs of burdening
religious believers when deciding whether to enact a generally
applicable law. Without some knowledge of religion, citizens will
have no way to decide whether their political representatives have
struck the right balance when they either vote to enact a generally
applicable law that burdens religious belief or practice, 2 2 or when
they decide not to support such a law on the grounds that the law's
benefits are insufficient to justify imposing a burden on religion.
In the context of legislative accommodations of religion, the
Court's decision in Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christof Latter-day Saints v. Amos,

21s

which held

that "it is a permissible legislative purpose to alleviate significant
governmental interference with the ability ofreligious organizations
to define and carry out their religious missions,"214 similarly
increases the importance of teaching students about religion. Amos
gives politically accountable officials significant discretion to provide
exemptions from generally applicable laws to religious believers.21
Legislatures certainly have taken advantage of this discretion,
carving out exemptions from statutes governing such diverse areas
as taxation, food safety, antidiscrimination, military service,

211. See Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990). The
Court did note that the strict scrutiny standard would continue to apply to hybrid claims
involving both the Free Exercise Clause and other constitutional protections, such as the
freedom of speech or the right Sf parents to direct the education of their children. Id. at 881.
212. Or to support a generally applicable regulation or other policy, short of formal
legislation.
213. 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
214. Id. at 335.
215. The Court has limited this discretion in some respects. See, e.g., Estate of Thornton
v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703,710-11 (1985) (holding unconstitutional a state statute providing
that no person could be forced to work on the day that he or she declared to be his or her
Sabbath day). As Michael McConnell notes, however, the Court's decisions as a whole have
"returned to national and state legislatures" the question of religious accommodation.
McConnell, supra note 189, at 2.
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immigration, and drug use.16 The rationale for providing such
exemptions is that religion is special in some way that justifies
treating it differently from other forms of belief. In order to evaluate
whether religious belief is in fact special, and whether this
specialness is significant enough to justify unique treatment under
the law, however, public officials must have some understanding of
what exactly might be special about religion. To evaluate the
decisions of those public officials either to include or not to include
a religious exemption or accommodation in a generally applicable
statute, citizens in turn also must know something about religion.
Classes in religious studies can help improve decision making in
this regard.
Finally, the Court's recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence
also supports the need to teach students about religion. Although
the Court has held firm on its position of limiting governmentsponsored religious practice in schools,2 1 7 it has, in a series of
opinions stretching back over ten years, given the State significant
leeway to provide financial and other types of aid to religious
organizations. Prior to 2000, Supreme Court case law prohibited
the State from providing instructional materials and computers
to religious schools; 218 the Court's decision in Mitchell v. Helms
overruled this line of cases and upheld the provision of such aid
in many circumstances. 2 9 Likewise, prior to 1997, it was unconstitutional for public school teachers to provide remedial
education on the premises of religious schools;220 the Court's
decision in Agostini v. Felton overruled the cases establishing this
prohibition and held that such remedial education was consistent
with the Establishment Clause.2 In a series of other cases, the
Court has allowed the State to provide various types of aid to
216. James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
IconoclasticAssessment, 78 VA. L. REv. 1407, 1446 (1992).
217. E.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (invalidating school policy
authorizing student-led prayer at school football games).
218. E.g., Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 251 (1977) (finding unconstitutional the use of
public monies for purchase of instructional materials and equipment for students); Meek v.
Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 366 (1975) (invalidating instructional-equipment loan program).
219. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
220. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 412-14 (1985); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball,

473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985).
221. 521 U.S. 203, 209 (1997).
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religious institutions, upholding the use of public funds to pay an
outside contractor for printing the publication of a religious student
group; 222 the payment of public money to a deaf student to pay for
an interpreter to assist him in his classes in a Catholic high
school; 2' and the payment of public money to provide vocational
services to a blind student who chose to study at a Christian college
to become a pastor. 22' The Court has upheld other sorts of financial
aid to religious institutions as well.225
As in the Free Exercise and accommodation contexts, these
Establishment Clause cases have left publicly accountable officials
with substantial discretion to enact laws affecting or involving
religion-in this case, aid programs that funnel public money to
religious organizations. Determining whether these elected officials
should in fact exercise this discretion to provide public aid to
religious organizations requires that citizens have some knowledge
of how the aid programs will affect religious believers and
communities, and therefore requires knowledge about religion itself.
Relevant questions might include how religious believers will feel
about being excluded from public aid programs, whether religious
organizations can survive without public aid, how members of
minority religious communities will feel about the fact that in
practice most public money given to religion will flow to
organizations affiliated with majority religious traditions, and
whether there is something unique about religion that will cause
religious believers to compromise their beliefs by accepting public
funds. Teaching students about religion will help equip them to
think about these questions and to answer them thoughtfully and
intelligently. This, in turn, will allow them to fulfill their role as
citizens to evaluate the decisions of their elected public officials
regarding the allocation of public funds.

222. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845-46 (1995).
223. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 3 (1993).
224. Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986).
225. E.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617 (1988) (rejecting facial challenge to
Adolescent Family Life Act, which provided grants to religious and other organizations
providing counseling on teenage sexuality); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-404 (1983)
(upholding Minnesota statute allowing state taxpayers to deduct expenses incurred in sending
their children to private schools, including religious schools).
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4. Understandingthe Role of Religion in PublicDebate and
DecisionMaking
Fourth, teaching about religion can improve students'
comprehension of the way in which many religious people form
opinions and make choices about law and other public issues, and
can therefore help promote mutual understanding and civic peace.
Although there is a significant dispute in the law reviews and
elsewhere as to whether, as a normative matter, citizens ought to
rely on religious beliefs or experience when forming or articulating
views on matters of public concern,2 26 there can be little dispute
226. For a sampling of this literature, see GREENAWALT, supranote 2; GREENAWALT, supra
note 5; MICHAELJ. PERRY, RELIGION IN POUTICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL PERSPECTIVES
(1997); Larry Alexander, Liberalism,Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology, 30 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 763 (1993); Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic
Society, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 677 (1993); Robert Audi, The Separationof Church and State
and the Obligationsof Citizenship, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 259 (1989); J. David Bleich,
Godtalk: Should Religion Inform Public Debate?, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1513 (1996); Khaled
Abou El Fadl, Muslim Minorities and Self-Restraint in Liberal Democracies, 29 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1525,1539 (1996); Franklin I. Gamwell, Religion andReasoninAmericanPolitics, 2 J.L.
& REL. 325, 332 (1984); John H. Garvey, The Pope's Submarine, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 849
(1993); Kent Greenawalt, ReligiousExpression in the PublicSquare-The BuildingBlocks for
an Intermediate Position, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1411 (1996); Abner S. Greene, Is Religion
Special?ARejoindertoScottIdleman, 1994 U. ILL. L. REv. 535; Abner S. Greene, The Political
Balance of the Religion Clauses, 102 YALE L.J. 1611 (1993); David Hollenbach, S.J., Contexts
of the PoliticalRole of Religion: Civil Society and Culture, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 877 (1993);
Scott C. Idleman, Ideology as Interpretation:A Reply to Professor Greene's Theory of the
Religion Clauses, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 337; Charles Larmore, Beyond Religion and
Enlightenment, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 799 (1993); Sanford Levinson, The Confrontationof
Religious Faith and Civil Religion: CatholicsBecoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047
(1990); Robin W. Lovin, Perry, Naturalism, and Religion in Public, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1517
(1989); Marshall, supra note 184; Michael J. Perry, ReligiousArguments in PublicPolitical
Debate,29 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1421 (1996); Maimon Schwarzschild, Religion andPublic Debate
in a LiberalSociety: Always Oil and Water orSometimes More Like Rum and Coca-Cola?,30
SAN DIEGO L. REv. 903 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, Religion and the Public Square:Making
Democracy Safe for Religious Minorities, 47 DEPAUL L. REv. 499 (1998); Steven Shiffrin,
Religionand Democracy, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1631 (1999); David M. Smolin, Cracks in the
Mirrored Prison: An Evangelical Critique of Secularist Academic and Judicial Myths
Regarding the Relationship of Religion and American Politics, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1487
(1996); Lawrence B. Solum, Novel PublicReasons, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 1459, 1460-67 (1996);
Symposium,Religiously BasedMorality:Its ProperPlaceinAmericanLaw andPublicPolicy?,
36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 217 (2001); Ruti Teitel, A Critique of Religion as Politics in the
Public Sphere, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 747 (1993); Jeremy Waldron, Religious Contributionsin
PublicDeliberation,30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817 (1993); Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence
G. Sager, UnthinkingReligious Freedom, 74 TEx. L. REV. 577 (1996) (book review); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, God as a Lobby, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1655 (1994) (book review). For discussions of
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that many citizens do in fact rely on religious beliefs and
experiences when formulating their views on such issues.2 2 7 As
Columbia Law Professor Kent Greenawalt explains, religious
the special problem of religion and judging, see the articles in Symposium, Religion and the
Judicial Process: Legal, Ethical, and Empirical Decisions, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 177, passim
(1998).
At least four types of arguments have been made in favor of imposing some limits on the
use ofreligious reasons and arguments in public discourse and decision making. First, it has
been suggested, primarily by Robert Audi, that reliance on religious reasons can, in some
circumstances, violate principles of separation of church and state that must be adhered to
in any free and democratic society. See Audi, SeparationofChurchand State,supra, at 278-86
(arguing that citizens should not advocate or promote any legal or public policy restrictions
on human conduct unless one also has and is willing to offer, and is motivated by, an adequate
secular reason); Audi, Place of Religious Argument, supra, at 687-99. Second, some (most
notably Abner Greene) have argued that citizens and legislators should not rely on religious
reasons because such reasons are epistemologically fundamentally different from other sorts
of reasons. Reliance on those reasons is therefore unfair, since, as Greene argues, it "excludes
those who do not share the faith from meaningful participation in political discourse and from
meaningful access to the source ofnormative authority predicatinglaw." Greene, The Political
Balance of the Religion Clauses, supra, at 1614; see also GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 76
(describing and rejecting an accessibility argument raised by Thomas Nagel); Audi, Place of
ReligiousArgument, supra,at 690 (noting that some reasons "cannot motivate ... rational[ly]
informed person[s]" to do certain things). Third, some contend that religious arguments are
inherently more divisive than other types of arguments, and that reliance on those reasons
in public discourse could therefore cause harmful consequences to such discourse, making it
more polarized, intolerant, and persecutory. E.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 5, at 219 ("Why
isn't it all right to advocate political positions in terms of narrower religious convictions?...
[In actuality, such discourse promotes a sense of separation between the speaker and those
who do not share his religious convictions and is likely to produce both religious and political
divisiveness."); El Fad, supra, at 1539 ("My own inclination is that if social and political
discourses are to avoid polarization, a degree of self-restraint is necessary."); Marshall, supra
note 184, at 859 (arguing that "religion has its dark side. This dark side, moreover, has the
potential to be a powerfully destructive political force. It may, for example, harm the process
of political decisionmaking. ... Religion, if unleashed as a political force, may also lead to a
particularly acrimonious divisiveness among different religions," and that "most
problematically, religion's participation in the political process can produce dangerous results:
Fervent beliefs fueled by suppressed fear are easily transformed into movements of
intolerance, repression, hate, and persecution."). Finally, it has been argued that allowing
reliance on religious reasons would unfairly favor Christian beliefs in public discourse to the
detriment of religious minorities. Sherry, supra,at 502 ("[1]n America, in actuality, allowing
religious reasons to justify public policy will have a negative effect on minorities, especially
Jews. The idea of favoring religion in general over non-religion is a chimera, because in
America, such a policy will always have the effect of favoring Christianity over other
religions.").
For a discussion of the arguments put forward against limiting public debate and decision
making in this way, see infra text accompanying notes 264-69.
227. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 30 ("Religious convictions of the sort familiar in this
society bear pervasively on people's ethical choices, including choices about laws and
government policies.").
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believers draw on a variety of "sources of ethical guidance,"
including "sacred texts, authoritative statements by church
organizations and religious leaders, consultation with the
community of believers, and direct inspiration, usually through
prayer and meditation."2" These religious sources of authority
provide ethical prescriptions of varying specificity that the believer
may rely on with varying degrees of confidence.22 9 Those who derive
ethical standards of behavior from authoritative sources will most
likely be guided by those sources in their consideration of issues of
public policy.2"' As Greenawalt says, "religious premises that
pervade one's view of social reality and justifiable human actions
will almost certainly affect what one thinks the government
should do."2 ' Religious convictions, Greenawalt notes, may be
relevant to a wide variety of divisive public issues including
"matters like military and foreign policy, capital punishment,
welfare distribution, animal rights, and abortion."2 2 Other important issues, such as environmentalism,3 3 euthanasia," and legal
ethics,2 3 can easily be added to that list.
This reliance by many deeply religious citizens on religious
sources of authority raises important civic problems. Those who do
not rely on such sources-or rely on them only to a limited
extent-often have difficulty understanding how deeply religious
citizens reach conclusions on issues of public policy, and vice versa.
228. Id. at 31. Of course, as Greenawalt observes, reliance upon these sources of authority
does not mean that religious believers eschew reason as a ground for ethical or political

choice. See id. at 31 ("[Viariations among believers over how far religious sources of guidance
should be mediated by reason are highly important."); see also Gamwell, supra note 226, at
332 ("The point of moment is that authentic religious beliefs, whatever their substance in fact
is, are inherently accessible to humans qua humans, or inherently rational in character.").
229. See GREENAWALT, supranote 5, at 31-34.
230. For a discussion of the various ways that a religious believer might be guided by

religious authority, see Garvey, supra note 226, at 859-76.
231. GREENAWALT, supra note 5, at 34.
232. Id.

233. E.g., Harold Coward, Religious Responses to the Population Sustainability
Problematic:Implicationsfor Law, 27 ENvTL. L. 1169, 1171-80 (1997) (reviewing religious

responses to the global challenges of population pressure and environmental degradation).
234. E.g., Haripriya M. Mannan, Death as Defined by Hinduism, 15 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.

REV. 423 (1996) (analyzing Hinduism's views on euthanasia).
235. E.g., Leslie Griffin, The Relevance of Religion to a Lawyer's Work: Legal Ethics, 66
FORDHAM L. REV. 1253 (1998); Ved P. Nanda, Hinduism and My Legal Career,27 TEX. TECH.
L. REV. 1229 (1996).
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As Yale Law Professor Stephen Carter has explained, those who
believe in the supremacy of religiously authoritative sources often
begin from epistemological starting points that are radically
different from those who do not share such beliefs. 6 For example,
a creationist who believes in the inerrancy of the Bible cannot, by
definition, believe in scientific theories that contradict biblical
teachings." A Jehovah's Witness who follows his religion's
prohibition against accepting blood transfusions cannot faithfully
accept a transfusion, regardless of how necessary his doctor thinks
the transfusion is for his health. 23 ' The Jehovah's Witness and the
doctor, like the evolutionist and the creationist, have fundamentally
different approaches to these problems. They are at epistemological
loggerheads. Because of this disjunction, the believer's reliance on
religion may appear unreasonable, misguided, or even ridiculous to
those who rely on other sorts of authority or reasoning to reach
decisions on public issues. Conversely, those who eschew religion as
a source for guidance on public issues may seem morally bankrupt
to those who do rely on religious sources for their values. This lack
of mutual understanding, in turn, can cause offense and alienation,
make it impossible for believers and nonbelievers (or "orthodox"
believers and "progressive" believers). 9 to understand each other's
needs and interests when discussing public issues, and exacerbate
what James Davison Hunter termed the "culture war" between
236. CARTER, supranote 1, at 218 ("[Ihe idea that we share either common startingpoints
or common forms of reasoning from our starting points may be no more than a pleasant
fantasy."); id. at 226 ("A large part of the trouble, of course, is that not everyone agrees that
the Enlightenment project of replacing divine moral authority with the moral authority of
human reason was a good idea.").
237. StephenL. Carter,Evolutionism,Creationism,andTreatingReligionasa Hobby, 1987
DUKE L.J. 977, 980-82. The creationism-evolution debate obviously has public ramifications,
particularly as it relates to what should be taught in the science classrooms of public schools.
238. See CARTER, supra note 1, at 219-21 (explaining how the liberal cannot understand
the Jehovah's Witness's belief that accepting a blood transfusion violates God's law against
ingesting blood).
239. In his classic book, James Davison Hunter describes the two "polarizing impulses"
that he believes constitute the "heart of the contemporary culture war:" the "impulse toward
orthodoxy" and "the impulse toward progressivism." HUNTER, supra note 106, at 43. The
impulse toward "orthodoxy," according to Hunter, refers to "the commitment on the part of
adherents to an external, definable, and transcendent authority." Id. at 44. Progressivists, on
the other hand, tend "to resymbolize historic faiths according to the prevailing assumptions
of contemporary life." Id. at 44-45. The two groups have "fundamentally different conceptions
of moral authority." Id. at 49.
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those who rely on religion as a source of values and those who do
not.
It is unlikely that teaching students about religion will resolve
Hunter's culture war, but it might help nonreligious, or
"progressively" religious, students understand the way many
"orthodox" religious citizens reach conclusions and make decisions
about issues of public concern, and vice versa. Students in religious
studies classes will learn about religious scripture, religious
experience (and the transformative effect such experience can have
on individuals),2" the ethical teachings of religious traditions, and
other concepts that will help them understand why devoutly
religious people approach important questions by referring to
sources of religious authority. This surely is not to say that the
young evolutionist will come to agree with his creationist friend (or
vice versa) or that the budding young doctor will agree with her
Jehovah's Witness classmate or that the pro-choice student will
learn to agree with the "orthodox" Catholic pro-life advocate; such
transformation is extremely unlikely, and most assuredly should not
be the goal of the religious studies class in any event. But by
learning, for example, about the Bible, the idea of biblical inerrancy,
and the teachings of the Catholic Church, the evolutionist, the
future doctor, and the pro-choice liberal might learn to understand
and appreciate why their "orthodox" classmates and fellow citizens
disagree with them. And through dialogue over these issues, those
students who tend more toward the "orthodox" might also come to
understand better their more "progressivist" (or atheistic)
classmates. Such understanding may, if we are lucky, lead to a
richer and more-civil civic discourse in the clothed public square
regarding some of our most divisive public controversies. 4 '

240. On religious experience, see WILLIAmJAMES, THEVARIETIES oFRELIGIOUS EXPER ENCE
177-238 (1990) (describing conversion experiences); id. at 343 ("M]ystical states seem to those
who experience them to be also states of knowledge. They are states of insight into depths of
truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect."); RUDOLF Ono, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY 4 (1950)
("For if there be any single domain of human experience that presents us with something
unmistakably specific and unique, peculiar to itself,assuredly it is that of the religious life.").
241. Cf PERRY, supra note 226, at 46 ("Because of the religious illiteracy-and alas, even
prejudice-rampant among many nonreligious intellectuals, we probablyneed reminding that
at its best, religious discourse in public culture is not less dialogic-not less open-minded, not
less deliberative-than is, at its best, secular discourse in public culture.") (footnote omitted).
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5. Tolerance
Finally (and most certainly related to the foregoing four points),
teaching about religion can help foster those virtues that all civic
education in a democracy seeks to promote: tolerance, empathy, and
mutual respect. 2 The major rallying call of the movement to teach
students about religion is the need to find "common ground.2 43 The
introduction of religious studies into the curriculum can help
achieve this goal in two ways. First, the very introduction of a
course about religion can help soothe the fear that religious
believers have about the pervasive secularity of the public school
curriculum. If a community can succeed in agreeing that such a
course would be educationally desirable and that it should be
implemented according to a set offair principles, then it has already
achieved a fair amount of cooperation and respect. The process
itself, in other words, is a way of finding some short-term common
ground.
The true challenge, however, a long-term one. Though it is far
from certain that teaching students about different religious faiths
will inspire them to be more tolerant and respectful towards those
who hold different religious beliefs, there is reason to be
optimistic.2 " Introducing students to the different dimensionsritual, ethical, scriptural, etc.-of a variety of religious traditions
can help dispel the intolerance and disrespect that arise from
242. Scholars dispute whether respect or tolerance should be the goal; as well as whether
it is the choice or the content of the choice that ought to be tolerated or respected. E.g.,
MACEDO, supra note 56, at 223 (critiquing Stephen Carter's concept of respect and arguing
that "[l]iberal citizens must respect each other's rights, but they need not approve of the
choices that other people make within the limits of their rights"); Linda C. McClain,
Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond "Empty'
Tolerationto TolerationasRespect, 59 OHIo ST. L.J. 19 (1998). Making any attempt to resolve
this dispute is beyond the scope of this Article.
243. See, eg., NORD & HAYNES, supra note 3, at 16 ("The greater risk, however, is to ignore
the distrust and discontent that have led many parents to conclude, fairly or unfairly, that
public schools are hostile to their faith and values. Ironically... religious issues in schools
have actually become a good place to start building common ground.").
244. It is important to distinguish teaching about tolerance from teaching about religion.
The question posed here is whether teaching about religion itself might promote tolerance or
respect, regardless of whether it is also accompanied by a message that students should be
tolerant and respectful of other faiths. There is good reason to believe that teaching a message
of tolerance andrespect will have some success in fostering those virtues. The argumenthere
is that simply teaching about religion itself will independently have that effect.
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naivet6 and ignorance about religion. Showing students how
religious believers themselves express their beliefs, what Nord and
Haynes call "understanding religion from the inside,"2 45 might allow
them to sympathize with people of different faiths. Teaching
students about how government action can frustrate religious
practices and the way many religious people rely on different
sources of authority to reach decisions on important public
questions could cause those students to empathize with (instead of
ignoring, marginalizing, or ridiculing) people who hold unfamiliar
religious beliefs.24 Moreover, religious studies classes, by
encouraging dialogue between religious and nonreligious students,
might also help religious students better understand the
perspectives of nonreligious students, thus improving tolerance in
the other direction as well. Although there is always a chance that
the ongoing effort to promote teaching about religion might
ultimately backfire-perhaps familiarity will, in the end, simply
breed more discord and suspicion-the positive possibilities seem
like reason enough to continue the effort.247
6. Two Counterarguments
a. The Argument From PoliticalLiberalism
This subpart considers and rejects two important possible
critiques of the case just set out in favor of schools teaching
students about religion.24 The two critiques are derived from the
245. NORD & HAYNES, supra note 3, at 50.
246. See id. at 30-32 (describing a middle-school social studies class in which the teacher
teaches about religion and in which "[s]tudents can address serious and controversial topics
more readily because they are prepared to exchange views without personal attack or
ridicule").
247. As Charles Haynes put it:
[We must learn more about another. Ignorance breeds suspicion and distrust.
Only through mutual understanding can we engage each other with respect and

civility.
Not that understanding others requires us to accept their religion. We are all
free to call others to the truth as we know it. But we do need to know something
about who our neighbors are if we're going to debate them without going for the

jugular.
Charles C. Haynes, ReligiousDiversity Can Be Source of U.S. Strength,DAYRON DAILYNEWS,
Dec. 7, 1999, at 12A, available at LEXIS, News, Individual Publication File.
248. Beyond the scope of the Article is any in-depth consideration of general critiques of
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the theory of civic education itself (as distinguished from teaching about religion as one part
of civic education). One such critique might be that education should strive to be neutral with
respect to instilling values or orientations in students. A somewhat more sophisticated
critique might contend that education should at least strive to be as neutral as possible, so
as to prevent those who control the curriculum from indoctrinating students into believing one
or another conception of how they ought to live. The short-though not entirely
complete-answer to these critiques, in my view, is that education cannot possibly be neutral,
or even close to neutral. As one legal scholar puts it:
A value-free curriculum is clearly impossible. Selectivity is inherent in making
decisions of inclusion and exclusion necessary to develop a curriculum.
Curricular choices, therefore, inevitably lend the color of official support to one
perspective over another. Additionally, pedagogical style and classroom
procedure instill through students' experience value positions .... Similarly,
schools simply cannot attain value-neutral or balanced education .... Value
neutrality itselfhas avalue bias favoring the liberal philosophy embodied by the
scientific method of inquiry.
Stanley Ingber, Religious Childrenand the Inevitable Compulsion ofPublic Schools, 43 CAsE
W. RES. L. REv. 773,778-79 (1993) (footnotes omitted); see also Sherry, supranote 152, at 158
("But educational neutrality is neither possible nor desirable."). Another critique of civic
education in a liberal state would claim that there is no need to educate students for life in
such a state; liberal democratic institutions are themselves sufficient to ensure the preferred
results. See, e.g., Galston, supra note 51, at 91 (identifying "a tradition of Mandevillean
argument that liberal polities do not need-indeed, are distinctive in not needing--civic
education directed to the formation of liberal citizens because social processes and political
institutions can be arranged so as to render desired collective outcomes independent of
individual character and belief."). The need for liberal civic education is, in my estimation,
adequately defended by others, such as Macedo and Galston, see GAISTON, supra note 145,
at 17-21,231-37,244-45; MACEDO, supra note 56, at 3-12. A fourth critique might contend that
even if civic education is to some degree desirable, other goals of education (utilitarian,liberal,
etc.) should predominate (and perhaps eclipse) the goal of training citizens. Balancing the
benefits of civic education against those of other theories of education is beyond the scope of
this Article.
This Article also does not consider in any depth the various practical problems of
implementing a teaching about religion program in the public schools. These obstaclestraining teachers, developing materials, getting communities to agree on basic principles,
among others-are indeed substantial. But as outlined in Part I, recent years have seen great
improvement in the development of curricular materials and teacher training, and efforts
such as those undertaken by Haynes and others have achieved significant success in bringing
diverse members of various communities together behind the idea of teaching about religion.
These developments indicate that the practical obstacles to widespread implementation of
teaching about religion programs are not insurmountable, particularly if unique methods of
community-based reform and perhaps alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are used
to instigate change and resolve problems that might arise. See Tomiko Brown-Nagin, "Broad
Ownership" of the Public Schools: An Analysis of the "T-Formation"Process Model for
Achieving Educational Adequacy and its Implications for Contemporary School Reform
Efforts, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 343 (1998) (describing a nonadjudicative model of school reform);
Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Schools, Communities, and the Courts:A Dialogic
Approach to EducationReform, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 99,99 (1996) (proposing a model for
education reform which "seeks to unite all the relevant stakeholders in a principled process
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two theories of civic education-liberal and republican -described
earlier. The first of these critiques can be stated this way: Because
discourse on important public issues in a pluralistic liberal
democracy should be conducted in language that is accessible to all
citizens, and because public decision making should turn on reasons
not drawn from comprehensive visions of the good life not shared by
all, religious beliefs (being such comprehensive visions 9 ) are not
relevant to public decisionmaking or discourse, and therefore
students need not learn about religion to participate meaningfully
in civic life.250
Such a critique quite clearly would be informed by at least some
elements of political liberalism. Political liberals such as Rawls and
Macedo argue that public decision making and discourse should
generally be carried out in terms that are equally accessible to all
reasonable citizens-as Macedo says, "in terms of reasons and
arguments that can be shared with reasonable people whose
religious and other ultimate commitments differ."25 1 The ideal of

of discussion, deliberation, and reevaluation of fundamental policies and values").
Finally, the suggestion that teaching about religion programs are problematic because the
way they are implemented may affect how students will understand the relationship between
religion and the state is considered, at least briefly, infra Part III.
249. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 5 ("A broader category, into which almost all religious
beliefs fall, is 'comprehensive views': overall perspectives that provide a (relatively) full
account of moral responsibilities and fulfilling human lives.").
250. John Rawls describes the meaning of a "comprehensive" moral view or conception of
the good life as follows:
A moral conception is general if it applies to a wide range of subjects, and in the
limit to all subjects universally. It is comprehensive when it includes conceptions
of what is of value in human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as
ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships, and much
else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life as a whole. A
conception is fully comprehensive if it covers all recognized values and virtues
within one rather precisely articulated system .... Many religious and
philosophical doctrines aspire to be both general and comprehensive.
RAWLS, supra note 152, at 13; see also id. at 59 (defining "reasonable comprehensive
doctrines").
251. Stephen Macedo, Liberal Civic Education andReligious Fundamentalism:The Case
of God v. John Rawls?, 105 ETHIcs 468, 475 (1995). For Rawls' articulation and defense of
public reason, see RAWLS, supranote 152, at l-lvii, 212-54. Rawls' position seems to apply to
reaching public decisions as well as to articulating reasons for those decisions. GREENAWALT,
supranote 5, at 53 ("Although Rawls does not explicitly discuss the point, I understand his
theory to embrace the ways in which a citizen justifies to himself the political positions that
he takes, as well as the reasons he communicates to others.").
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252
according to political liberals, demands that
public reason,
citizens articulate their positions on public issues without reference
to their fundamental views on the nature of the good life, regardless
of whether those views are religious or secular in nature.2 5 3 Such a
limit on the proper grounds for public decision making and
discourse is defended as being necessary to promote civic trust in a
deeply pluralistic society.25 4 As Macedo puts it, "should we not try
and offer our fellow citizens reasons that they ought to be able to
accept without making the absurdly unreasonable demand that they
first accept our convictions about the ultimate ends of human
life?" 5 Though political liberals have not gone so far as to critique
in print the idea of teaching students about religion for civic
purposes (so far as I know),5 6 one might build upon their conception
of public reason to argue that if religious grounds are off-limits in
public decision making and debate, then there is little need to teach
students about religion to prepare them for civic life.
This criticism has some force, but ultimately it is inadequate to
defeat the case for teaching about religion as civic education. To
begin with, as the previous subparts of this Part have explained, the
case for teaching about religion for civic purposes does not rest
solely on the need to teach students to understand how religious
people make public decisions and their public articulation of
religious reasons for reaching those decisions. Thus, even if the
point about public reason were granted in full, and it were conceded
that public decision making and discourse should remain entirely
free from religious reasoning, there would still be sufficient reason
to teach students about religion for public purposes. Even if religion,

252. For a good summary of Rawls' conception of public reason, see Solum, supranote 226,
at 1460-67.
253. See Macedo, supranote 251, at 475 (noting that [nleither Protestant fundamentalism
nor Dewey's secular humanism are proper grounds for determining basic rights and
constitutional principles").
254. For a discussion ofother grounds for limiting religious input on public decision making
and discourse, see supranote 226.
255. Macedo, supra note 251, at 495.
256. At times, Macedo seems to come close to stating this critique in his recent book.
MACEDO, supra note 56, at 121-22 ("Indeed, maintaining an educational establishment that
teaches children that important public issues can be deliberated upon without considering
religious questions is itself part of the education for liberal democratic citizenship properly
understood."); id. at 183 ("Liberal public reason avoids saying anything about how religion is
to be studied: that is left to churches and other private groups.").
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as political liberals might suggest, should be a private affair in the
sense that it should not inform political choices, the impact of
government action on religion remains a public concern, just as any
government action affecting other essentially private matters (such
as sex, artistic creation, etc.) does. Therefore it would remain
important, for example, for students to learn about the role that
religion has played in history and about how government action can
affect religious belief and practice, so they can intelligently evaluate
legislation and other public action that might affect religion.
Moreover, the point about tolerance and mutual respect remains
valid as well, since that argument turns not on whether religious
people may properly rely on religious grounds in reaching and
articulating public decisions, but rather on whether people should
be treated with respect regardless of their private world views. In
sum, the argument from public reason, at best, only diminishes
slightly the case for teaching about religion as civic education.
The critique is even weaker than this, however, because the
argument in favor of public reason is unpersuasive even as an
attack against the justification for teaching about religion for civic
purposes that it most clearly stands up against-namely, the
argument that students should learn about the ways many religious
people make public decisions. For one thing, for the argument to be
successful, it would have to claim that all public decisions, not
simply a significant subset of those decisions, must be made without
recourse to religious reasons. Otherwise, teaching students about
religion would still be important for teaching students how religious
citizens make decisions on those public issues to which the rule of
public reason does not extend. Indeed, political liberals like Rawls
and Macedo do limit the reach of this rule, with Rawls arguing that
it applies only to "'constitutional essentials' and questions of basic
justice," 7 and Macedo suggesting that it only applies to questions
257. RAwLS, supra note 152, at 214-15. Rawls goes on to say-

Many if not most political questions do not concern those fundamental matters,
for example, much tax legislation and many laws regulating property;, statutes
protecting the environment and controlling pollution; establishing national
parks and preserving wilderness areas and animal and plant species; and laying
aside funds for museums and the arts.

Id. at 241. Indeed, Rawls has limited the reach of his rule of public reason even further, noting
in what he calls his "proviso" that "reasonable [comprehensive] doctrines may be introduced

in public.reason at any time, provided that in due course public reasons, given by a reasonable
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involving the "most basic political rights and institutions."" s More
to the point-even once again conceding for the sake of argument
the normative appeal of limiting public discourse to public
reasons-such a rule would not translate directly to an argument
against teaching about religion as a way of preparing students to
understand how, in fact, many public decisions are made and how,
in reality, much public discourse is conducted. Even if it were
improper as a matter ofpolitical theory2 5 9 or constitutional law"60 for
citizens or legislators to rely in some cases on religious reasons
when reaching public decisions or to articulate those reasons in
public, the fact would still remain that a great many religious
people do reach such decisions, at least in part, on religious reasons
and do articulate their support for legislation and other policy
choices in religious terms. Civic education must train students to
function effectively within the political system that actually exists.
It surely can aim to transform that system, but it cannot adequately
prepare students by ignoring established and probably indelible
features of the political system in which those students live. As
Galston says:
political conception, are presented sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines
are introduced to support" Id. at li-lii. Thus, teaching about religion would still be justified
under Rawls'version of political liberalism as a way of teaching students about how religious
people reach decisions on public issues, since religious reasons are sufficient, at least in the
interim, for justifying such decisions under the proviso.
258. Macedo, supra note 251, at 475.
259. See GREENAWALT, supranote 2, at 126 (outlining the types of restraint on the use of
religion in politics that might be recommended as a matter of political theory).
260. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S 602 (1971) (holding that statute must have a
.secular legislative purpose" to pass Establishment Clause scrutiny); PERRY, supranote 226,
at 34 ("[W]e should probably conclude that as apracticalmatter,the nonestablishment norm
requires only that government not make ...political choices about the morality of human
conduct-unless a plausible secular rationale supports the choice without help from a parallel
religious argument."). The fact that a law must have a plausible secular purpose to pass
constitutional muster does not mean that religious arguments are off-limits in public debate.
E.g., Michael J. Perry, supranote 226, at 1438 n.46. Perry argues:
Sullivan is wrong to suggest that the fact that government may not make
political choices in the absence of a plausible secular rationale constitutes "the
banishment of religion from the public square." ... First, the "public
square-the public culture of a society-includes much more than politics ...
[Ilt
is neither
Second, religion has not been banished even from politics ....
constitutionallynor morallyinappropriate for legislators or other public officials,
much less citizens, to present religiously based arguments about the morality
of human conduct in public political debate.
Id (citation omitted).
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The adequacy of a conception of civic education cannot be
determined in the abstract, but only through its congruence with
the basic features of the society it is intended to sustain. To
depart significantly from those features is to recommend a
conception of civic education suitable for some society other than
the one at hand.26 '
Given the fact that in American public life, many individual
decisions on public issues are made at least partially for religious
reasons, 26 2 schools would be shortchanging students if they failed to
provide some insight into how those decisions are actually made on
the grounds that in an ideal world those decisions would be made
for other types of reasons.263
One might respond here that a system of public education seeking
to promote citizenship may choose to ignore-or to present only in
a negative manner-even established and indelible features of a
political system, if those features are normatively undesirable or
harmful. After all, racism might play a significant role in the way
many people make public decisions, but nobody would suggest that
schools should teach about racism in a way that would not condemn
it. Therefore, the argument would go, because Rawls and others
have demonstrated that, as a normative matter, reliance on religion
in public decision making and discourse is clearly improper, schools
should not teach students about religion to help them understand
religious discourse on public issues, even though as a descriptive
matter many people do, in fact, conduct such discourse.
Although the major premise of this argument is sound-surely
there are certain indelible features of the American civic landscape
that need not be presented in anything but a negative light, if at
all-the minor premise-that reliance on religion in public decision
261. GALSTON, supranote 145, at 246.
262. See PERRY, supra note 226, at 47 (noting that in the United States "we do present and

discuss ... religiously based moral arguments in our public culture" and that "religiously
based moral discourse ... inevitably.., takes place in public culture").
263. This is not to say that normative arguments against the use of religiously based
reasons in public decision making and discourse should be ignored in the development of a

religious studies curriculum. Indeed, the curriculum should be designed to incorporate those
concerns. For example, a class might introduce the issue of whether religious arguments are
properly relied upon in talking about and reaching conclusions on public issues, and it might

explicitly discuss the various arguments put forth on both sides of that debate.
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making and discourse is clearly inappropriate-is not. Although
Rawls and other political liberals have certainly made a forceful
case for keeping comprehensive visions of the good life out of such
decisionmaking and discourse, other writers and scholars, many of
them law professors working in the field of law and religion, have
advanced equally, if not more, forceful arguments to the contrary.
These arguments are sufficient to defeat. the minor premise
presented above, and therefore the conclusion as well.
Scholars have advanced at least four principal arguments against
placing limits on the use of religious reasons and arguments in the
public square. First, some have argued that such limits cannot work
because, as a practical matter, it is impossible for religious believers
to separate religious beliefs from secular ones. Those with deeply
held religious beliefs, therefore, will always rely on religious reasons
when reaching conclusions about issues of law and public policy.2
Second, and closely related to the first reason, some have argued
that requiring religious believers to reach and articulate positions
on public issues without reference to their deeply held religious
beliefs is fundamentally unfair.2" Third, many have argued that
religious beliefs are on the same epistemological level as other types
of beliefs-political, moral, etc.-and thus, like arguments based on
those other types of beliefs, should be allowed in public discourse. 6
264. See GREENAWALT, supra note 5, at 155 (stating that to demand that religious people
"pluck out their religious convictions is to ask them how they would think about a critical
moral problem if they started from scratch, disregarding what they presently take as basic
premises of moral thought. Asking that people perform this exercise is ... unrealistic in the
sense of impossible

....

");

PERRY, supra note 226, at 47 (noting that it is "impossible" to

maintain a wall of separation between religiously based discourse and the discourse of public
political debate); Lovin, supra note 226, at 1523 ("This reliance on religious conviction in
advance of political justification is not an irrational act or a willful defiance of liberal
principles. It stems, rather, from an understanding that religious convictions, by their nature,
override other reasons for action .... Religious imperatives are 'trump.' They overrule
prudential considerations .... "); William W. Park, SpiritualEnergy and Secular Power, in
THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEvELoPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 171, 204 (Mark
Janis ed., 1991) (MRleligiousvalues will inevitably inform a religious citizen's legal choices,
no less than secular values influence the policy choices made by the non-religious citizen.").
265. E.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 5, at 155 (arguing that it is "positively objectionable"
to make religious believers separate their religious beliefs from what they think on public
issues); Sandel, supranote 153, at 1776 ("[1]t is not always reasonable to bracket, or set aside
for political purposes, claims arising from within comprehensive moral and religious
doctrines.").
266. See Alexander, supra note 226, at 774 (stating that the "liberal's rejection of religiousbased policies suggests some sort ofepistemological divide or discontinuity between what we
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Finally, several writers have suggested that allowing believers to
make religiously based arguments in public about public issues will
in fact deepen public discourse. These writers have suggested that
religious discourse can be as open-minded and deliberate as socalled secular discourse,26 7 that religious arguments can provide
novel perspectives that otherwise would not make their way into
public discourse, 26 8 and that religious contributions can generally
enrich the overall quality of public debate.2 69
One need not resolve whether these arguments ultimately are
sufficient to defeat the argument from political liberalism to
conclude that they are significant enough to defeat the argument
that the position of political liberalism is so clearly correct that
schools should ignore, or treat only in a negative light, the fact that
a great many people rely on religious reasons when deciding and
talking about public issues. The arguments put forward in defense
of this reliance are serious and substantial and, like those on the
other side, cite weighty concerns about fairness, discrimination, and
the ability of citizens of all orientations to participate fully in the
democratic process. A school that decided not to teach about religion
can claim justifiably to know secularly, ... and what we can claim justifiably to know
religiously, the latter being an inferior form of knowledge for purposes of public policy," and
arguing that"[n]o such epistemological divide exists"); Hollenbach, supra note 226, at 896-97
(denying any discontinuity between religious reasons for policy choices and other types of
reasons); Idleman, supranote 226, at 343-52 (arguing against Greene's position that religious
arguments are inherentlyinaccessible to nonbelievers); Schwarzschild, supranote 226, at 913
(noting that any systematic body of principles can be analogized to religion).
267. PERRY, supra note 226, at 46 ("[Weprobably need remindingthat, at its best, religious
discourse in public culture is not less dialogic-not less open minded, not less
deliberative-than is, at its best, secular discourse in public culture."). For commentary to the
effect that religious arguments can resonate even with those who do not share the religious
premises upon which they are based, see id. at 80:
IT]he moral insight, the insight into the requirements of human well-being,
achieved over time by a religious tradition, as the yield of the lived experience of
an historically extended human community, might well have a resonance and
indeed an authority that extends far beyond just those who accept the tradition's
religious claims.
268. See Waldron, supra note 226, at 841-42:
Even if people are exposed in argument to ideas over which they are bound to
disagree ... it does not follow that such exposure is pointless or oppressive. For
one thing, it is important for people to be acquainted with the views that others
hold. Even more important, however, is the possibility that my own view may
be improved, in its subtlety and depth, by exposure to a religion or a
metaphysics that I am initially inclined to reject.
269. See, e.g., Hollenbach, supranote 226, at 888-96.
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on the grounds that to do so would endorse what it believes is an
inappropriate fact of American civic life would itself be taking a side
on a deeply and reasonably contested question of great importance.
While such side-taking might be appropriate in certain circumstances, here it would not be, given that the reliance on religious
reasons is such an important part of American life and that
understanding this reliance is so important to the development of
civic peace.
b. TheArgument From Civic Republicanism
A second critique of teaching about religion for civic purposes
would also call into question the idea that religion should play a
prominent role in public life, but from a very different angle. This
critique, informed by notions of civic republicanism, 27 0 might suggest
that public institutions should be devoted to forging a common
culture and a common vision of the good life, and that there is
therefore no room for celebration of individual religious differences
in the public square. Religious diversity might be tolerated in the
private sphere, but public discourse and education must focus not
on these differences, but on our commonalties-our common history,
concerns, needs, and goals. Under such an approach to public
institutions and discourse, schools should leave teaching about
religion to private institutions such as churches and temples and
devote their limited resources to fostering a common culture and
instilling in students the disposition to work together to sustain that
culture.
There are several problems with such a critique. First, it suffers
from the same problem that the critique from political liberalism
suffers-it ignores the fact that in twenty-first century America,
many public decisions are made on religious grounds that are not
shared by everyone and that have not been derived through any
common project. Again, even if it were conceded that public
institutions-and perhaps even legal doctrine-should be tailored
to achieve certain republican aims, it does not follow that education
should press republican aspirations exclusively, particularly when
it is clear (as it currently is) that the achievement of many of those
270. See supra text accompanying notes 167-72.
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aspirations is not likely to be realized in society at large anytime in
the near future.2 7 '
Second, and more fundamentally, knowledge of individual differences, including religious ones, would seem to be a prerequisite for
the success of any republican venture. 2 Surely it will be an
impossible task to forge anything resembling a common culture in
a pluralistic society if citizens do not have some understanding of
how fundamental commitments on matters of ultimate concern, to
use Tillich's phrase," 3 differ across various religious subcommunities and among individual believers. As Suzanna Sherry
observes, "[to the extent that multiculturalism is inclusive ... it is
not only compatible with a responsible republican education, it is
also necessary if republicanism is to survive in [a] ... diverse and
democratic society."2 74 Sherry's point makes sense in the context of
teaching about religion because without an understanding of
religious differences-including the difference between religion and
nonreligion, and the difference between "orthodox" and "progressive"
religion-it is hard to see how citizens would be able to move
forward to find common ground. It would seem, then, that training
students to tolerate and respect different religious traditions, as
well as teaching students how to think within different paradigms,
271. See GREENAWALT, supra note 5, at 75 ("I want to concede the theoretical possibility
that in an otherwise liberal society, religious convictions might be so uniformly held they
could provide a shared basis for political reasoning, though I am doubtful that could occur in
any modem prosperous society with substantial nondiscriminatory immigration."); RAWLS,
supra note 152, at xviii:
Now the serious problem is this. A modem democratic society is characterized
not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral
doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive

doctrines. No one of these doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally. Nor should
one expect that in the foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable
doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or nearly all, citizens.
272. For discussions of multiculturalism in education and beyond, see generally THOMAS
J. LA BELLE & CHRISTOPHER R. WARD, MuLTCuLTURALsM AND EDUCATION: DIVERSTY AND

rTS IMPACT ON SCHOOLS AND SOCIETY (1994); MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS
OF RECOGNITION (Amy Gutmann, ed. 1994).
273. See PAUL TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH 1-29 (1957).
274. Sherry, supra note 152, at 166. Sherry uses the term "ethnically" in this sentence to
modify "diverse and democratic society," but the same point would appear to apply equally to
religion. In other parts of her article, Professor Sherry equates the two types of diversity. Id.
at 168 ("Even if it were possible for every child to be given a curriculum tailored to her own
ethnic (or religious) ancestry, such a course would endanger the welfare of both the
community and the child.").
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how religion has influenced history both here and abroad, how
government action affects religious practice and belief, and how
religious people make public decisions would not only be consistent
with a republican approach to civic education, but it might even be
a necessary precondition to achieving republican aims.
IlI. TEACHING ABOUT RELIGION AND CIVIC EDUCATION: WHAT TO
TEACH AND HOW

The preceding part articulated a theoretical argument for why
public schools should teach about religion to prepare students for
civic life. This part considers briefly the next logical question: What
and how should schools teach about religion to achieve those civic
purposes? Clearly, these are very complex questions, the answers to
which could take up an entire volume. Moreover, beyond a very
general level, the actual details of how a religious studies program
should be implemented in actual classrooms will have to be worked
out by education specialists with experience and expertise in
designing curricula. In light of these limitations, this part simply
offers some general introductory thoughts about the kinds of issues
that schools will have to consider, and suggests some general
principles that schools should follow. Following these general
thoughts and suggestions, the Article addresses one important
specific problem that will arise whenever schools decide to start
teaching about religion-namely, how broad a sweep of religious
traditions should schools include in their religious studies classes?
A Introductory Thoughts
As documented in the Introduction, the last five or ten years have
seen a significant increase in support for the idea that public schools
should teach about religion." 5 Some even claim that, as a result of
this support, there is now a "New Consensus" in favor of teaching
about religion. 76 Although these developments surely are worth
275. See supra text accompanying notes 114-43.
276. E.g., NoRD & HAYNsES, supranote 3, at 9 (stating that: "[gliven the heated nature of

our culture wars," many people would be surprised to find "that over the last decade a fairly
broad consensus about the role of religion in public schools has developed at the national level
among the leadership of many religious and educational organizations. This New Consensus
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celebrating, the idea of a "New Consensus" is, in an important
sense, somewhat misleading. Educational authorities may be
gradually realizing that it is important generally to teach students
about religion, but this does not mean that they have reached any
sort of agreement on the details of what and how students should
learn about religion. These unanswered questions are indeed
important, particularly given the already-overloaded curriculum
and the intense controversy surrounding religion in the public
schools.2 7 7 For example, should schools teach students only about
Christianity and Judaism, or should they teach about a broader
range of major religions? Should they limit themselves to the major
religions or also teach a smattering of minor ones? Should they give
equal time to minor religions and major ones, or emphasize the
major ones? How should a school determine if something is a major
or minor religion? Or that something is a religion at all? Should
schools teach only about religious scripture and history, or should
they give students some idea of how believers practice their religion
today? What other elements and dimensions of religion should
schools teach students? Religious ethics? Theological history?
Religious art and music? Should schools offer separate courses in
religion or only teach religion where it naturally arises in the
already existing curriculum?2 78 Should religious studies classes be
offered on a required, opt-in, or opt-out basis? Should students be
taught about religious views on issues of public policy, or should
religion be presented as a primarily private affair? What role should
has been articulated in a number of documents."); id. at 36 ("Our educational framework is
grounded in the New Consensus that has developed over the course of the last decade.");
Felsenthal, supra note 129, at Al (noting that the culture war in the schools is "winding
down" and that "[i]n its place is emerging a new consensus that allows for extensive teaching
about religions and their value systems, but no preaching"); Jacobsen, supra note 129, at 76
("Working with legal advisors from education and advocacy groups on the left and the right,
Haynes and Thomas helped forge a consensus that clarifies what religious liberty means and
how it can be implemented successfully in public education."); Witham, supra note 116, at A5
("A group of educators and policy advocates yesterday united around a 'new consensus' on
teaching about religion in public schools, calling it a long-shot agenda but the most likely to
satisfy all Americans.").
277. See supra note 49.
278. This issue is referred to in the reform literature as the issue of "natural inclusion."
E.g., NoRD, supra note 3, at 209 ("Arguably, religion should be included in the conversation
whenever it has something to say about the subject at hand, whenever it 'naturally' comes up.
But there is a very important ambiguity hidden in the term 'natural inclusion.' Natural to
whom?").
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the so-called "dark side" of religion play in religious studies
classes?. 9 Should religion be presented alongside other strands of
intellectual history or by itself? Any school seeking to integrate
religion into the current public school curriculum in a thoughtful
manner will have to move beyond the "New Consensus" by
struggling with these difficult questions, among others. 8 °
To answer these questions, and to set workable priorities, schools
need to start with a clear idea of why they wish to teach students
about religion. Different theories of education will suggest very
different answers to the questions. For example, a school seeking
to teach students about religion to expose them to different
conceptions of the good life that they might choose to adopt as their
own would have little reason to favor major religious traditions over
minor ones, because each tradition presumably would represent an
equally viable possibility for the students. Such a school might focus
more intensely on the experiential dimension of religion than on
historical materials, and would likely offer electives rather than
required courses. On the other hand, a school whose purpose in
teaching about religion is to prepare its students for participation
in the world economy"' might seek a less comprehensive religious
studies program, perhaps simply augmenting its world history
classes with religious materials from prominent world religions so
students will have a better ability to interact with people from other
nations and cultures. Finally, a school following Galston's definition
of "philosophic" education, a school that thus wants to teach its
students to seek truth,2 8 2 might focus on the epistemological
dimension of religion, particularly as it relates to the relationship
between religion and science.8 3 In each case, the general theory
justifying the inclusion of religious materials in the curriculum will
279. See supra note 184.
280. It is true that Nord and Haynes have pretty much answered most of these questions
for themselves, see supra text accompanying notes 119-25, but it is unclear whether school
districts generally agree with them. Furthermore, Nord and Haynes do not confront the allimportant prioritization issue in any sustained fashion. It would seem to be impossible to
integrate all of their suggestions into an actual curriculum, and, in my view, they do not offer
sustained principles which schools can use to prioritize their resources.
281. This might be one version of a utilitarian theory in support of teaching students about
religion.
282. See supra note 51.
283. For an excellent discussion of this relationship, see generally IAN G. BARBOUR,
RELIGION IN Ax AGE OF SCIENCE (1990).
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have important effects on how the curriculum is designed and
structured.
As they consider how to design religious studies programs to
achieve their educational goals, schools must also keep in mind at
least three other concerns. First, of course, they must give serious
thought to what they think about religion itself because how they
present religion to students undeniably will affect how students
learn to think about it. For example: Is religion primarily a private,
personal phenomenon, or does it have a significant public dimension
as well? Are the ethical teachings of religious traditions more
important than their ritual practices or scriptural texts? Is there
something inherently divisive or "dark" about religious belief.?2 4
Are religious beliefs significantly different from other sorts of
beliefs, such as political or philosophical beliefs?"5 The answers
to questions such as these clearly will have an impact on the
curriculum, independent of the educational theory that justifies
teaching about religion in the first place. Second, schools must think
seriously about how their presentation of religion might affect the
students' understanding of the proper relationship between religion
and the State. Inevitably, what schools teach about religion and how
they teach it will affect the way that students think about this
relationship. For example, a curriculum that ignores religious
themes and ideas may signal to students that religion has no proper
role in public life, as might a curriculum that treats religion as a
primarily private phenomenon. A curriculum that stresses the
role that religions have played in instigating warfare over the
centuries might have a different effect on students' understanding
of Free Exercise and Establishment Clause norms2 68 than would a
curriculum that focuses on religion's positive role in civil and
human rights movements. A class that treats those belief systems
284. See supra note 184.
285. Compare SANDEL, supranote 198, at 63-64 (arguing that religious beliefs are deeply
held and important to individuals), with Marshall, supra note 197, at 319-23 (doubting that
religious beliefs are more deeply held and important to individuals than other deeply rooted
political, social, and cultural beliefs).
286. I mean this both as students will come to understand how courts should think about
questions arising under these clauses, as well as, more importantly, how they will come to
understand how public institutions other than courts should deal with religious belief-e.g.,
should lawmakers and policymakers accommodate religious belief, should owners of public
property allow religious symbols to be placed on their property, etc.
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traditionally thought of as religious as highly similar to those
traditionally thought of as philosophical might cause students to
think one way about whether public programs and laws should be
set up to accommodate religious believers, whereas a class that
treats so-called religious belief systems as significantly different
from so-called philosophical ones may cause students to think quite
differently about such issues. 7
Finally, as a matter of educational theory, schools must consider
how their curricula should handle these types of highly contested
issues. Specifically, they must consider whether to present only one
side of contested questions, or instead to present multiple
perspectives on those questions. If they decide that multiple
perspectives are appropriate, they further must decide whether to
present multiple sides of all significantly contested issues, or only
some of those issues. For example, if the relevant decision makers
take the view that religious belief systems are very different than
philosophical ones, should they present only that view, or should
they explain the opposing view (that both systems are essentially
the same) as well? Should they present the "dark" side of religion
even though they believe that the "bright" side predominates? If
they believe that religion is essentially a private phenomenon,
should they also present the view that religion can play a prominent
role in public life?'
This Article has explored the theory of civic education and has
argued that schools should teach students about religion to train
them to participate effectively in a pluralistic liberal democracy.
Several implications for implementing an actual religious studies
curriculum follow rather straightforwardly from the earlier
discussion of why teaching about religion is important for civic
education. For instance, even though schools should add religious
themes and ideas to existing social studies classes so that students
can learn about the role that religion has played in human history,
the goals outlined above probably can not be attained through
287. Of course, factors other than curriculum development, such as the teacher's
presentation of the material, will also have important effects on how students understand
these issues. See Ingber, supranote 248, at 778-79.
288. Deciding whether to present multiple or minority perspectives would also seem to be
an important issue when schools present to students the current Supreme Court doctrine on
questions of religious liberty.
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simply adding religious content to classes that already exist.
Instead, separate classes in religious topics will have to be added to
the curriculum so that students can gain an in-depth understanding
of religion. Second, the content of religious studies classes should be
tailored to achieve civic purposes. For example, students might be
required to take part in exercises designed to teach them how to
think about problems from different religious perspectives (What do
Buddhists think about death? How does the Confucian understanding of the family differ from how familial issues are treated in
the Old Testament?). Teachers might present concepts such as
religious ritual and symbolism in the context of how government
action can infringe upon religious practice and belief. Religious
topics that might be more heavily implicated by government action,
such as ritual or sacred space, should be stressed more than ideas
that are not as important for understanding that relationship, such
as theological history or religious perspectives on history. Religious
concepts should be presented in the context of teaching important
civic virtues such as tolerance and mutual respect. As Nord and
Haynes contend, schools should make substantial use of primary
sources, so that students can learn about the nature of religious
beliefs from the voices of those who hold such beliefs.28 9
In many ways, however, identifying civic education as the general
justification for introducing religious studies materials into the
classroom is just a beginning. As already discussed, civic education
is by no means a unitary theory. 290 Different theories of civic
education will dictate different types of religious studies curriculadifferent content, different emphases, different prioritization, and
perhaps in some cases, different messages about the proper
relationship between religion and government. For example, a
theory of civic education holding that all students should be
required to learn the skills and dispositions necessary for effective
participation in a liberal democracy might dictate a required class
in religious studies-and its attendant stress on tolerance and
mutual respect-with no possibility of opting out,2 91 while a theory
of civic education seeking to inculcate liberal values only to the
extent that those values are not inconsistent with the values
289. See supra text accompanying note 124.
290. See supra text accompanying notes 149-76.
291. See, e.g., Gutmann, supra note 153, at 565-70.
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already held by religious believers might dictate an optional
religious studies class, or at least one with a clear opt-out
provision.2 92 A theory of civic education that takes as its purpose the
teaching of mutual respect might dictate a somewhat different type
of religious studies class than a class justified by a civic educational
theory based on tolerance. 9 3 A republican or participatory theory of
civic education might dictate a class in which students discuss and
debate religious concepts and ideas more actively than a class
justified by a liberal theory of civic education. In sum, the initial
identification of civic education as a general theory to support
teaching students about religion, although important, is only a
preliminary step in fleshing out the details of any specific religious
studies curriculum. Schools must give thought to what they mean
by civic education to flesh out the details of their curriculum. As
they do so, one of the most important details they will need to
consider is what range of religions to teach about, as the next
subpart explains.2 94
B. Which Religions?
Given the "vast and fascinatingly rich panorama of mankind's
religious experience, " 295 any school that tries to decide which
religions to teach its students will have to choose from a nearly
endless set of possibilities and permutations. Despite this
theoretical cornucopia of choices, several prominent models of
which religions to teach stand out for schools to follow. First,
many schools apparently choose to teach students about only
those religious traditions that have the greatest following in the
United States-Christian religious traditions, including perhaps
Catholicism and Judaism 6 -often in the context of teaching about
292. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, On EducatingChildren:A ParentalistManifesto, 63 U.
CH. L. REV. 937, 938 (1996).
293. For discussions of the difference between tolerance and respect, see sources cited
supra note 242.

294. Perhaps the most difficult question of all as a matter of educational and political
theoryis the question of whether to allow an opt-out from classes that seek to inculcate liberal

virtues. This Article does not address that issue in depth, but interested readers should
consult sources cited infranote 383.
295. SART, supra note 123, at 23.
296. See KOSIN &LACHMAN, supra note 3, at 15-16 (reporting that 26.2% of all Americans
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the Bible.2 9 Alternatively, schools could present, as part of their
history classes, only those religious traditions that have
significantly influenced American history. 298 Third, schools could
choose to teach about the world's major religions, often meaning
Christianity, Judaism, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism,
and perhaps Taoism. 2 91 Or they could choose to teach primarily
about the major religions with some reference to other important
religious traditions, chosen either for their global and historical
influence and number of adherents3 ° or because those traditions are
practiced by members of the class or local community.3 '
The simple conclusion-the one that constitutes the so-called
"New Consensus"--that schools should teach students about religion
cannot by itself identify the proper model from among these
possibilities. Nor do we get much further by deciding that the reason
schools should teach about religion is to prepare students for
citizenship. Instead, we need to specify more precisely the specific
parameters of the civic educational theory that justifies the religious
studies program in the first place. Indeed, the question of which
religions to teach is a critical one for civic education. If civic
education aims at training students to conduct their lives within,
and to support, their political community, 30 2 then it very much
matters how schools and educational leaders conceive of the
relevant political community. The conception they arrive at will in
large part dictate how broad a sweep of religious traditions they
think their students should study. Schools must therefore think
hard about the scope of the political community they seek to
emphasize. Do they want to train students to participate in a local
community or a national one? A homogeneous one or a pluralistic
are Catholic; 60% are non-Catholic Christians; and 2.2% are Jewish).
297. See infra text accompanying notes 324-26 (describing efforts to teach about the Bible).
298. For an example of a curriculum adopting something similar to this approach, see
HAYNES, supra note 36, at 109-21, 147-61 (including lessons on the role of the AfricanAmerican Church and the needs and requirements of Muslim students in public schools).
299. SMART, supra note 123, at 5 (listing all but Taoism as the "great living faiths");
HUSTON SMITH, THE RELIGIONS OF MAN (1958) (including chapters on all seven religions).
300. See SMART, supra note 123, at 5 (noting that in addition to the six "greatliving faiths,"
Taoism, Shintoism, the Jain and Sikh religions, and certain modem Christian offshoots, such
as the Latter-day Saints, are "also important").
301. This is the recommendation of Nord and Haynes. NORD & HAYNES, supra note 3, at
47-48.
302. See Galston, supra note 51, at 90.
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and diverse one? Should schools limit themselves to training
students for participation in the American political community, or
is preparation for living in the international community also
appropriate?
As a general matter, although students certainly must be taught
knowledge, skills, and dispositions relevant to political life in their
local and regional communities, it would seem that the true
challenge for public schools in modern America is to train students
for participation in the broadest and most diverse possible political
community. It is certainly true that students must learn how to
support the American national community, because a great many
of the political decisions that affect the everyday lives of citizens
take place on a national scale. It would also appear that, in teaching
students to live in their national community, schools should teach
students about a variety of minority faiths, because it is in the clash
between those faiths and the government, as well as between
minority faiths and more broadly held beliefs, that many of the most
difficult civic challenges involving religion arise.03 The need to
teach students to tolerate others, to understand how people think
from within fundamentally different intellectual paradigms, and to
appreciate the often deleterious effects of government action on
religious beliefs and practices is more acute with respect to minority
faiths than other, more dominant religious traditions."0 4 In order to
meet these civic challenges, schools must teach their students to
participate in a diverse and pluralistic national political community.
The relevant political community, however, is even broader than
the national community, even if that national community is
understood quite broadly. In a world in which nations and peoples
are linked by high-speed transportation, a highly developed
international economy, global political alliances and associations,
and the Internet, students must learn how to exist within and
support the global political community, with its incredibly broad
array of religious diversity. 5 This is true for several reasons. First,
303. See, e.g., ECK, supra note 7, at 22-25.
304. See MACEDO, supra note 56, at 189 ("Understanding the special burden that public
rules sometimes impose on religious or cultural minorities requires adopting the minority
perspective .... ").
305. See ECK, supra note 7, at 24:
We cannot live in a world in which our economies and markets are global, our
political awareness is global, our business relationships take us to every
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the need to understand how other people think about problems from
within very different intellectual and epistemological paradigms is
one that applies not only to local, regional, and national problems,
but also to international problems. Thinking about how domestic
legislative and policy decisions, such as those bearing on free trade
and military issues, will be understood by citizens of other countries
and political orientations has become critical to evaluating those
decisions." Teaching students about a broad range of religious
traditions will better prepare them to think about the international
ramifications of domestic legislation from the perspective of other
people than would teaching about a narrow range of religions.
Second, as already discussed above, only by understanding the role
that religion has played in the history of foreign cultures can we
really understand those cultures.0 7 Thus, to the extent that schools
are teaching the history of other parts of the world, they should also
teach about the religions that historically have affected those areas.
Third, it is important for students to understand both how our
policy and legislative choices might affect religious believers in
other countries-an example might be to understand what role
American free trade legislation might have on the ability of Falun
8
Gong followers to practice their religion in China 3 0 -and
how
religious people around the world make their own policy and legal
decisions based on their religious beliefs-an example might include
understanding Islamic law,3" which often seems so unfamiliar to
continent, and the Internet connects us with colleagues half a world away and
yet live on Friday, or Saturday, or Sunday with ideas of God that are essentially
provincial...."
306. For example, how they might be understood by groups such as Chinese Communists
and Islamic leaders in Middle East nations.
307. See supratext accompanying notes 180-84.
308. See, e.g., Gayle M.B. Hanson, China Shaken By Mass Meditation, INSIGHT, Aug. 23,
1999, at 24 (describing Falun Gongmovement); Bill Nichols, Critics: ChinaTrade Blinds U.S.
to Abuses, USA TODAY, Jan. 11, 2000, at 8A (describing how rights activists accused the
Clinton administration of being more concerned with China's admission to the World Trade
Organization than with its oppression of the Falun Gong movement).
309. For discussions of Islamic law in religious studies literature, see John R. Bowen,
Quran, Justice, Gender: InternalDebates in Indonesian Islamic Jurisprudence, 38 HIST.
RELIGIONS 52,55 (1998) (analyzingprocesses ofdeliberation and debate within the Indonesian
jurisprudential community); Ebrahim Moosa, Allegory of the Rule (Hukm): Law as
Simulacrum in Islam?, 38 HIST. RELIGIONS 1, 2 (1998) (analyzing how Islamic jurists can
conclude, at the end of an empirical evaluation of the facts in a given case, whether
conclusions "constitute a transcendental and divine authority"). For a discussion in the legal
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many Americans.3 1 ° Finally, because the need to promote tolerance
and mutual respect in an often intolerant and belligerent world
certainly extends beyond our national borders, it also would seem
to make sense to teach these virtues in the context of a broad range
of religious traditions.
Applying these principles to the possible models outlined above
demonstrates that, although narrow religious studies programs
focusing only on the Bible, or on Christianity, or on the role that
dominant religious traditions have played in American history do
promote some goals consistent with civic education3 11 (and might
surely be consistent with other theories of public education), they
nonetheless are far from ideal ways to prepare students to exist
within and support their political community."' They are of limited
use in teaching students how to look at issues from a variety of
intellectual perspectives and are underinclusive with respect to
teaching students the religious dimension of world history.
Although they certainly can provide students with some sense of
religious ritual, symbol, authority, and other concepts, students are
likely to be left with a very limited knowledge of these concepts, and
that knowledge will most likely be of the sort with which they are
already most familiar. Such classes cannot provide the best context
for teaching mutual respect and toleration, as they focus on the
most prominent religions instead of those that might more broadly
be met with ignorance and suspicion. Instead, schools should aim to
teach a broad range of religious traditions. If they teach a class on
the Bible, they should follow the Wake County school district and
offer a class in world religions as well. 13 And they should probably
follow Nord and Haynes and teach not only major religions, but also
those with fewer adherents, though these need not necessarily be
literature, see El Fadl, supra note 226.
310. For an excellent contemporary account, see William T. Vollmann, Across the Divide,
THE NEW YORKER, May 15, 2000, at 58.
311. For instance, they certainly help satisfy the need to teach students about religious
influences on American (or Western) history and culture so they can better understand
current political and legal issues.
312. Nord and Haynes agree that schools should not require Bible classes, because they
"come] a little too close to privileging the Jewish and Christian traditions." NORD &HAYNES,
supra note 3, at 171 ("The ideal, once again, is to incorporate the Bible into a religion course
in which it would be studied with other sacred scriptures.").
313. See supratext accompanying notes 134-36.
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limited to those that are practiced locally, particularly if some other
religious traditions might better be used to illustrate key religious
concepts.
This last point leads to one final possibility. Schools and
developers of educational materials might consider focusing on
teaching key religious concepts (e.g., religious experience, ritual,
symbolism, authority, scripture, sacred space and time) instead of
focusing primarily on the content of specific religious traditions
(e.g., the names of Biblical characters, or the specific teachings of
the Buddha). In doing so, they could illustrate those concepts with
multiple examples drawn from a wide variety of traditions, both
major and minor, and even from those traditions that are obscure
or no longer exist. After all, if the key idea in teaching religion for
civic purposes is to teach students concepts and dispositions that
will help them participate in and support their political community,
it is more important that they learn those concepts and dispositions
than for them to master in any breadth or depth the content of any
particular traditions. Students might be able to learn just as much
about religious ritual by studying Aztec sacrifice, 14 Swedish
shamanic performances, 3" and cross-tradition ritual weeping 6 as
they can from studying Christian or Jewish ritual practices. They
may be able to learn as much about sacred space from studying the
religious practices of ancient North American and North Asian
peoples 1 7 as from studying contemporary churches and temples.
Indeed, this approach actually might be less controversial than a
course focusing on major traditions, because it could avoid the
problem of having a nonadherent teach in depth about religious
traditions to which many students in the class belong-a concern of
some parents of religious children.

314. See Michel Graulich, Aztec Human Sacrifice as Expiation, 39 HIsT. RELIGIONS 352

(2000).
315. See GALINA LINDQUIST, SHAMANIC PERFORMANCES ON TH URBAN SCENE: NEOSHAMANISM IN CONTEMPORARY SWEDEN (1997).
316. See Gary L. Ebersole, The Functionof Ritual Weeping Revisited: Affective Expression
and Moral Discourse, 39 HIST. RELIGIONS 211 (2000).
317. See ELIADE, supra note 203, at 52-54.
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IV. TEACHING ABOUT RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION

Thus far, this Article has focused on the benefits, from a civic
perspective, of teaching students about religion in public schools. A
full consideration ofwhether schools should begin teaching students
about religion, however, also must consider the possible costs of
implementing such a program. Perhaps the most worrisome cost is
the threat that teaching about religion will lead to constitutional
violations and litigation."' 8 Indeed, because the line between
objective presentation of religion on the one hand and promotion
and inculcation of religion on the other hand is so fine, and because
the impulse to inculcate students may be very strong in some people
and communities, the argument certainly could be made that
teaching students about religion is not worth the constitutional
costs.
In this part, the Article contends that, on the contrary, the
constitutional costs do not outweigh the benefits of teaching about
religion. The seven subparts that follow discuss seven important
constitutional problems that could arise in connection with a
teaching about religion program. The Article introduces each
problem, suggests some of the problem's complexities, and then
explains why the problem does not defeat the case in favor of
teaching about religion, either because the problem is not as great
318. For a brief discussion of the practical implementation costs of teaching about religion,
see supra note 248. Another important cost of teaching about religion is the displacement of
other subjects from the curriculum. Because the typical public school curriculum is already
either full or overloaded, requiring students to take a course or two in religion will necessarily
mean that they will have to forego taking other courses. The question arises, then, whether
teaching about religion is more important than teaching about other subjects, and, if so, what
subjects should be displaced. A full and comprehensive answer to this question would require
consideration of the importance of a range of other subjects, a project that I simply cannot
complete here. Moreover, the. question must be answered by specific reference to the
circumstances facing each particular school or school district. In light of these difficulties, I
choose to rest my case by simply pointing out as strongly as I can the advantages of teaching
about religion, rather than by comparing those advantages to the advantages of teaching
other subjects. I maynot go so far as Warren Nord, who suggests that schools should consider
teaching one year of religion and 11 years of math instead of 12 of math and no years of
religion, NORD, supra note 3, at 212, and I will concede that in some particularly
disadvantaged school districts, teaching about religion might not be advantageous enough to
make the final cut. I do think, however, that in many, if not most, school districts, teaching
about religion is important enough, for the reasons discussed above, to make it at least an
elective and to perhaps require students to take at least one semester-long course.
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as it would first appear or, more often, because schools, as well as
concerned parents and students, can take steps to prevent the
constitutional problems from occurring. 1 9 Although the natural
inclination of lawyers, particularly those who are members of
minority religious traditions or do not believe in any religion at
all,32 is to doubt whether litigation and legal problems can be
avoided in such a delicate area, it is worth considering that the
recent growth in the movement to teach about religion has met with
much success and does not appear to have been accompanied by any
overwhelming increase in related constitutional litigation. 21
A. IntentionalInculcation
The Supreme Court has long held that public schools may not
indoctrinate students or otherwise intentionally attempt to
inculcate religious belief in their students. As the Court observed in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, "[tihe State must be certain, given the Religion
Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate religion." 22 In
light of this prohibition, it can be argued that promoting teaching
about religion is a bad idea because it might encourage certain
schools and teachers to use the "teaching about religion" label as3 a
subterfuge to inculcate students in a particular religious belief. 1
319. Even though a detailed legal analysis of these problems, focusing on the specific types
of actions that would or would not violate the Establishment Clause, would be interesting and
important, and is certainly something for future work, this Article does not undertake such
an analysis.
320. The author, in full disclosure, is a member of both of these two groups.
321. This is not to say that issues have not arisen. For example, a recent high school field
trip to see the exiled Tibetan religious leader, the Dalai Lama, gave rise to controversy from
legislators who questioned the use of public tax dollars for what they thought was an
essentially religious event. Bess Keller, Dalai Lama's 'Summit Stirs Debate for Schools,
EDUC. WEEK ON THE WEB (May 23, 2001), available at http//www.edweek.org/ew/ewstory.
cfm?slug=37summit.h20; see also Ellen Sorokin, Islam Courseat Middle Schools in California
Angers Parents,WASH. TIMES, Jan. 16,2002, at Al (describing objections to course requiring
students to wear Muslim robes, adopt Islamic names, and stage make-believe pilgrimages to
Mecca to learn about the faith). Such controversies, however, seem minor compared to the
great benefits that the reform movement has brought.
322. 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (noting
that "religious indoctrination ...reasonably ...attributed to governmental action" is
unconstitutional); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 223 (1997) ("As we have repeatedly
recognized, government inculcation of religious beliefs has the impermissible effect of
advancing religion.").
323. Or in the view that having a religious belief is better than having no religious belief,
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Indeed, this scenario appears to have already occurred in Florida.
Though many schools around the country apparently have been
teaching the Bible in a constitutionally appropriate manner,124
evidence uncovered in the last few years by the People for the
American Way indicates that many school districts in Florida, often
using a curriculum developed by an organization called the National
Council on Bible Curriculum in Public Schools, 3 25 may have, in fact,
unconstitutionally "taught the Bible to their students not from an
objective perspective as part of a truly academic and secular course,
but from a religious perspective, generally from a particular
sectarian perspective of Christianity."3 6 Moreover, it is quite possible that this type of teaching is also occurring elsewhere.
which would also be unconstitutional.
324. For an account of how the Bible is being taught in classrooms around the country, see
generally Marie Goughnour Wachlin, The Bible: Why We Need to Teach It; How Some Do, 87
ENG. J. 31 (1998).

325. Information about this group can be found on the People for the American Way
website athttp'/www.pfaw.org/issues/religious.-freedom/fl-bible-ncbcpsfacts.html (lastvisited
Feb. 14, 2002)); see also Yonat Shimron, The Bible Returns: Religion's Revival in North
CarolinaSchools, THE NEws & OBSERVER, Jan. 25,1998, at Al (describing the group and the
use of its curricula in North Carolina schools).
326. People for the American Way Foundation, The Good Book Taught Wrong: 'Bible
History' Classes in Florida'sPublic Schools 3 (1999) [hereinafter GOOD BOOK], availableat
httpA/www.pfaw.orgissuesreligiousfreedom/florida-bible.pdf. People for the American Way
(PFAW) became involved with the Bible teaching issue in Florida in 1997, when the school
board in Lee County adopted curricula for Bible history courses after a contentious year-long
controversy in the community. According to PFAW, during the debate over adoption of the
curricula, one committee member criticized those he thoughtwere not enthusiastic supporters
of the ctirricula by calling them "Jews ... and others who you wondered if they had any
religion at all." Id. at 2. After the school board adopted the curricula, PFAW, along with a
Florida law firm, sued the school district on behalf of parents who thought the curricula
presented the Bible from a Christian perspective. A district court found for the plaintiffs,
enjoining the district from teaching the "New Testament" curriculum. Gibson v. Lee County
Sch. Bd., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1426, 1434 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (finding "it difficult to conceive how the
account of the resurrection or of miracles could be taught as secular history" and noting that
"counsel for Defendants recommended the deletion of references to the resurrection, as well
as many other modifications .... The Court can only hope that the School Board will
implement the advice of its attorneys."). The Court also held that the school district could
teach the "Old Testament" curriculum, but that plaintiffs should videotape the classes and
return to the Court if they believed the classes were being taught in violation of the First
Amendment. Id. The Court further held:
In the event that Plaintiffs continue to believe that First Amendment violations
are occurring in Lee County schools, the Court urges Plaintiffs to return to this
Court with tapes and transcripts which clearly and specifically identify when,
where, how and why the violations occur. The Court expects Plaintiffs to remain
vigilant.
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The concern over promoting inculcation is certainly a significant
one. Obviously, it would be a substantial argument against the
teaching about religion movement if that movement were in fact
remarkably increasing the amount of inculcation of religion taking
place in the public schools. There are several reasons, however, why
the problem is ultimately not sufficiently troublesome to defeat the
case for teaching about religion. First, it is quite likely that the
schools that would use the "teaching about religion" label as a
subterfuge are already inculcating students in various ways.3 27
Promoting teaching about religion, and developing guidelines and
standards for appropriate instruction, can only increase awareness
of the distinction between inculcation and objective presentation,
and make it clearer that inculcation is unconstitutional and
inappropriate.
Second, schools-as well as individual teachers, parents, children,
and watchdog groups-can prevent constitutional violations through
vigilance. Steps that concerned citizens can (and should) take
include holding community meetings both before and during the
Id. Following this decision, the school board settled the case with the plaintiffs, agreeing to
substitute a more neutral, academic curriculum for the challenged curricula. GOOD BOOK,
supra, at 3. Despite the decision, PFAWs report indicates that fourteen school districts in
Florida have been offering Bible classes that "appear to be violating the Constitution." Id. at
4. According to the report, the school districts are presenting the Bible from a Christian
perspective, for example, by teaching that the "Old" Testament is predictive of the "New"
Testament, an interpretation not shared by Judaism; by failing to teach books of the Bible
considered to be canonical by Catholics; and by asking questions of students assuming they
are Christians. Id. at 4-8. As an example of the latter problem, the report quotes one
examination question which asks: "If you had a Jewish friend who wanted to know if Jesus
might be the expectant [sic] Messiah, which book [of the Gospels] would you give him?"
Another asks: "Why is it hard for a non-Christian to understand things about God?" Id. at 8;
see also Craig Timberg, Schools Try Out Bible History Classes, PORTLAND OREGONIAN, June
11, 2000, at A8 (describing Bible classes in Virginia that are similar to the ones being taught
in Florida).
327. See supra note 84 for sources suggesting that many school districts have never
followed the holding in Schempp and other cases.
328. It could be argued here that since vigilance is necessary, promoting teaching about
religion hurts members of minority religious traditions by placing the burden on them to
police the process. Surelyit is true that if schools start teachingmore about religion, members
of minority religions and those who believe in no religion will need to exert a certain amount
of energy to protect their constitutional rights. But this is always true for minorities in
nations that protect minority rights. Rights are rarely self-enforcing. Moreover, members of
minority religious traditions stand to gain significant long-range advantages, in terms of
tolerance and mutual respect, from encouraging schools to teach about their religious
traditions. This advantage justifies whatever efforts minorities might have to take in the
short term.
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implementation of a teaching about religion program, developing
guidelines and standards,3 29 monitoring, and employing alternative
dispute resolution procedures 330 to head off litigation and ensure
that schools do not violate the Constitution. The experience in
Florida tends to bear out these suggestions. Although the People for
the American Way did file a lawsuit, which it won, against an
offending district, other less adversarial methods have also been
used to promote appropriate teaching. The People for the American
Way report outlining problems existing in Florida districts is one
example, 331' as are the guidelines issued in response to this report by
the Florida School Commissioner regarding the proper teaching of
the Bible.3 2 On a larger scale, the National Bible Association and
the First Amendment Center at Vanderbilt University recently
published a booklet, partially in response to the Florida situation,
called The Bible & Public Schools: A FirstAmendment Guide, to
educate school districts and teachers about how to teach the Bible
without violating the First Amendment.33S
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the argument from fear
simply goes too far. The only prophylactic rule that could prevent
the possibility of subterfuge would be a rule that counsels against
329. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text (discussing Nord and Haynes'
proposals).
330. At least one county has adopted such an alternative dispute resolution procedure.
DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH, SCHOOL DISTRICT POLICY AND PROCEDURES § 19, reprintedin FINDING

COMMON GROUND, supra note 32, at 16*13. Although it is not clear whether such a process
would be binding, in that it would prevent parents from suing before exhausting the process,
it surely would be helpful, since it would offer parents a more informal, expeditious, and
inexpensive method for raising concerns with the religious studies program.
331. See supranote 326.
332. E.g., Charles C. Haynes, FindingCommon Ground:Florida'sBible-CourseGuidelines
Could Be Model For All, GANNETT NEWS SERV., Apr. 10, 2000 (noting that Florida's
Commissioner of Education released new guidelines for teaching the Bible in public schools
in response to the criticism there).
333. NATIONAL BIBLE ASSOCIATION & FIRST AmImqDENT CENTER, THE BIBLE & PUBLIC
SCHOOLS: AFIRST AENDMENT GUIDE (1999). The guide suggests that teachers use a biblical

sourcebook, rather than any particular Bible, to avoid "suggest[ing] to students that [the
adopted Bible] is normative, the best Bible," id. at 6, that they expose students to a variety
of biblical interpretations, id., and that they offer Bible-in-literature classes, rather than
classes in the history of the Bible, since the latter "is a difficult undertaking for public schools
because of the complex scholarly and religious debates about the historicity of the Bible," id.
at 8; see also Beth J. Harpaz, Guide Offered On TeachingAbout Bible in PublicSchools, THE
BATON ROUGE ADVOCATE, Nov. 12, 1999, at 8A (describing the guide), available at 1999 WL
6121031.
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teaching about religion under any circumstances. Such a rule would
virtually guarantee that students graduate from public high schools
without learning anything about religion at all, except for perhaps
what they learn about their own or their parents' faiths in private
religious schools in the afternoons and on the weekends. For all
the reasons discussed earlier,""4 this is highly undesirable from a
civic perspective. Vigilance, rather than ignorance, should be the
response to the fear of inculcation.
B. UnintentionalInculcation
Even absent an intention to promote religion, state action that
has the effect of inculcating religious belief or otherwise promoting
or endorsing religion is prohibited by the Establishment Clause. The
oft-maligned Lemon test,3 5 as modified by the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Agostini v. Felton,3 6 asks whether government
action has a primary "effect of advancing or inhibiting religion,"
which in turn asks whether the action "resul[ts] in governmental
indoctrination.""' Likewise, the Court's prohibition on government
endorsement of religion, as Justice O'Connor explained in Wallace
v. Jaffree,3 8 "preclude[s] government from conveying.., a message
that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or
preferred,"3 9 or as the Court put it in County ofAllegheny v. ACLU,
"prohibits government from34 appearing to take a position on
questions of religious belief." 0
Critics of encouraging schools to teach about religion might argue
that schools and teachers-even if they do not intend to inculcate,
promote, or endorse religion-will nonetheless tend to do so, at least
occasionally, and will therefore, despite their best intentions, violate
the Establishment Clause. Because violations of the Establishment
Clause are inevitable, the argument might run, it would be better
for schools simply to eschew teaching about religion altogether.

334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.

See supratext accompanying notes 177-247.
See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971).
521 U.S. 203 (1997).
Id. at 233-34.
472 U.S. 38 (1985).
Id. at 70 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989).
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The critics here would be right that occasional violations of the
Establishment Clause may occur when teachers actually present
material about religion to students. Teachers are only human of
course, and they come to their classes armed with their own
religious beliefs, assumptions, and biases. It is certainly possible
that teachers will communicate these beliefs and biases
subconsciously in their presentation of material, and that this
presentation will, therefore, at times have the effect of promoting or
endorsing certain religious viewpoints. This is all the more likely
since teachers communicate ideas and values not only through the
actual material they present, but also in the manner in which they
present it, including their use of "pedagogical style and classroom
procedure."341 Thus, for example, a Christiain teacher might imply,
by the language he chooses to use or even by his tone of voice or
body language, that Christian beliefs are superior to other religious
beliefs. Such an unintentional message would appear to violate the
Supreme Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence and could
give rise to controversy or litigation.
Again, this critique is cause for concern, but not cause for
abandoning the religious studies project altogether. For one thing,
the costs do not outweigh the benefits. Occasional, and most likely
relatively minimal subconscious violations of the Establishment
Clause are troubling, but not nearly as troubling as the current
system (or at least the system as it existed five years ago), which
leaves children largely ignorant of the great diversity and
importance of religious belief. Second, as with the case ofintentional
inculcation, schools and concerned citizens can take several steps to
ensure that subconscious promotion of religion is kept to a
minimum. Paying serious attention to teacher training is one
obvious step that schools can take. Conducting community meetings
both before and during the program, and keeping communication
channels open among students, parents, and teachers can help bring
to light violations or concerns and therefore prevent future
problems. Finally, teachers can use primary sources and the
technique of attribution ("Buddhists believe X," "Christians believe
Y") to let religious believers speak for themselves and therefore

341. Ingber, supra note 248, at 778.
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minimize the possibility that the teachers will subconsciously
present their own views on religion. 4 2
C. Coercion
The Supreme Court has unanimously held that schools may not
coerce students into participating in a religious ritual or practice,
such as prayer.34 3 Moreover, in Lee v. Weisman, four Justices agreed
with Justice Kennedy's position that the Establishment Clause
prohibits subtle forms of psychological coercion,'" such as the type
of coercion that can arise from peer pressure in school classrooms,
as well as more traditional force-based forms of coercion .3s Thus,
the Court in Weisman, citing Schempp, Edwardsv. Aguillard, and
other cases, observed that "there are heightened concerns with
protecting freedom of conscience from subtle coercive pressure in
the elementary and secondary public schools,"3' and therefore held
that a public school could not allow clergy members to offer prayers
at its official school graduation ceremony.3 47 The Court recently
reaffirmed this prohibition on subtle forms of coercion in Santa Fe
IndependentSchool Districtv. Doe, which invalidated a school policy
allowing a student to deliver a prayer at the beginning of a football
game."' Quoting from Weisman, the Court reiterated that "the
government may no more use social pressure to enforce orthodoxy
than it may use more direct means.3 49
Although the Court has never addressed any issue involving
whether certain forms of teaching about religion might shade into
prohibited coercion, schools wishing to avoid constitutional litigation
342. See FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 32, at 7*5.
343. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 642 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing with
the majority's statement that "the Establishment Clause 'guarantees that government may
not coerce anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise'").

344. Id. at 592-98.
345. Justice Scalia's dissent, joined by three other justices, took the position that the
Establishment Clause prohibits only this latter type of coercion. Id. at 642 ("I see no warrant
for expanding the concept of coercion beyond acts backed by threat of penalty-a brand of
coercion that, happily, is readily discernible to those of us who have made a career of reading
the disciples of Blackstone rather than of Freud.").
346. Id. at 592.
347. Id. at 599.
348. 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000).
349. Id.
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should be careful not to place students in a position that might
make them feel subtle psychological pressure to participate in a
religious ritual or to put themselves too closely into the mindset of
an adherent of a particular religion. For example, one possible tool
for teaching students about the diversity of sacred spaces might be
to take them on a field trip to see, for example, a Buddhist temple.3 0
It would be inappropriate, and perhaps unconstitutional under
Weisman and Santa Fe, however, for a teacher to suggest in any
way that students should participate in a ritual, such as prayer or
incense burning, while they visited the temple. Instead, to dispel
any coercive pressure, the teacher should probably make it explicit
that students do not have to take part in any such ritual.35 1
Likewise, it also probably would be inappropriate, and possibly
unconstitutional under some circumstances, for a teacher to ask a
student to assume the role of an adherent of a particular religious
tradition and to explain his or her views-on prayer, on the divine,
on a controversial public issue, etc.-in the first person as a member
ofthat tradition.3 52 In other words, for example, a teacher should not
ask a non-Christian student to pretend to be a Christian and then
to explain his or her views, as a Christian, on the relationship
between good and evil. Although such an exercise would not in fact
coerce a student into becoming a Christian, the exercise might come
dangerously close to making the student feel pressure to be at least
something approaching a Christian for the duration of the
exercise.3 53 Instead, it would preferable for the teacher to ask the
student what a Christian might think about the relationship
between good and evil.

350. For a rich discussion of the massive number of Buddhist temples in America, see EcK,
supra note 7, at 148-51, 168-70.
351. Even this might not be enough, if the situation was similar to the situations at issue
in the school prayer cases, in which the majority of students would voluntarily participate in
the prayer. If the majority of the students visiting the temple, for example, were Buddhist,
and their participation in a ritual at the temple would make the minority students feel
pressure to also participate in the ritual, then the teacher might have to take stronger steps
to dispel any coercion, or forego the trip to that particular temple altogether.
352. This would be particularly true if the exercise wds an extended one or the role the
student was asked to assume was one of an adherent of a tradition of which the majority of
the class were members.
353. It is for this reason that the course described in Sorokin, supra note 321, is
constitutionally problematic.
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Although the line between objective presentation and coercion
might be a fine one at certain points, the possibility that something
might happen in the classroom that would constitute an
inappropriate or even unconstitutional coercion ofreligious belief or
practice is not substantial enough to cause schools to abandon the
teaching about religion project. It should be relatively easy for
schools, thinking ahead and using quality materials, to avoid
situations that could violate constitutional rights or instigate
litigation. And those schools that choose not to take such steps are
probably the type of schools that would engage in religious coercion
even without the protection of the "teaching about religion" label.
D. Endorsement Through Selection of What Traditionsto Teach
The Supreme Court dicta described in Part I makes it fairly clear
that schools may choose to teach about any subset of religion, even
if that subset is quite small.354 For example, schools may teach
about only Christianity or only the Bible and may ignore the rest of
the rich panorama of religious life and history if they wish.
Although such a limited course would not bring the civic benefits
that a fuller religious studies program offers, 55 the Court is right to
sanction such a program, because teaching about even a limited
slice of religion has important secular civic benefits and can be done
for secular reasons. As one lower court concluded with respect to the
Bible, after surveying the Bible's importance for understanding
Western art, language, popular culture, history, and law, "it
becomes obvious that a basic background in the Bible is essential to
fully appreciate and understand both Western culture and current
events."35 6
But just as a school may not take actions that have both the
purpose and effect of promoting religion (inculcation), 5 ' and may
not take actions that have the effect but not the intent of promoting
religion (unintentional inculcation), 5 ' so too may they not, under
354.
among
355.
356.
357.
358.

See supra text accompanying notes 59-67 (describing Supreme Court endorsement of,
other things, teaching about the Bible in public schools).
See supra text accompanying notes 303-13.
Crockett v. Sorenson, 568 F. Supp. 1422, 1429 (W.D. Va. 1983).
See supra text accompanying notes 322-23.
See supra text accompanying notes 335-40.
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current Supreme Court doctrine, take actions that do not have an
actual secular purpose, or have the purpose of endorsing religion,
even if those actions do not actually promote religion.3 5 9 The
rationale for such a rule is that the "government [may not] appea[r]
to take a position on questions of religious belief or '[make]
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing
in the political community. " ' Thus, for example, it would appear
that a school that required students to take calculus solely because
it thought such a course would bring students closer to God might
run into trouble even if none of the students felt any influence on
their religious beliefs as a result of taking the course. This would be
particularly true if the school reached its decision in a way that sent
a message that religious reasons are uniquely and predominantly
important to how the school makes curricular decisions, thus
signaling to those who are not religious that they are not equal
members of the school community.3"'
359. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 (2000) (government action must have "a
secular purpose"); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989) ("In recent years,
we have paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged governmental practice has
the purpose ... of 'endorsing' religion, a concern that has long had a place in our
Establishment Clause jurisprudence."); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 588-94 (1987)
(finding that statute's purpose was to endorse a religious doctrine and to advance a particular
religious belief). Obviously, there are quite difficult issues involved in how a court would
determine whether a school possessed the forbidden intent. For one thing, it is not clear how
to reconcile the Courts Lemon test standard requiring only some secular purpose and the
Court's endorsement standard forbidding the government from intending to endorse religion.
Does a school that intends to endorse a religious belief but also has a strong secular reason
for taking an action violate the Establishment Clause? It is not entirely clear. Nor is it clear
exactly what kinds of evidence would establish that the government intended to endorse
religion. Moreover, the question of how a court should go about determining the intent of the
government raises many familiar problems. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 635-40
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
360. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
361. CARTER, supra note 1, at 162 in which he states:
If my children attended a public school that decided, for purely religious reasons,
to begin offering a modem calculus course not previously part of the curriculum,
I would be the first to cry "Hallelujah!" It would not matter one whit that the
calculus course was consistent with some religion's holy book-and I doubt that
anybody would sue.
Carter's point is well taken, but two additional points are also relevant. First, itwould present
a different situation if the adoption of the calculus course was accompanied by speeches and
written documents proclaiming that the school was adding the course because of its belief in
a particular religion. This would send a message of disapproval to adherents of other religions
or no religion, a message that might violate the Court's no-endorsement principle. Second, as
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In light of this principle, schools should not decide to teach about
a particular tradition in order to promote that tradition or to make
their students better adherents of the tradition or to promote the
values of the tradition. It is certainly conceivable that a community
overwhelmingly of one religious faith might be tempted to teach
about religion for one of these purposes. But even if the decision
makers have these purposes in mind, they should at least take the
simple step of articulating secular reasons for teaching about
religion and should refrain from making oral or written statements
indicating that their intent is to promote religion. In fact, they
should probably even make oral and written statements to the
contrary. Then, even if the decision makers were in fact motivated
by religious purposes, they would not have sent a message of
exclusion to nonbelievers and therefore would not likely encourage
a constitutional attack.362 In light of how easy it would be for a
school to take such steps, it is unlikely that the forbidden purpose
problem will be much of an obstacle to implementing a religious
studies course. Nor would it be much of a problem by itself-absent
any actual statements or other evidence that might make
nonadherents feel estranged-if school decision makers silently
choose to teach about religion for religious purposes-the secular
and civic benefits would be the same, and it is not clear what the
harms would be. Nonetheless, to gain the active support of the
entire community, it would be preferable if decision makers realized
the many secular, civic benefits of teaching about religion and
structured their curriculum to achieve those benefits. As in the
case of inculcation, concerned parents and students can insist on
inclusive procedures and open communication to help ensure that
schools teach about religion for purposes that are attractive to all
citizens of the community.
a practical matter, resting a decision to add a course on religious grounds is likely to foster
less-enthusiastic support than resting the decision on more broadly applicable grounds, for
the obvious reason that it will be hard for nonadherents to get excited about the religious
reason. As spelled out in the text, these two reasons counsel in favor of resting a decision to
teach about religion on secular, civic grounds.
362. These steps would, of course, not guarantee that the program would not be challenged
or invalidated, see Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587-89 (looking behind articulated purpose to find
illegal one), but they would surely help, particularly if there are not indications in the
legislative history that the purpose was, in fact, an illicit one, cf id. at 592-93 (analyzing
statements of law's sponsor).
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E. Endorsement Through Selective Presentationof a Shared Text
or Traditionwith Multiple Schools
Courts have invalidated some Bible studies classes for presenting
the Christian view of the Bible as normative. For example, two
courts have held that it is unconstitutional for schools to teach the
Christian interpretation of the resurrection of Jesus in the New
Testament as normative. 363 Likewise, the People for the American
Way report on Bible teaching in Florida"' reports that many school
districts are violating the Constitution by framing and teaching
their Bible history classes from Christian perspectives. For example,
the report complains of classes using only Christian terms to
describe the Bible ("Old Testament" rather than "Hebrew Bible" or
"Hebrew Scriptures"), putting forward Christian interpretations of
the story of Adam and Eve, and presenting the Old Testament as
predictive of the New Testament."' In all of these cases, even if it
is not articulated precisely in these terms, the concern appears to be
that the underlying majority Protestant community3 6 is selectively
presenting a text shared by multiple religious traditions
(Protestants, Catholics, Jews, Muslims) to promote its own view of
the meaning of the text.
At first glance, this analysis might seem to raise the specter that
a school could easily violate the Constitution when teaching about
any shared text or tradition with multiple sects. After all, many
religious traditions have numerous sects or divisions, and many of
the distinctions among them will be difficult to identify and explain,
particularly for traditions not familiar to western teachers and
students. Would a mistaken characterization of any shared text or
tradition, implicitly presenting one side of a highly contested issue,
363. Gibson v. Lee County Sch. Bd., 1 F. Supp. 2d 1426, 1434 (M.D. Fla. 1998); Wiley v.
Franklin, 474 F. Supp. 525,531 (E.D. Tenn. 1979). It is not entirely clear from these decisions
what the courts found problematic. It would not seem to be a problem for a school to teach
that Christians believe that Jesus's resurrection was evidence thatJesus was the son of God.
It appears from the cases that the schools must have been teaching more than this, perhaps
that there is only one interpretation-the Christian one--of these events.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 324-26.
365. GOOD BOOK, supranote 326, at 4-6.
366. The People for the American Way also note that the Bible is presented from a
specifically Protestant perspective, excluding, for example, books considered canonical by
Catholics but not by Protestants. Id. at 6.
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necessarily present constitutional problems? For example, would it
be unconstitutional for a teacher to teach that Confucians generally
believe human nature is good, when one of Confucius's great
followers Mencius believed this but his other most significant
follower, Hsfin-tzu, did not? 67 Would it be unconstitutional to teach
that Buddhists believe that nirvana and samsara are different,
when in fact at least some Mahayana Buddhists (as opposed to
68
Hinayana Buddhists) believe they are the same?
Fortunately, it is very unlikely that a court would find such a
reductive presentation unconstitutional, at least in communities
that are not overwhelmingly constituted by Mencian Confucians or
Hinayana Buddhists.36 9 The two critical facts that seem to be
driving the Bible cases will generally be missing from such
situations: (1) there will likely be no intent to promote a particular
side of the shared text or tradition, and (2) the underlying
community will not likely be made up of the favored school, and will
therefore not stand to benefit religiously from the overly simplistic
presentation. Thus the underlying concern in the Bible cases-that
one sect should not be allowed to advance its contested view of a
shared text or tradition in a public school-is absent from the
Confucian and Buddhist examples. There is certainly a problem
with a school overly simplifying complex religious traditions, but the
problem is educational rather than constitutional, and the solution
is likely to be seen as better materials and training, not litigation.
F. Disapproval
It is clear that schools may teach facts and values that are at odds
with some religious beliefs. For example, schools can teach that
racism is immoral, even though some religions might hold racist
367. A.C. GRAHAM, DIsPurEs OF THE TAO: PILosoPmIcAL ARGUMENT IN ANCiENT CHINA
244-51 (1989) (describing differences between Hsitn-tzu and Mencius).
368. Frank E. Reynolds & Jason A. Carbine, General Introduction, in THE LIFE OF
BUDDHISM 9 (Frank E. Reynolds & Jason A. Carbine eds., 2000) (noting the "Mahayana
doctrinal emphasis that samsara and nirvana were not ontologically separate realities").
369. A problem might also arise if the teacher was a proponent of one of those schools and
there was evidence that he or she intended to promote his or her version of the religion by
presenting it selectively. It is by no means impossible that one of these situations could arise.
As Diana Eck notes in her recent book, the American religious landscape has become
enormously pluralistic. See ECK, supra note 7, at 1-25.
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views. Schools can teach about the theory of evolution, even though
it contradicts the beliefs of many religious Americans?" And, as
Stephen Carter has suggested, no objective presentation of religion
would be complete without some mention of the "negative side" of
religion,3 71 such as wars, torture, slavery, and other evils committed
in religion's name. Even though teaching these facts and values
might offend some religious believers, such teaching does not violate
the Establishment Clause because it does not promote or endorse a
religious belief 72
Nonetheless, there may be some limits on what types of negative
messages schools can communicate about a particular religion or
religion generally. The Supreme Court's endorsement test prohibits
the government not only from expressing endorsement of religion,
but also from expressing disapproval of religion. As Justice
O'Connor put it in a relatively recent case: "[Elvery government
practice must be judged ...to determine whether it constitutes an
endorsement or disapproval of religion." 73 There has been little
examination of this part of the endorsement test by either courts or
commentators,3 74 and it is therefore unclear how far the disapproval
prohibition reaches. The Court certainly has never applied it to
prohibit schools from teaching subjects that offend religious
believers, and it appears unlikely that it ever would apply it in such
370. For a discussion of the history of the creationism-evolution debate in America, see Jay
D. Wexler, Note, Of Pandas, People, and the First Amendment: The Constitutionality of
TeachingIntelligentDesign in the PublicSchools, 49 STAN. L. REv. 439,444-51 (1997).
371. See CARTER, supra note 1, at 207.
372. See Peloza v. Capistrano Unified Sch. Dist., 37 F.3d 517, 521-22 (9th Cir. 1994)
(rejecting claim that school violated Establishment Clause by requiring teacher to teach
evolution or secular humanism). Objections to teaching such topics are treated, if at all, under
the Free Exercise Clause, which entitles religious objectors, in some situations, to opt out of
generally applicable laws and practices. For a discussion of the Free Exercise Clause in this
context, see infra text accompanying notes 375-88.
373. Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) (quotingLynchv. Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 694 (O'Connor, J., concurring)); see also
Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,249 (1990) ("Because the Act on its face grants equal
access to both secular and religious speech, we think it clear that the Act's purpose was not
to 'endorse or disapprove of religion.').
374. For one brief discussion, see Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment is Not Establishment,
13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. PoLy 341, 368-70 (1999). Volokh argues that the
disapproval formulation, as well as other Court expressions of evenhandedness, prevents the
government from discriminating against religion in operating an open educational subsidy
program. See also Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. Cm. L.
REV. 115, 151-53 (1992).
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a fashion. It is quite possible, however, that a court would find that
a direct criticism of some aspect of religious belief or practice does
violate the prohibition on government disapproval of religion. For
example, if in a class on evolution a teacher said that the scientific
evidence proved that God did not exist or that the Bible was wrong,
a court might hold the teacher's actions unconstitutional. Likewise,
it might very well violate the Establishment Clause for a teacher to
disparage a particular religious belief or text or practice during a
religious studies class by, for example, saying that Buddhist views
on reincarnation are ridiculous or intimating through body language
that the Hindu God Ganesha is absurd because he has the head of
an elephant."7 5
Once schools recognize that such disapproving statements and
actions might violate the Constitution, it is unlikely that they will
occur with any frequency. (One would hope that it does not take the
Constitution to reach this result.) Although there may be close
cases-which are unlikely, in any event, to give rise to much
litigation, because it is unlikely they will be found by courts to be
unconstitutional-schools can ensure that teachers do not even
come close to the disapproval line through the use of good materials,
training, and guidelines. If they so desire, teachers can still
introduce criticisms of religion into class discussions by putting
them in the mouths of those intellectual figures, for example Freud
or Marx, who have espoused them. This use of attribution-for
example: "Marx thinks religion is the opiate of the masses. How
might a Zoroastrian respond to Marx's criticisms?"--takes the
disapproval out of the mouth of the government, and thus the reach
of the First Amendment, while still allowing the teacher to use the
criticisms to develop students' analytical thinking skills.
G. IncidentalBurden on Religious Believers
One important critique of teaching about religion that this Article
has not yet discussed and that dovetails with an important
constitutional issue is the religious critique of the religious studies
project. Some deeply religious people object to the idea of teaching
religion objectively in the public schools because such an approach
375. On the worship of Ganesha in the United States, see ECK, supra note 7, at 120-23.
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to religion encourages a dangerous attitude of relativism 7 6 and
devalues religion by making it seem like choosing a religion is like
choosing a product, a "styl[e] of dress,"37 7 or any other good or
service up for sale in a market economy. This critique is certainly a
valid one from the perspective' of those who do not believe that
religious beliefs are, in Michael Sandel's terms, the "product of free
and voluntary choice by the faithful."378 As Nomi Stolzenberg puts
it, "to its opponents, the objective study of religion, and objective
approaches to knowledge in general, are quintessentially secular
humanist activities."37 9 It is bad enough, these critics might claim,
that the public schools systematically imply-through their science
curriculum, lack of prayer, and other means-that religion is
unimportant, but to actually teach students that religion is
something one chooses, and that there are many viable religious
choices, is simply intolerable.
Although this is an important critique, it fails to defeat the case
for teaching about religion for civic purposes for several reasons.
First, it is unclear whether the harm suffered by those who would
object to such teaching would outweigh the significant societal
benefits, described earlier, that would be gained if students were to
learn about religion. This is particularly true given that, according
to those actually working with real communities to implement such
teaching about religion programs, the number of religious objectors
is in fact quite small, 8 0 and school leaders can often accommodate
the concerns of those objectors by making sure that the process
through which teaching about religion programs are implemented
is inclusive, deliberative, and civil in nature.3"' Second, the religious
376. E.g., Stolzenberg, supra note 151, at 665 ("Indeed, it seems plausible that continued
exposure to a curriculum denying certainty about the truth and adopting an objective, neutral
perspective might lead children away from the fundamentalist faith or at least might make
them self-conscious about it.").
377. MACEDO, supra note 56, at 70.
378. SANDEL, supranote 198, at 63-64 (1996) (emphasis omitted).
379. Stolzenberg, supranote 152, at 614.
380. FINDING COmiON GROUND, supra note 32, at 1*6 (indicating that although"there are
extreme voices in the debate, we know from experience that most teachers, parents, and
administrators, and school board members are committed to a principled dialogue, andto fair,
open public schools. This includes the vast majority of parents often labeled as members of
the 'religious right.').
381. See id.
If the resulting agreements and policies are to inspire broad support in the
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objection to teaching about religion is adequately countered by the
fact that the current curriculum, through its silence on religious
matters, is widely viewed by many-including conservative
Christians-as hostile to religion. Teaching about religion, in other
words, despite its inherently secular qualities, is viewed by many as
a remedy for the current marginalization of religion in public life
and is, on balance, highly supportive of religious ways of life.382
Third, teachers and schools can take steps, through disclaimers and
other means, to make religious parents feel more comfortable with
religious studies classes.
But teaching about religion in the face ofopposition from religious
believers raises the constitutional cost issue by inviting religious
believers to bring Free Exercise lawsuits seeking judicially mandated exemptions from religious studies classes. As a matter of Free
Exercise doctrine, it is unlikely that such lawsuits would succeed.
The one circuit court to consider a similar claim held that there was
no Free Exercise right to an exemption from a class teaching
tolerance, on grounds that such a class did not impose a burden on
the free exercise of religion. 8 3 Although the Supreme Court's Smith
community, all stakeholders must be fully represented in the discussion. When
reaching out to critics of the schools, particularly conservative religious groups,
school leaders must look beyond stereotypes to find those representatives most
interested in dialogue and consensus. Given the lack of civility in the public
square of America today, it is not easy to build bridges of understanding and
trust, but it can be done.
Me; see also Felsenthal, supra note 129, at Al ("In district after district, Mr. Haynes has won
praise for defusing hostile rhetoric and designing religion policies endorsed by people on both
ends of the political spectrum .... Even as extremists continue to use the issue as a social
wedge, the fight is winding down in most of the country.").
382. NORD & HAYNES, supra note 3, at 2 ("[Many religious conservatives are outraged by
[the fact that the curriculum all but ignores religion]; they take the absence of religion to
imply a hostility to religion."); id. at 16 ("The greater risk, however, is to ignore the distrust
and discontent that have led many parents to conclude, fairly or unfairly, that public schools
are hostile to their faith and values."); id. at 25 ("We are convinced that the current
curriculum does inhibit religion by marginalizing religion in our intellectual and cultural life,
(implicitly) conveying the sense that religion is irrelevant in the search for truth in the
various domains of the curriculum .... "); NoRD, supra note 3, at 8 ("What liberals seldom
acknowledge is that by ignoring religion, and by promoting secular views hostile to religion,
public education in effect takes sides against religion.").
383. E.g., Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (denying
Free Exercise exemption claims in connection with reading course designed to teach
tolerance). The scholarly commentary on whether schools should be required to grant
exemptions to objecting students, whether as a matter of constitutional law or political (or
educational) theory, is substantial. For a sampling of this literature, see Shelley Burtt,
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decision limiting Free Exercise protections contains an exception for
claims involving both a Free Exercise right and the right of parents
to direct the education of their children, 8 ' it is far from clear that
the Court would find that a religious studies class either imposed a
burden on religious belief or that, if it did impose a burden, the
burden was not justified by a compelling state interest. 35'
Even so, schools should be very wary of requiring students to take
a class that they (or their parents) strenuously object to taking on
religious grounds. Not only will such a requirement encourage
litigation, however unsuccessful it may prove to be, but more
importantly it will cause dissension in the community and undercut
support for the program as a whole. Instead, schools should consider
designing the classes as electives which students must opt into,388
or as mandatory classes with an opt-out provision.38 7 Although
Religious Parents, Secular Schools: A Liberal Defense of an Illiberal Education, 56 REV.
POLITICS 51, 53 (1993) ("I argue in this article for a strong principle of parental deference
under which most parental objections to particular aspects of the public school curriculum are
both respected and accommodated."); Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools:
Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27 SEON HALL L. REV. 1194, 1224 (1997) (indicating
that the "effort to make sure that all children are educated in the same way is just as
totalitarian now as it was in the nineteenth century when Protestant nativists were doing it.
It is simply a means of limiting the range of diversity and, thus, the range of possible
dissent."); Dent, supra note 22, at 880-905; William A. Galston, Two Concepts ofLiberalism,
105 ETHICS 516,516 (1995) ("This essay may be understood as an effort to say why I believe
the Yoder holding was philosophically correct and to explore the wider implications of this
judgment for the theory and practice of contemporary liberal democratic citizenship."); Gilles,
supranote 292, at 938 ("There are compelling reasons to give parents not only the right to
transmit their values to their children, but also the right to reject schooling that promotes
values contrary to their own."); Gutmann, supra note 153, at 565-70 (defending decision in
Mozert); Mary-Michelle Upson Hirschoff, Parentsand the PublicSchool Curriculum:Is There
a Right to Have One's Child Excused From ObjectionableInstruction?, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 871
(1977); Macedo, supranote 251, at 485 ("As a matter of basic principle at least, we have good
reason to refuse the Mozert families' request to opt out."); Stolzenberg, supra note 152
(analyzingMozert from perspective of fundamentalist families).
384. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
385. On this last point, seeMozert, 827 F.2d at 1071 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (finding that
even if there was a burden on free exercise rights, it was justified by the compelling interest
in teaching civility and other citizenship skills).
386. NORD & HAYNES, supra note 3, at 23 ("A number of schools have added another
dimension to their excusal policies-one that is popular with many parents: opt in.").
387. Id. at 22 (arguing that school officials should take religious requests for
accommodation seriously). It appears that many school districts do include either opt-in or
opt-out provisions in their guidelines for teaching about religion. See, e.g., DAVIS COUNTY,
UTAH, SCHOOL DISTRCT POLICY AND PROCEDURES § 16.7, reprinted in FINDING ComiON
GROUND, supra note 32, at 16*11 ("A request for waiver shall not be denied unless school
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designing the classes in such a way will undercut to some-probably
limited 3 -- extent the advantages of teaching about religion, by
allowing some subgroup of students to opt-out of the class, it will
better ensure that the program is actually implemented, will still
yield substantial civic benefits for those who do take the class, and
will substantially decrease the risk of constitutional litigation. 9 It
will also demonstrate that schools recognize the importance of
religious belief and religious tolerance, which, after all, is the very
point of teaching about religion in the first place.
CONCLUSION

In her significant recent work, Payingthe Words Extra:Religious
Discourse in the Supreme Court of the United States, lawyer and
now Dean of Students at the University of Chicago Divinity School
Winnifred Fallers Sullivan argues that
the encounter of American law and American religion will be
more successful if American lawyers, judges, and legal scholars
enrich their discourse about American religion by participating
in and contributing to a larger conversation about the nature of
human religion and of the relationship of religion and culture
and society.' 90

officials determine that requiring the participation of the student is the least restrictive
means necessary to achieve a compelling school interest."); RAMONA, CALIFORNIA UNIFIED
SCHOOL DIsmICT POLICY, reprinted in FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 32, at 16*27

("Students will be excused, when feasible from lessons/activities which their parents find
objectionable for religious reasons."); ST. LOUIS PARK PUBLIC SCHOOLS, MINNEAPOLIS,
MINNESOTA GUIDELINES § 4(A)(1), reprintedin FINDING COMMON GROUND, supra note 32, at

16*36 (providing that courses in the history, sociology, and literature of religions must be
elective); WICOMICO COUNTYBOARD OF EDUCATION, SALISBURY, MARYLAND GUIDELINES § 4(A),

reprintedin FINDINGCOMMON GROUND, supranote 32, at 16 *24 ("[S]chool administrators and
teachers will allow students to be excused, where it is feasible, from activities that are
contrary to religious beliefs.").
388. Most objectors, it appears, can be convinced that the course is a good idea. See supra
text accompanying notes 378-80.
389. It is quite likely that the opt out would survive constitutional scrutiny, particularly
ifit is broadly worded. See, e.g., Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S.
327, 334-37 (1987) (discussing constitutional standard for accommodating religious beliefs).
It is also hard to see who would bring a lawsuit challenging an opt-out procedure. Offering the
course as an elective, as opposed to an opt-out, will eliminate any chance of litigation.
390. SULLIVAN, supra note 201, at 45.
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What Sullivan counsels for lawyers, judges, and legal scholars rings
equally true for all citizens. In our religiously clothed public square,
a great many Americans rely on their deeply held religious beliefs
when they talk about and decide how they feel about nearly every
major issue of public importance, including issues involving law.
When government (at all levels, from the local to the federal) enacts
laws and takes other actions to deal with these public issues, it
inevitably affects religion in a variety of ways. The Supreme Court
has said that it is largely the citizen's responsibility, not the Court's
responsibility, to evaluate whether government has made the right
choices when its actions affect religion. If Americans are going to
understand what is happening in their public life-to understand
why our fellow citizens make the decisions they do, and to
understand the true impact of our government's decisions-then all
citizens, not just those trained in law, must enrich their understanding of religion and its relationship with society and the state.
This Article has argued that Supreme Court opinions are right
when they say that public schools should teach students about
religion, and it has offered a sustained theoretical defense of that
position. Schools should teach about religion to prepare students for
citizenship in a nation and in a world suffused with religion. The
Constitution places some limits on how public schools should go
about this important project, but, as various members of the
Supreme Court have repeatedly and rightly recognized, it by no
means stands in the way.

